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Abstract
By granting universities the rights to assert ownership of intellectual property (IP)
resulting from United States (US) federally sponsored research, the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980 has stimulated considerable interest from policymakers around the world.
Inspired by the US example, the Australian government has introduced a similar patent
policy to encourage the commercialisation of publicly funded research. Research
institutions have quickly responded to this policy and established technology transfer
offices (TTOs) to manage the identification, protection and exploitation of IP created
by their employees. It is often assumed that this IP-based approach accelerates the
transfer of new inventions from academia to industry and helps to generate national
benefits and social return from public investment in research.
This thesis provides a case study of the commercialisation of publicly funded research
in the biotechnology sector in Australia. Following mainly a qualitative approach, the
study explores the rise of the research commercialisation phenomenon by tracking its
historical origins, key turning points and their present ramifications. It also examines
the perceptions, motivation and experiences of various participants such as academic
scientists, technology transfer managers, entrepreneurs/CEOs and private investors.
At the individual level, an important finding of this study was that the term research
commercialisation is understood differently by different participants. Two main views
were identified which not only differ semantically, but also in their objectives, time-
scales, assumptions and measures of success. The clarification of these views enables
the participants to better understand each other and minimise unproductive debates.
At the institutional level, this study revealed that by focusing on the exploitation of
IP resulting from publicly funded research, Australia’s current TTO-based structural
arrangements may interfere with the flow of scientific discoveries from academia to
v
industry and encourage academic inventors and entrepreneurs to bypass the TTOs.
Explanations for these unexpected outcomes are given and suggestions for possible
improvement are discussed.
Although this study is based on the biotechnology sector in Australia, the research
findings may have important implications for any other sectors and for other countries
with similar structural arrangements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Man cannot discover new oceans unless he has the courage to lose sight
of the shore.
Andre´ P. G. Gide
(1947 Nobel Laureate in Literature)
1.1 Background
Over the last few decades, universities and public research organisations around the
world have greatly expanded their involvement in patenting, licensing and spin-off1
activities. A new term, research commercialisation, has recently been introduced to
describe this phenomenon (Markman, Siegel, & Wright, 2008; Rothaermel, Agung, &
Jiang, 2007). The meaning of the term research commercialisation is often explicitly
assumed in literature. For the scope of this thesis, it is defined as the transfer of a new
scientific discovery from academia to industry.
Many observers have attributed the recent rise of research commercialisation to the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and subsequent similar legislations and policies
in other OECD countries (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004). The Bayh-
Dole Act is a US federal government patent policy which makes it easier for universities
to retain ownership of intellectual property (IP) resulting from government sponsored
research. It has frequently been portrayed as a policy success for facilitating the
transfer of university inventions to industry. For example, OECD (2002) argued that
1A university spin-off is a company founded to exploit intellectual property created in an academic
institution (Shane, 2004, p. 4)
1
such legislation “provides greater legal certainty, lowers the transaction costs, and
fosters more and efficient channels for technology transfer” (p. 3).
Inspired by the US example, the Australian government has introduced the National
Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research (ARC
et al., 2001). Although these principles are not formal legislations, they encourage
public research organisations and universities to assert ownership of IP created by
their employees in the course of their research work.
Apart from the introduction of the national principles, the Australian government
has implemented various instruments to promote the commercialisation of publicly
funded research, particularly in the biotechnology sector (Zhao, 2004). Over 200
programs have recently been launched to support research commercialisation. The
average annual expenditure on these programs is approximately $3.7 billion (Cutler,
Cutler & Company, & DIISR, 2008). With this tremendous amount of investment, the
government expects that “the exploitation of research will need to become an integral
part of the research process” (ARC, 2000, p. 33) and “universities must introduce
strategies to stimulate and facilitate increased transfer of knowledge to business and
society” (Batterham, 2000, p. 88).
In response to government expectations, Australian universities and public research
organisations have developed policies and systems to manage and support research
commercialisation. Technology transfer offices (TTOs) have been established on most
campuses to facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries from academia to industry.
Under the current structural arrangements, TTOs are primarily concerned with IP-
based channels. Most of their efforts are focused on the identification, protection and
exploitation of IP generated within their research institutions (Allen Consulting Group,
2004; ACI, Howard Partners & Carisgold, 2002).
2
Figure 1.1 Articles published on research commercialisation, 1981–2005.
Source: Rothaermel et al. (2007, p. 6).
1.2 Classification of Existing Studies
The rise of the research commercialisation phenomenon has attracted considerable
interest from scholars (Figure 1.1). Between 1981 and 2005 at least 173 journal
articles have been published on this topic. Based on a comprehensive review of these
articles, Rothaermel et al. (2007) divided existing research into four main areas: (a)
entrepreneurial university, (b) productivity of TTOs, (c) new firm creation, and (d)
environmental context.
Studies from the entrepreneurial university area are concerned with organisational
designs that enhance or hamper research commercialisation. These studies typically
revolve around incentive systems, university status, location and culture (Argyres &
Liebeskind, 1998; Etzkowitz, 2003; Owen-Smith, 2003, 2005).
Research from the productivity of TTOs area is concerned with the identification of
factors that drive the performance of TTOs. Most measures of productivity are focused
on the numbers of invention disclosures, patents and licences, royalties and equity
positions. Based on these performance measures, several factors have been shown to
3
be linked to the productivity of TTOs. These factors include university environment,
structure and staffing of the TTO, mechanisms of technology transfer, and nature and
stage of technology (Debackere & Veugelers, 2005; Siegel, Veugelers, & Wright,
2007; Siegel, Waldman, & Link, 2003a).
Studies from the new firm creation research area are focused on the spin-off route for
commercialising university research. These studies have described a number of factors
that affect the creation of university spin-offs, e.g. TTOs, university policy, investors,
founding teams, underlying technology and external conditions (Di Gregorio & Shane,
2003; Lerner, 2005; Lockett & Wright, 2005).
Research from the environmental context area places research commercialisation in
the context of innovation networks. These studies are generally focused on science
parks, incubators and differences in geographic location (Phan, Siegel, & Wright,
2005; Zucker & Darby, 1996).
A common characteristic of the current literature on research commercialisation is
that most studies are concerned with the US and European settings. A few scholars
pointed out that experience drawn from Stanford, MIT or a few other successful cases
in the US, cannot be directly applied to other nations due to their different economical,
cultural and institutional contexts (Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003; Klofsten & Jones-
Evans, 2000; Mowery & Sampat, 2005).
A review of the research commercialisation literature shows that there is only a handful
of scholarly investigations that are focused on the Australian context. These Australian-
based studies are primarily concerned with specific issues or particular experience
in research commercialisation. For example, Yencken (2005) examined the role of
spin-off companies in the commercialisation of university and other public research
agency research outcomes. Both Thorburn (2000a) and Upstill and Symington (2002)
analysed the commercialisation experience of Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
4
Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia’s largest R&D organisation. Harman and
Stone (2006) investigated the characteristics and experience of university technology
transfer managers. Zhao (2004) reviewed recent government policy changes affecting
the commercialisation of university research.
Building upon the work of these scholars, Collier (2008) recently conducted a PhD
study on university commercialisation in Australia. The objectives of his study were to
find out why some universities apparently exhibited superior performance in research
commercialisation and to identify the characteristics they possessed. Using a case
study methodology which involved 8 Australian universities, 5 overseas universities
and 5 small-and-medium enterprises, this study found that factors such as institutional
and senior executive support, superior TTO management, world-class research and
size of university all influence the performance of universities. His research findings
were in agreement with a report commissioned by the Australian government (Allen
Consulting Group, 2004). Both provided a rich description of specific issues that are
relevant to the Australian context.
Although many important variables have been identified, existing studies on research
commercialisation are fragmented. They often fall into a number of disjoint disciplines
such as innovation, sociology, management, economics, education and history. There
is no connected structure that ties together the current separate subfields of study of
research commercialisation. This makes review, much less integration, of what is
known rather difficult.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
As described in the previous section, despite the burgeoning literature on research
commercialisation, very few studies are focused on the Australian setting. Our current
understanding of the phenomenon is limited to a number of semi-isolated research
5
streams and disciplinary perspectives. There is a need for interdisciplinary efforts
to systemically reflect upon Australia’s experience and draw some important lessons
that are specific to this country’s institutional context. Achieving a broader integrated
perspective can be helpful for thinking about research commercialisation and guiding
future research and policy.
Typically social science research is carried out within a certain tradition. According
to Jacob (1989), “the concept of tradition focuses our attention on assumptions that
researchers make about the nature of the universe, theory, legitimate questions and
problems, and appropriate methodologies” (pp. 229–230). This concept has been
useful for guiding research and making sense of the diversity of research in a field.
However, we must be careful not to allow it to cloud our vision or restrict our horizon
(Atkinson, Delamont, & Hammersley, 1988). There are specific circumstances where
researchers do not share the assumptions of existing traditions or find existing traditions
inadequate (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1977). Under these circumstances, scholars may
need to take holistic perspective and draw upon multiple traditions or disciplines to
offer new viewpoints, raise new questions, provide ways of answering these questions
and suggest new explanations (Stember, 1991).
This study adopts a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. The overarching purpose
is to develop an interconnected intellectual structure that brings various elements of
the research commercialisation process within the Australian context into harmonious
relationships. To achieve this purpose, the following guiding research questions were
formulated at the beginning of the study:
1. How is research commercialisation perceived by Australian participants?
2. How do Australia’s current TTO-based structural arrangements facilitate
the transfer of new scientific discoveries from academia to industry?
6
The first research question is concerned with describing and interpreting the meaning,
motivation, attitudes and views of various participants towards the commercialisation
of publicly funded research.
The second research question is concerned with Australia’s structural implementation
of research commercialisation. Our current TTO-based structural arrangements have
been developed based on the US best known practice. Driven by the desire to maximise
economic and social return from public investment in research, much of our effort
is focused on the transfer and exploitation of IP created by universities and public
research organisation. This research question seeks to explore how such structural
arrangements facilitate the research commercialisation process.
Following mainly a qualitative approach with inductive logic, this study proceeded
without having pre-conceived frameworks to maximise the probability of discovering
new insights. The two research questions provided a useful guide for the empirical
exploration of the phenomenon within the Australian setting. However, the study
was not limited to answering these two questions and aimed to go beyond them.
The final outcome was the development of conceptual frameworks and models that
integrate various pieces of knowledge about the research commercialisation process in
Australia.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis explores the research commercialisation phenomenon in the Australian
local setting. The structure of the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the exploratory case study methodology employed in this study
and explains why the biotechnology sector was purposely chosen as an extreme case.
Research design issues of validity, generalisability and ethical consideration are also
7
discussed in this chapter.
The subsequent two chapters establish the context of research commercialisation through
reviewing its historical development.
Chapter 3 tracks the origins of university patenting and licensing activities, describes
the early technology transfer practice and the key turning points. It also explains how
research commercialisation evolved and came to the university agenda in Australia.
Chapter 4 reviews the general environment created by the Australian government to
promote research commercialisation, and the support and management structures that
have been implemented by the research institutions.
The next three chapters provide a rich description of the empirical data obtained from
semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Relevant documents and other
available data from secondary sources were also used to provide additional support.
Chapter 5 addresses the first research question of this study and describes how research
commercialisation is perceived by different participants.
Chapter 6 investigates the second research question of this study from two different
angles. The first part describes the participants’ research commercialisation experience
through the TTOs. The second part of this chapter examines the performance of the
TTOs mainly using secondary data.
Chapter 7 presents some interesting findings that emerged from this exploratory study
and explains why some participants went around the TTOs to commercialise their
research results.
Chapter 8 provides further analysis of the empirical data of this study and clarifies
the confusion and contradiction that are often associated with our current TTO-based
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structural arrangements. Several conceptual frameworks and models for thinking about
research commercialisation were introduced.
Chapter 9 summarises the research findings, presents the main contributions and the
limitations of this study, and provides directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Research Methodology
Discovery consists of seeing what everybody else has seen, and thinking
what nobody else has thought.
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi
(1937 Nobel Laureate in Medicine)
2.1 Introduction
This chapter justifies the research methodology used in this study and discusses various
research design issues. To achieve the overarching purpose of this study and to best
answer the two research questions, I followed the recommendations of Eisenhardt
(1989) and adopted mainly a qualitative approach with inductive logic. An exploratory
case study strategy was used to examine the research commercialisation phenomenon
taking place in the Australian setting. I purposely selected the biotechnology sector
for my exploratory case study due to its extreme manifestations. Biotechnology is the
sector where IP resulting from publicly funded research is most relevant to commercial
outcomes (Bessen & Meurer, 2008; Stokes, 1997), and it is also the sector where most
of the research commercialisation activities have occurred (DEST, 2004).
Data collection for the case utilised a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. I
used qualitative methods for primary data collection. This included 32 semi-structured
face-to-face interviews and participant observation. In addition to qualitative methods,
documents and archival records from secondary sources were also employed to provide
quantitative data and additional support. The use of multiple sources of data allowed
triangulation and strengthened the research findings.
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To analyse the empirical data, I adhered to the strategies described by Miles and
Huberman (1994). Derivation of conceptual frameworks and models was guided by
the theory-building process of Christensen (2006).
At the end of this chapter, I discussed the validity and generalisability of this study
together with ethical considerations.
2.2 Research Approach and Strategy
2.2.1 Qualitative Approach
Qualitative research is based on the belief that there is no one universal truth, because
the social world is an outcome of the dynamic interaction of human beings. It is
concerned with describing, interpreting and understanding the meanings which people
attribute to their existence and to their world (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a qualitative
approach emphasises the specific context or setting in which people live and work.
It is fundamentally well-suited for locating the meanings they place on events and
processes. Often subjective meanings are forged in discussion or interaction with
participants and through social and cultural norms that operate in their lives. The
process of qualitative research is largely inductive which allows the development of
theories or patterns from the data collected in the field (Audet & d’Amboise, 2001;
Morgan & Smircich, 1980).
By contrast, the traditional mode of scientific inquiry, also known as quantitative
research, assumes that there are laws or theories that govern the world which need
to be objectively verified and refined. It reflects a deterministic philosophy in which
causes determine or influence outcomes. The focus on quantitative approach lies in
formulating and testing hypotheses (Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Popper, 1959).
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Miles and Huberman (1994) and Creswell (2003) suggest that researchers should use
a qualitative research design when there is a need for an in-depth understanding, local
contextualisation and potential for causal inferences. Commercialisation of publicly
funded research is a dynamic and multifaceted process which involves a variety of
players and relationships. It is difficult to objectively measure the perceptions and
viewpoints of key participants of commercialisation through quantitative indicators.
Moreover, a quantitative approach can not capture the socially constructed and “living”
nature of the underlying process. Hence, a qualitative research design was considered
to be more suitable for achieving the objective of this study. A qualitative approach
not only allows exploration of emerging issues, but also facilitates the development
of conceptual frameworks or models for further research (Audet & d’Amboise, 2001;
Morgan & Smircich, 1980).
2.2.2 Inductive Logic
Inductive logic is a reasoning process that draws generalised conclusions from specific
observations. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, this process typically begins by observing
and describing the phenomenon. During this step, constructs are often developed.
They are abstract ideas that describe the essence of what the phenomenon is and how it
operates. The second step involves classifying the phenomenon into categories. These
description categorisation schemes are often referred as frameworks or typologies. In
the third step, the association between attributes of the phenomenon and outcomes
of interest is defined. A conceptual model is then developed to describe the general
tendency. Figure 2.1 is a simplified representation of the inductive logic; but in
practice, the research process reiterates these steps again and again. There are multiple
feedback loops which are tightly linked to data.
This study followed mainly a qualitative approach with inductive logic. Rather than
being confined by pre-conceived frameworks and pre-defined variables, I began the
12
Gather data through fieldwork and secondary sources  of information
Analyse data to form themes or general categories
Make generalisation 
Figure 2.1 A simplified illustration of the inductive logic of a qualitative research.
research with an open mind to maximise the probability of discovering new insights.
The dynamics of the commercialisation of publicly funded research was understood
based on empirical findings, not with an expectation or configuration of any particular
factor. Through the inductive analysis of data collected in the field, the end point of my
research was to make generalisations based on an interconnected set of concepts and
relationships. The frameworks and models developed would assist our understanding
of the research commercialisation phenomenon and serve as a basis for further studies.
The theory-building process will be discussed in more detail in section 2.6.
2.2.3 Case Study Strategy
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534) defines a case study as a “research strategy which focuses
on understanding the dynamics present within single settings”. It is particularly useful
when a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a set of contemporary events
over which the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 2003, p. 1). A case study
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allows depth of analysis, a holistic view of the relationships and processes in the
actual real-world situation (Denscombe, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 1994). There
are three main types of case studies: descriptive, exploratory and explanatory. A
descriptive case study represents a complete description of a phenomenon within its
real-life context. An exploratory case study investigates uncharted territory and is
aimed at defining the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study. An explanatory
type attempts to identify the causal link based upon existing theory and focuses on
explaining how or why particular situations or outcomes occurred. (Yin, 2003).
Out of these three types of case studies, I chose an exploratory case study research
strategy because the available literature on the commercialisation of publicly funded
research in the Australian context is very limited. An exploratory case study offers
the potential for revealing the richness, holism and complexity of the phenomenon and
encourages interesting discoveries and deep appreciation of a situation so that useful
conceptual frameworks may be developed (Yin, 2003).
2.2.4 Case Selection
The choice of a case influences the quality and the confidence of the conclusions. In
qualitative research, “information rich” cases, i.e. the ones which provide empirical
and theoretical significance, are often deliberately chosen. Miles and Huberman (1994,
p. 34) note that three types of cases have the greatest payoff in purposive case selection:
• Typical Cases – those who are “normal” or “average” for those being studied;
• “Deviant” or Extreme Cases – those who represent unusual manifestations of
the phenomenon of interest; and
• “Negative” or Disconfirming Cases – those who are “exceptions to the rule”.
14
In this study, I adopted a sectoral approach and purposively chose the biotechnology
industry as an extreme case. Each industry has its distinct sets of characteristics and
what works for research commercialisation in one sector may not apply to an other.
Therefore, there is a need to segregate the phenomenon by sector (Druilhe & Garnsey,
2004). Malerba (2002) stated that the main advantage of taking a sectoral approach is
that it allows a better grasp of the structure and boundaries of a given field, the agents
and their interactions, the learning, innovation and production processes.
The biotechnology sector represents an unusual case in the commercialisation of the
publicly funded research in Australia. There are several reasons behind why I selected
this sector for the case study.
First, biotechnology is the sector where university-generated IP is most relevant to
commercial outcomes (Bessen & Meurer, 2008; Mansfield, 1998; Mowery et al., 2004;
Stokes, 1997). Existing studies show that in most industries, patents and licences
involving university inventions are of relative little importance (Cohen, Nelson, &
Walsh, 2002). By contrast, in the biotechnology industry, IP is perceived as a key
enabling factor in the process of technology development (OECD, 2004).
Second, biotechnology is the sector that most heavily reliant on public sector research
(Audretsch & Stephan, 1996; McMillan, Narin, & Deeds, 2000; Nakamura & Dalpe´,
2003). Unlike other industries, a large proportion of biotechnology companies are
founded or co-founded by university scientists. These companies often began life
as “virtual enterprises”, with no physical assets and few full-time employees. They
maintain extremely close links to universities (Pisano, 2006; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer,
1998). A survey conducted by Research Australia showed that in 2004, 66% of
the biotechnology companies in Australia originated from the universities (Research
Australia, 2004).
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Figure 2.2 Sectors of research spin-offs established between 1971 and 2000.
Source: adapted from Thornburn (2000b, p. 7).
Figure 2.3 Licences executed by public research institutions in 2001 and 2002.
Source: DEST (2004, p. 24).
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Last but not least, biotechnology is the only sector where the majority of the research
commercialisation activities in Australia have occurred (DEST, 2004). Thornburn
(2000b) showed that out of 198 research spin-off companies established between 1971
and 2000, 39% of them happened in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors
(Figure 2.2). The majority of recent licensing activities which involved IP resulting
from public sector research also occurred in the biotechnology sector. According to a
recent government survey (DEST, 2004), in 2001 and 2002, almost half of all licences
originated from the biotechnology and health related fields (Figure 2.3)
2.3 Research Design
The research design is a logical plan that links the research questions being posed to an
appropriate data collection strategy and analysis. My research design mostly followed
the recommendations of Eisenhardt (1989) with slight modification (Table 2.1).
I began with a body of literature to identify key issues and unanswered questions.
Based on my education in life sciences and innovation management, work experience
in both university and industry, and extensive reading, two research questions were
formulated at the beginning of this study to guide the research. At the individual
participant level, I was interested to find out how various participants really behave
and what they actually mean when they describe their research commercialisation
experience and attitudes. At the institutional level, I wanted to uncover how our current
TTO-based structural arrangements facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries from
academia to industry.
To answer my research questions, I needed to use a qualitative approach that allowed
flexible investigation of issues. Within the qualitative approach, I found the exploratory
case study was the most appropriate research strategy for addressing the research
questions of my study. I purposively selected the biotechnology sector as an extreme
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case because of its unusual manifestations (described in section 2.2.4).
Before commencing any fieldwork, I conducted an in-depth review of the existing
literature to explore the historical roots of research commercialisation. This allowed
me to identify key ideas and turning points that formed the backbone of our current
TTO-based structural arrangements. Specifically, I was trying to understand how
academic patenting, licensing and spin-off activities came to the university agenda
in Australia, with an eye to thinking about their current resonance and ramifications.
My review incorporated various social, political and cultural perspectives, rather than
being bounded by a specific discipline.
After I understood the historical context in which the phenomenon had emerged, I
explored how our current commercialisation environment has been shaped by the
Australian government and the institutional support and management structures that
have been implemented. This analysis enabled me to identify the key participant
groups with which to target and develop initial interview questions.
As the research proceeded, I undertook a pilot study in Canberra to ascertain key issues
and assess the quality of my initial interview questions. The pilot results confirmed
that the research approach made sense given how the participants described their
experience, perceptions and feelings. The participants also helped me to gain insight
from the real world and deepened my understanding. From this pilot study, I adjusted
and refined the interview questions. More specific probes were included to allow
further exploration.
The subsequent fieldwork involved 32 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. In
addition to conducting these interviews, I also undertook the role of a R&D associate at
an Australian biotechnology company over a period of 8 months to collect participant
observation data. As data were collected and analysed, a more complex and deeper
understanding emerged which led to further changes in interview questions and a
search for certain types of archival data. Relevant documents and archival records
from secondary sources were also used to provide additional support. Methods of
data collection and analysis will be described in detail in the next two sections of this
chapter.
Towards the end of this study, any additional interviews conducted added little to
the overall picture as no new significant themes or concepts were emerging. The
participant’s responses could almost be predicted. It was at this point I decided that
saturation had been reached. Saturation is when the incremental improvement to
the understanding of the phenomenon is minimal. When saturation is reached, the
researcher can conclude the study, because the benefit of further analysis is very
marginal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). There is no firmly defined
guideline to the number of participants that determines saturation. It is purely a
judgment call which is based on the informant’s responses.
2.4 Data Collection
2.4.1 Sampling Strategy
In this study, the sampling strategy was motivated by the desire to gain a broader
and integrated perspective of the research commercialisation process in the Australian
context. The underlying search was driven not by the amount of data to reach statistical
significance, but rather by the richness and credibility of data.
The richness and credibility of data were achieved through a two-stage sampling.
The first stage used a stratified approach together with purposive sampling to identify
specific research sites, whereas the second stage involved purposive sampling to select
individual participants.
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Table 2.1
Summary of The Inductive Research Process Used in This Study
Step Purpose Activity
1.
Formulating
research
questions
To focus research effort
• Based on literature and own
experience, two research questions
were formulated
2.
Selecting
cases
To identify useful cases, i.e. those
that provide conceptual categories
• Purposive sampling, not random
• Selected biotechnology as an
extreme case
3.
Crafting
protocols
To foster divergent perspectives
by triangulation of evidence • Used interviews & participant observatory
as the primary data collection methods,
supported by documentary and archival data
• Combined both qualitative and
quantitative evidence
4.
Collecting
data
To allow flexibility in data
collection process as new line
of thinking emerges
• Followed good ethics practice
• Wrote field notes on an ongoing
basis which involved both observation
and analysis
• Included additional interview
questions and data source to probe
emergent themes
5.
Analysing
data
To look beyond initial impressions
and see evidence through multiple
lenses
• Data management assisted by
computer program Nvivo
• Data were analysed at multiple
levels
6.
Deriving
models
To sharpen construct definition,
validity, and measurability, and
verify relationships
• Developed definition and measure
for constructs through constant
comparison with data
• Verified the emergent relationships
between constructs fit with the
empirical evidence
7.
Enfolding
literature
To build internal validity and
sharpen generalisability
• Comparison with similar evidence
in research commercialisation
literature
• Comparison with conflicting evidence
8.
Saturation
To conclude the process when
marginal improvement becomes
small
• Identified when saturation occurred
Source : adapted from Eisenhardt (1989, p. 533).
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Table 2.2
Research Sites Selected for Data Collection
University PRO/Research institute Private company
Australian National
University (ANU) –
Canberra
Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Organisation
(CSIRO) - Sydney &
Canberra Sites
Company A – Sydney
University of Sydney
(USYD) – Sydney
Research Institute A –
Sydney
Company B – Canberra
University of New South
Wales (UNSW) - Sydney
Research Institute B –
Brisbane
Company C – Brisbane
University of Queensland
(UQ) – Brisbane
Company D – Sydney
Macquarie University (MQ)
– Sydney
At the first stage, research sites were classified into the following 3 strata: universities,
research institutes and public research organisations, and private companies. This
selection frame did not include government departments (e.g. DEST, DIISR) due to the
difficulties in collecting qualitative data from policymakers. For simplicity, investors
were associated with the private companies stratum as they provided funding to these
companies.
The selection of a specific research site from the strata was based on two criteria:
geographical richness and credibility of data sources. I chose 3 out of 4 major cities
in Australia which host most intensive research in biotechnology1 (see Table 2.2).
Within the universities stratum, 4 selected universities belonged to the group of 8 (Go8)
which have the strongest reputation and receive the bulk of government funding2.
The University of Queensland was selected on purpose because it is considered to
be the best performing university in research commercialisation in Australia, thus
providing an atypical example. Within the research institutes and public research
1Most biotechnology research in Australia is carried out in major east coast cities, namely, Sydney,
Canberra, Brisbane and Melbourne.
2There are 39 publicly funded universities in Australia, but the research-intensive universities (the
group of 8 or Go8) attract approximately 70% of the nation’s total research funding each year (Milsom,
2003).
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organisations stratum, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Organisation was
chosen because it is the largest publicly funded research organisation in Australia.
Two leading medical research institutes were also included in the sample. Within the
private companies stratum, only biotechnology spin-offs with products in the market
place were selected. In summary, a total of 5 universities, 2 research institutes, 1
public research organisation and 4 spin-off companies were chosen as the research sites
(Table 2.2). To protect the participants’ identity, the names of the research institutes
and spin-off companies could not be disclosed due to their relatively small size.
At the second stage of sampling, the selection of individual participants was driven by
the desire to understand their experience in research commercialisation and patterns
of behaviour. To ensure the depth of experience and diversity of perspectives, the
individual participants were chosen based on two criteria: 1) have 5 years or more
experience in research commercialisation; and 2) come from one of the following key
stakeholder groups:
• Academic scientists who conduct research under government funding and have
made promising discoveries;
• Technology transfer managers who serve as a liaison between academia and
industry and manage their institution’s IP portfolio;
• Entrepreneurs and business managers (e.g. CEOs) from industry who further
develop the IP resulting from publicly funded research into new products or
service; and
• Private investors who provide venture capital to technology-based spin-offs.
At each university and research institute, academic scientists and technology transfer
managers were identified through the organisation’s annual reports and websites. CEOs,
22
business managers and entrepreneurs of spin-off companies were identified through
the AusBiotech industry directory which provides a comprehensive list of Australian
biotechnology companies and their key personnels.
In terms of sampling size, there was no intention to fix it to a pre-defined value.
Sampling continued until no new information was forthcoming or nothing new was
heard in the case of interviewing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
2.4.2 Overview of Data Collection Methods
Data collection in a case study needs triangulation, allowing converging lines of inquiry
so those research findings are stronger, more accurate and convincing (Yin, 2003). In
this study, three data collection methods were employed (Table 2.3). Each method has
its own comparative strengths and weaknesses. Data collection via semi-structured
interviews and participant observation were the primary means of gaining original
qualitative data, with documentary and archival data as secondary sources. Multiple
data sources and types foster deeper analysis and provide a rich picture.
2.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews
The primary data collection method used for this study was the face-to-face interview.
Doing face-to-face interviews is a good way of collecting qualitative data, as personal
interaction allows a deep exploration of the concepts and issues under investigation.
The face-to-face interview can encourage the participants to share opinions and to
dredge previously un-thought memories from the unconscious mind, thus uncovering
rich and complex information (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001, p. 138).
In designing the interview guide, I adopted a semi-structured approach which involved
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Table 2.3
Data Collection Methods Employed in This Study
Data collection
method
Purpose Strengths Weaknesses
Primary method
Semi-structured
face-to-face
interview
• Identify
participants’
perception,
motivation, patterns
of behaviour
and viewpoints
• Targeted -
focused directly
on case study
topic
• Insightful
• Response bias
• Reflexivity
Participant
observation
• Observe how
university research
is commercialised
within a company
• Observe how
scientific
discoveries are
transferred between
university and
industry
• Contextual - covers
context of event
• Insightful into
interpersonal
behaviour and
motives
• Reality - covers
events in real time
• Time consuming
and costly
• Bias due to
investigator’s
manipulation of
events
Secondary method
Documents or
archival records
• Track historical
development of
research
commercialisation
and examine current
structural
arrangements
• Examine research
commercialisation
performance using
survey data
• Stable -
can be reviewed
and repeated
• Broad coverage
• Contains precise
or exact info
• Reporting bias -
reflects bias of
author
• Biased selectivity,
if collection is
incomplete
Source: adapted from Yin (2003, p. 86).
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Table 2.4
Summary of Interview Participants by Stakeholder Groups
Stakeholder Group No. of Interviewees
Academic Scientists 11
Technology transfer managers /business development managers 9
CEOs and entrepreneurs of spin-offs 5
Private investors 4
Others (Vice Chancellors) 3
Total 32
a series of open-ended questions based on key issues and concerns that were central
to the case. Open-ended questions define the topic but also provide opportunities to
discuss some issues in more detail (Salkind, 1997). I used probes and cues to gain
a more complete answer where the question is difficult for the interviewee and/or
answers are brief.
Pilot testing is an important step to be undertaken prior to the commencement of
the fieldwork. It allows the researcher to identify key issues and to obtain some
assessment of the interview questions. This is to ensure that the data collected is as
relevant, reliable and suitable for analysis as possible. In this study, a series of pilot
interviews with academic scientists and technology transfer managers were carried out
in Canberra.
After the pilot study, interview questions were refined and a detailed interview guide
was developed to ensure the quality and consistency of the data collection. Similar
questions were asked of all participants, although some questions were tailored to a
particular group. A two-stage sampling was used in the selection of the interviewees.
Overall, 32 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were carried out which included
academic scientists, technology transfer managers or business development managers,
entrepreneurs and CEOs from biotechnology spin-off companies, private investors and
vice chancellors (Table 2.4). The interview guide is shown in Appendix C.
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Prior consent was obtained from individuals who agreed to participate in this study
(see Appendix D for consent form). Interviews were conducted at the premises of the
participants at dates and times suitable to them. The logistics of the interview process
required trips to Sydney, Brisbane and Canberra. Interviews were generally requested
to run for 40 minutes, or in the case of senior executives, half an hour. In practice,
however, individuals were more generous with their time and some interviews ran
over one hour. Throughout the interviews, I applied skills in active listening, reflecting
responses, paraphrasing and neutral probing to encourage a rich and fruitful discussion
and an accurate representation of what was disclosed.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim so as to accurately preserve
the comments made by the participants. Tape recording allowed me to concentrate
on questioning and listening and provided an accurate and unbiased record of what
was being said. The interview transcripts were subsequently checked for accuracy to
ensure data quality.
2.4.4 Participant Observation
Data collection via participant observation was another primary means of obtaining
original qualitative data in this study. Participant observation is a powerful way of
studying social settings and cultures. The observers become involved in the daily lives
of informants, observing them and noting their behaviours, emotions and interactions,
thus producing an “inside” portrayal of a case study phenomenon. This approach
also provides the opportunity to gain access to events or groups that are otherwise
inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 2003).
Participant observation is invaluable for understanding how a scientific discovery is
actually transferred from academia to industry. In this study, participant observation
was carried out over an 8 month period at a biotechnology spin-off company based in
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Sydney. During this period, I undertook the position of a R&D associate. The company
focuses on the research, development and commercialisation of new therapies for
respiratory and inflammatory diseases. As part of the R&D team, my role involved
developing and screening new lead compounds. As well as conducting research, I was
required to participate in a range of company meetings, briefings and discussions. This
experience provided me with the opportunity to observe and uncover how research
commercialisation actually occurs in a real world industry setting.
I have tried to be as reflexive as I could during this period. As my objective revolved
around gaining an understanding of the actual research commercialisation process
from an industry perspective, much of my reflexivity tended to focus on thinking about
the events, situations and processes in the field rather than addressing my personal
feelings. I kept a journal in which I recorded issues that occurred in the field, concerns,
memos, ideas and thought provokers. This journal allowed later systematic reflection
on the fieldwork process and facilitated data analysis.
2.4.5 Documents and Archival Records
Documents and archival records provide important secondary sources of data for case
studies (Yin, 2003). Several types of documents were used in this research which
included books and journals, newspaper and magazine articles, government reports
and publications, letters and submissions, and information from the internet. This
study also employed archival records in the form of quantitative survey to assist the
examination of our current structural arrangements for research commercialisation.
Initial understanding of the biotechnology industry was gained through reading books,
journal articles and government reports. As research went and new issues emerged
during analysis, specific documentary data were sought.
Although documents are useful to corroborate evidence from other sources, they must
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be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have
taken place. This is because documents are produced by people within the constraints
of their worldviews. Every document is written for some specific purpose and some
specific audience (Yin, 2003). By constantly trying to identify the objective of the
writing, this study reduced the risk of being misled by documentary evidence.
Books and journals provide access to previous research, other ideas and analysis of the
situation under study. It is important in using this sort of data to recognise that not all
books and refereed articles are of high quality. Although there is an increasing number
of recent journal articles on research commercialisation, the majority are for the US
and European contexts.
Newspapers and magazines provide access to a wealth of up-to-date information, but
of variable quality and reliability. Research commercialisation recently has received a
great deal of press coverage. Relevant articles frequently appeared on The Australian
Financial Review, Business Review Weekly and the major newspapers such as The
Australian, or the Sydney Morning Herald. Newspaper articles often portray research
commercialisation success stories or a particular viewpoint, therefore a critical mind
is required in interpreting the contents of such evidence.
Government publications and reports represent official versions of events, and the
analysis of situations and activities. There are a number of government reports available
on research commercialisation, especially after the late 1990s.
2.5 Data Analysis
Data analysis is the process of transforming data into research results. In qualitative
research, data analysis involves the description or summarisation of data, the findings
of relationships and themes within that data, the derivation of implications for policy
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or practice, and potentially the development of a conceptual model. Qualitative data
analysis is a bit like assembling a jigsaw puzzle. Jigsaw puzzles cut up a whole picture
into fragments. To assemble the puzzle, the researcher needs to put all the similar
pieces in piles; then assemble the big chunks; and finally, identify the linking pieces
so that the big chunks can be tied together into a coherent picture (LeCompte, 2000).
Unlike quantitative measures, qualitative data are more complex and ambiguous. This
type of data has no initial intrinsic organisational structure of meaning by which to
explain the phenomenon under study. The researcher needs to create a structure and
impose it on the data. The structure is created in stages, and forms the basis for
assembling data into an explanation or solution. The interpretation of the meanings
inherent in the data is unavoidably subjective, because people use words within their
own contexts. Subjectivity cannot be eliminated, but it is important to be aware of how
it affects the usefulness and credibility of research results (LeCompte, 2000). This will
be discussed in section 2.7.
In this study, data analysis was performed at multiple levels, i.e. individual and
institutional. The two levels were used to assemble the research data into an organised
structure. The interview and participant observation data were initially analysed at the
individual level. By focusing on the key participants of research commercialisation,
different motivations, perceptions, attitudes, and patterns of behaviour were identified.
From their responses, important factors and themes were inductively derived and their
relationships were defined. This understanding helped the subsequent analysis at the
institutional level. Data from secondary sources were then analysed to corroborate
with primary interviews findings and to create a triangulated picture. As new themes
and relationships emerged, I stepped up to the next level (i.e. national level) and
made further generalisations. This bottom-up approach to data analysis allowed a
rich understanding of how the sector worked as a system, and how the various aspects
of that system worked together to produce the end behaviour.
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Data analysis was a continuing process in this study, beginning at the time of the pilot
interviews and proceeding throughout the period spent collecting data. It involved
cumulative learning and frequent revisiting of previously analysed data as new ideas
and relationships were emerging. The pilot study allowed the interview guide to be
tested and refined, new issues and targets for research to be found. As the research
proceeded, the initially fuzzy concepts were progressively made clearer. Relationships
were gradually identified, and eventually conceptual frameworks and models were
developed (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
This study followed the data analysis approach described in Miles and Huberman (1994),
moving from familiarisation with the data through coding and memoing, to diagrams
of codes and themes, to the development of conceptual models and then writing-up.
The key stages can be summarised as follows:
• Familiarisation with the data through reviewing, listening of interview tapes,
reading of transcripts and observational notes
• Organisation and indexing of data for easy retrieval and identification
• Anonymising of sensitive data
• Coding, including memoing and writing comments
• Identification of themes, relationships and patterns
• Re-coding
• Development of provisional categories
• Exploration of relationships between categories
• Refinement of themes and relationships
• Development of model and incorporation of pre-existing knowledge
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• Writing up, including anonymous excerpts from the original data
Initially, listening to interview recordings and reading transcripts and observational
notes allowed the data to be checked and familiarised. As the data became intimately
known, obvious codes rapidly emerged. Codes are tags or labels assigning units of
meaning to the descriptive information compiled during a study. They usually are
attached to “chunks” of varying size such as words, phrases, sentences, or entire
paragraphs (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). Important codes often re-occur and they
tend to be rich in interconnections. Memos were written to define the meanings of each
code and to record any inspiration and understanding that came to mind. Memos were
particularly helpful in bringing concepts together and forming basic understanding of
the case. Over time codes and memos accumulated which required tools to facilitate
data management. Nvivo software was used to place codes in hierarchal trees and to
arrange relationships between codes (Bazeley, 2007). It helped to identify themes or
emergent concepts. As analysis proceeded, re-coding was needed to develop better
defined categories. This process continued until no new significant themes or concepts
emerged, and the relationships between them were stable.
2.6 Theory Development
Management and social science researchers often use the term theory loosely and
do not differentiate it from a model. For example, in Glaser and Strauss’s seminal
work Grounded Theory (1967), their term substantive theory actually corresponds
to a model. This study makes a clear distinction between these terms following the
definitions described in Cooper and Schindler (2006, pp. 47–49). A theory is a set of
systematically interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that are advanced to
explain and predict phenomena. A model is defined as a representation of a system that
is constructed to study some aspect of that system or the system as a whole. A theory
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differs from a model in that a theory’s role is explanation and prediction, whereas a
model’s role is representation.
A model can be seen as the descriptive predecessor of a theory. A model has limited
predictive power about the cause and effect relationships. It needs to be refined and
tested through several iterations. The complete theory-building cycle is shown in
Figure 2.4 and it actually has both an inductive and a deductive side. To improve
a model, hypotheses need to be tested on different sets of data to see if the same
correlation exists between attributes and outcomes of interest. If the empirical evidence
fails to confirm the existing model, then the researchers need to revisit the beginning
of the process. More accurate description and categorisation of the phenomenon are
required so that a new statement of association can be articulated to accommodate the
anomaly. The confusion and contradiction that are often associated with the models
will eventually be resolved through careful observation, move beyond statements of
correlations to define what causes the outcome of interest in different situations. It
is useful to think of theory as a body of understanding that the researchers can build
on cumulatively as they iterate through these steps. The discovery of an anomaly
is what triggers a cycle of improvement and scholars should design their research
to maximise the probability that they will be able to identify anomalies rather than
avoid them. Getting the categories clearly characterised is the hallmark of a good
theory (Christensen, 2006).
This study followed the theory-building process of Christensen (2006), but due to
limited time and resources, it stopped at the descriptive stage. The final conceptual
frameworks and models were explicated through inductive analysis of the data from
the case. Although hypothesis testing and model refinement were desirable, they were
beyond the scope of this research.
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Observe, describe and
 measure the phenomenon 
(constructs)
Categorisation based 
upon attributes 
(frameworks & typologies)
Statement 
of association 
(models)
Observe, describe and
 measure the phenomenon 
(constructs)
Categorisation based 
on circumstances 
Statement 
of causality
Anomaly
Anomaly
Descriptive stage
Normative stage
Confirm
Predict
Predict
Confirm
Careful field-based 
research
Figure 2.4 Descriptive and normative stages of theory-building process.
Source: adapted from Christensen (2006, p. 42).
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Table 2.5
Summary of Key Tests for Establishing the Quality of This Case Study
Quality tests How achieved in this study
Construct validity:
establishing correct operational measures
for the concepts being studied
• Used multiple sources of data to
triangulate findings (e.g. interviews,
participant observation, documents, and
archival records)
• Established chain of evidence
Internal validity:
establishing a casual relationship, whereby
certain conditions are shown to lead to other
conditions, as distinguished for spurious
relationships
• Used iterative process to build
explanation about the biotechnology case
• Performed time-series analysis to show
historical perspective and tendency over
time
External validity:
establishing the domain to which a study’s
findings can be generalised
Used biotechnology as an extreme case to
provide specific and realistic insight within
this sector
Reliability:
demonstrating that the operations of a study
can be repeated, with the same results
• Used a case study protocol which
consisted of project plan, research
questions, interview guides and outlines of
report
• Developed a case study database for
record keeping
Source: adapted from (Yin, 2003, p. 34).
2.7 Validity and Reliability
Four tests have been commonly used to determine the quality and rigour of a qualitative
case study. Yin (2003) defines these tests as construct validity, internal validity, external
validity and reliability. Validity determines whether the research truly measures what
it is intended to measure and how accurate the research results are. Reliability is
the extent to which results are consistent if the study was reproduced under a similar
methodology (Golafshani, 2003).
Table 2.5 summarises what has been done to ensure the quality of this study. The
following subsections will address each of the four tests.
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2.7.1 Construct Validity
Construct validity is the degree to which a construct that is purported to be assessed
is actually measured and represented. Two tactics were used to improve construct
validity in this study: multiple sources of data and establishing a chain of evidence (Yin,
2003). I used several sources of data to triangulate the research. By getting many
views from different participant groups and by obtaining data from multiple sources,
I examined the research commercialisation phenomenon from different angles. If
all of these produce a similar picture, then construct validity is improved because
the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same
phenomenon. To improve construct validity and minimise bias, I also followed and
documented the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial research questions to
ultimate case conclusion.
2.7.2 Internal Validity
Internal validity is the degree to which one can infer that a casual relationship exists
between two variables (Cook & Campbell, 1979). The purpose of this study is to seek
understanding of the research commercialisation phenomenon in a context-specific
setting and to unveil patterns of behaviour and general tendencies. Although prediction
was not attempted based on my research findings, possible explanation for causes was
made for the case.
I used two tactics suggested by Yin (2003) to improve the internal validity of this
study: explanation building and time-series analysis. The eventual explanation of
the biotechnology case was a result of a series of iterations which was described in
sections 2.2.2 and 2.6 in detail. The time-series analysis was carried out from two
different perspectives. The first perspective involved conducting document review on
the historical roots of research commercialisation. This allowed chronological events
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to be traced over time. The second perspective involved analysing survey data from
secondary sources to illustrate key changes and patterns of behaviour over a period of
time.
2.7.3 External Validity
External validity is the extent to which results from a study can be generalised across
different settings. It is established through analytical generalisations in qualitative
research (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Making generalisations
involve a trade-off between internal and external validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A
study cannot be realistic, precise in details and generalisable at the same time. In order
to make generalisable statements that apply to many contexts, one can include only
limited aspects of each local context.
This study provides some realistic insights about the commercialisation of public
funded research in the biotechnology sector in Australia. I cannot specify the degree to
which my research findings derived from this single case can be applied to other sectors
and/or countries. Further studies would be required to confirm the generalisability of
my research findings to other settings.
2.7.4 Reliability
Reliability is concerned with the extent to which if the study was repeated in the same
way, the same findings would be found by another researcher (Salkind, 1997). Since
there are many perspectives and many possible interpretations of the same phenomenon,
replication in a qualitative research will not yield the same results as it might in a
quantitative investigation. However, several measures can be taken to ensure the results
of a qualitative study are consistent with the data collected (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
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The two tactics used to enhance the reliability of this study were the use of a case study
protocol and developing a case study database (Yin, 2003). In this study, I developed
a case protocol which contained an overview of the research, fieldwork procedures,
interview questions, and an outline of a case study report to guide the data collection
process. A case study database was also maintained throughout my research to ensure
participant rights to anonymity and accessibility of data and results.
2.7.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Methodology
The main advantages of using a case study methodology are outlined below:
• A case study can assist the understanding of a phenomenon within its real-life
context that would otherwise be enigmatic or confusing (Yin, 2003).
• A case study can facilitate theory development, particularly the generation of
novel theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).
• Case studies offer great potential for revealing the richness, holism and complexity
in events (Yin, 2003).
Despite these strengths, using a case study methodology has limitations in resource
intensity, researcher dependence, subjectivity and credibility of generalisation (Yin,
2003). This method is very resource intensive, thus it is costly to carry out a large
number of cases. The quality of the research outcome is dependent on the investigator’s
analytical and writing skills. Case study research is inherently subjective because the
investigator analyses data through his or her subjective understanding. Generalisations
developed from a case study are usually context dependent.
Some of these limitations have been overcome in this study, while others have not
because they are related to the nature of the case study methodology. A single case has
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been carried out in this study and the generalisability of the research findings cannot
be known until further cases have been done. However, replications of this research
in other sectors and context would have required another study. The subjectivity of
the methodology has been dealt with through awareness of bias and the worldviews
underpinning qualitative research.
2.8 Ethical Consideration
In undertaking research involving human subjects, consideration must be given to
ethical concerns that may arise through the study. Responsible research anticipates
ethical dilemmas and attempts to adjust the design, procedures and protocols during
the planning process rather than treating them as an afterthought. Ethical research
aims not to harm or mislead participants and to protect their identities and the data
they provide (Denscombe, 1998).
This study involved the handling of human subjects, principally through interviews. It
was approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee based on the subjects
being exposed to minimal personal risk as a result of participation in the project.
The participants’ rights have been adhered to the ANU ethics guidelines and good
research practice. Participants were well-informed of the aims and benefits of the
project, and were provided with background material to permit them to make an
informed judgement on whether to participate. Prior to the start of each interview,
informed and voluntary consent was obtained from the participants (see Appendix D
for consent form). Participants who agreed to be interviewed were able to withdraw at
any time or refuse to answer any questions. Most of them were very helpful in sharing
their experience and insights during the interviews, and nobody withdrew from the
study. Anonymity and confidentiality of participants was strictly maintained to avoid
attributing any particular point of view or comments to a single individual. No names,
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except from publicly available materials are mentioned in the thesis or any reports or
publications that have come from the research.
2.9 Summary
This chapter described the research design and processes by which data was collected
and analysed. It explained why an exploratory case study strategy was adopted, and
identified the strengths and limitations inherent within this approach. Measures to
ensure the quality of this study and ethical issues were discussed.
The next two chapters of this thesis will review the historical development of research
commercialisation to establish the general context of the phenomenon.
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Chapter 3
The Rise of Research Commercialisation
You have to know the past to understand the present.
Dr Carl Sagan
(American Astronomer, Writer and Scientist)
3.1 Introduction
Many observers have attributed the recent rise of university patenting and licensing
activities to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US and subsequent
similar legislative and policy changes in other industrialised countries. Inspired by the
perceived success of the Bayh-Dole Act, the Australian government has introduced a
number of policies and initiatives to promote research commercialisation. Although
up until now there is no formal patent legislation in Australia, the National Principles
of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research and the current
structural arrangements have been developed based on the US best practice model.
Given the importance of the Bayh-Dole Act in research commercialisation and its
influence on Australia, it is worthwhile to examine this legislation in detail. The
birth of the Bayh-Dole Act involved a chain of events spanning several decades within
circumstances particular to the time. The effects of this legislation therefore cannot be
understood without placing it in a broad historical context and considering its original
intention, specific conditions and assumptions.
This chapter explains the key ideas and turning points behind the Bayh-Dole Act and
its subsequent implementation which formed the backbone of Australia’s current TTO-
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based structural arrangements. The first section of this chapter traces the historical
development of university and industry collaboration and technology transfer activities
in the US. The next two sections review the political origin of the Bayh-Dole Act and
the key changes after its introduction. The following section describes the effects of
the Bayh-Dole Act on industrialised countries. The last section explains how research
commercialisation came to the university agenda in Australia.
3.2 History of University Technology Transfer
The US has a long standing history of university-industry collaboration and technology
transfer (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998). Although there was some interest in patenting
and licensing well before the 1980s, most universities avoided direct involvement in
the management of patents and chose to outsource this to third parties (Mowery et al.,
2004). Research results and knowledge moved freely between university and industry
through publications, conference presentations, faculty consulting, and the movement
of personnel such as trained graduates (Cohen et al., 2002). It is important to note that
in the early days, academic patenting and licensing were not the primary channels for
technology transfer.
The strong university-industry tie in the US is largely due to the structure of its higher
education system which consists of a very heterogenous collection of institutions.
Funding from state and local sources provided strong incentives for public universities
to pursue applied research with local economic and social benefits. Inter-institutional
competition for students and faculty members were encouraged. The constant search
for resources created another strong incentive for universities to collaborate in research
and technology transfer activities with industry long before the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act (Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994).
Some US universities had begun to patent faculty inventions as early as the 1920s. This
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was well documented in the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) Committee of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks Report (AAAS, 1934).
The primary motivation for patenting was the protection of the public interest and the
preservation of an academic institution’s reputation.
Despite considerable awareness of and interest in patenting by university scientists and
administrators, few institutions had developed formal patent policies prior to the late
1940s. Many universities avoided direct involvement in the management of patents
and licensing because of concerns over political consequences of profiting from faculty
inventions. In other cases, administrators feared that involvement in patent management
might jeopardise their non-profit tax status. Consequently, for much of the 1925–
1970 period, university inventions were mainly managed by independent organised
foundations or holding companies such as the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
and the Research Corporation (Mowery et al., 2004).
The first university-affiliated research foundation was the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF). It started in 1924 when Dr Harry Steenbock developed a method
for increasing vitamin D content in food and drugs through an irradiation process. He
was concerned that incompetent or unscrupulous individuals or private firms could
use his invention and possibly do harm, unless he brought it to market with legal
protection. In spite of criticism from his colleagues at the university and the medical
community, Steenbock patented his findings and decided to assign his invention to the
University of Wisconsin, where he worked at the time. Unfortunately, the university
considered his invention not worth the necessary investment and consequently declined
his offer of patent ownership. Working with alumni, Steenbock instead created WARF,
an entity affiliated with, but legally separate from the university that could accept
and license patents, and return revenue back to the inventor and university. With
this structure, universities could focus on research and education, but still have the
possibility of reaping the rewards from patent licensing without potential financial and
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political liability (Blumenthal, Epstein, & Maxwell, 1986; Mowery et al., 2004).
The WARF managed to license Steenbock patents to Quaker Oats on an exclusive
basis for the production of vitamin-enriched cereal products. The foundation also
negotiated a number of licences with pharmaceutical firms for the development of
vitamin supplements (Mowery et al., 2004). Spencer (1939) reported that by 1936, the
Steenbock patents had earned more than $6.7 million (in 1996 dollars) for WARF.
The WARF success and substantial licensing income influenced the development of
patent policies at other US universities during the 1930s. The other force which had
an impact on university patent policies was the 1929 Great Depression which forced
many institutions to seek new sources of funding, and WARF offered an attractive
model for emulation. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Purdue University, the
University of Minnesota, and Cornell University all established affiliated but legally
separate foundations that were similar to WARF (McKusick, 1948; Mowery et al.,
2004).
Another organisation which played an important role in the early university patent
management is the Research Cooperation (Mowery & Sampat, 2001). It was founded
in 1912 by Fredrick Cottrell of the University of California at Berkeley. Cottrell was
interested in research on air pollution control. In the early 1900s, he invented the
electrostatic precipitator which is a device that removes fumes from chimneys by
electrically charging them and collecting them on an oppositely charged plate. He
subsequently obtained several patents on electrostatic precipitators and intended to
license his patents to support scientific research. To implement this plan, he initially
considered using the University of California to manage his patents but later rejected
this possibility because he believed that the involvement of university administrators
in licensing could have detrimental consequences for the culture of scientific research
at the university. Instead, Cottrell decided to form an independent entity “not merely
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to produce revenue for scientific research, but to act as a sort of laboratory of patent
economics and to conduct experiments in patent administration” (McKusick, 1948,
p. 208).
During the first two decades after its foundation, the Research Corporation focused
its effort on the development and strengthening of its patents covering electrostatic
precipitation technologies. By 1915, the electrostatic precipitation business became
profitable. Due to its early success in managing the precipitation patent portfolio, a
number of university faculty members turned to the organisation for assistance with
the patenting and licensing of their inventions in other fields (Mowery & Sampat,
2001).
Beginning in the 1930s, the Research Corporation began to manage patents for faculty
members and universities on a case-by-case basis, but it had no formal agreements
with universities. In order to expand its activities in patent management and search
for new sources of revenue, the Research Corporation negotiated its first Invention
Administration Agreement with MIT in 1937. Under the agreement, MIT disclosed
potentially patentable inventions to the Research Corporation, which then evaluated
them and accepted for administration those deemed to have commercial potential. All
services were provided at the expense of the Research Corporation. Any royalty was to
be divided between MIT and the Research Corporation on a 60/40 basis. The Research
Corporation’s share of the royalties, after deduction of operating expenses, funded its
research program. The MIT agreement sparked interest in patent licensing by other
universities. By the late 1930s, the Research Corporation evolved into being a manager
of patenting and licensing of university inventions for many of the leading US research
universities (Mowery & Sampat, 2001).
World War II and the Cold War that followed transformed the structure of the US
national innovation system (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998). Formerly funded by the
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state government, universities experienced a surge of federal funding, particular in the
area of military and biomedical research. Federal funds for basic research increased
more than five-fold during the 1958–1968 period (NSB, 2002a). Biomedical sciences
were largely funded by the National Institute of Health (NIH) within the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). By 1971, NIH supported nearly 37% of
academic R&D, a share that grew to more than 46% by 1981 (NSB, 2002a). This
expansion in basic research had increased the pool of potentially patentable academic
inventions, and many federal research sponsors required the development of a formal
patent policy. According to Palmer (1962), 85 US universities had adopted or revised
patent policies during the 1940–1955 period. Many of these universities continued
to choose “outsourcing” patent management to the Research Corporation even well
into the 1960s. For example, Columbia’s patent policy stated that it was not deemed
within the sphere of the University’s scholarly objectives to hold patents, and Harvard,
Chicago, Yale, and John Hopkins adopted similar positions (Palmer, 1962; Mowery et
al., 2004).
In summary, before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, much of the interaction
between US universities and industry involved a variety of channels. Although a small
number of universities expanded their patenting and licensing activities and developed
their own patent policies in the postwar period, most universities were ambivalent
about direct involvement in patent management and chose to outsource such activities
to the Research Corporation or other independent organisations.
3.3 Political Origin of the Bayh-Dole Act
The birth of a uniform US federal patent policy over ownership resulting from publicly
funded research, namely, the Bayh-Dole Act, involved a series of events spanning
across several decades. The intricate political dynamic behind the evolution of the
Bayh-Dole Act was documented in detail by Mowery et al. (2004).
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The Bayh-Dole Act can trace its lineage to an influential view introduced by Vannevar
Bush in 1945. As the director of Office of Scientific Research and Development, Bush
was requested by President Roosevelt to come up with a plan to improve national
welfare based on lessons derived from wartime research experience. In response to
this request, Bush submitted his proposal in a seminal report entitled Science: The
Endless Frontier. In Bush’s view:
Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It
creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must
be drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-grown.
They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn
are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science.
(Bush, 1945, p. 16)
A graphical representation of his view is shown in Figure 3.1. Bush emphasised the
importance of basic research in the national economy and advocated the government
to establish a new federal agency to support academic research. He believed that with
increased government funding support for basic research, new knowledge would be
generated. The diffusion of such knowledge would help to stimulate new enterprises
and provide jobs (Bush, 1945).
Bush was mainly concerned with the creation and diffusion of new knowledge (Stages
1 and 2 in Figure 3.1) and he did not mention explicitly in the report how this new
knowledge would be used to develop into new products and services (Stage 3). It
was assumed that if the government took the responsibility to invest in basic research
and encourage the diffusion of new knowledge, then industry would take care of the
subsequent commercial development process and the economic benefits would follow.
This assumption was probably right at the time, given that wartime military research
generated a large amount of discoveries with immediate practical applications (NSB,
2002a). The subsequent conversion step (Stage 3) was relatively straight forward.
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Figure 3.1 Bush’s view on the role of basic research in the national economy.
The framework is derived from “Science: The Endless Frontier”. Stages:
(1) knowledge creation, (2) technology transfer, (3) commercial development.
Bush’s view laid out the foundation for US postwar science and technology policy.
He was successful in convincing the federal government of the importance of basic
research in fostering economical development. Some of his recommendations were
accepted and soon led to the formation of agencies including the National Institutes of
Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Naval Research. Federal
support for academic research grew from $138 million in 1935 to $6.7 billion in 1970
(NRC, 1938; NSB, 2002b)
Despite this massive federal investment in scientific research, by the 1970s the US
government still had not seen the economic and social benefits envisioned by Bush.
In fact, most breakthroughs were still sitting within academic institutions and failed
to be translated into new products and services. According to a report published by
the Federal Council of Science and Technology (FCST), less than 5% of the 28,000
patents owned by the federal government as of 1976 were licensed for commercial
development (Federal Council on Science and Technology, 1978). Some forward-
looking members of congress linked this outcome to the federal patent system. They
believed that appropriate incentives needed to be created to speed up the transfer of
federally funded inventions to industry.
47
A particular focus during the US postwar science and technology policy discussion
was the debate over the issue of ownership of patents resulting from government
funded research (reviewed by Eisenberg, 1996). The predominant view of the time
was that the federal government should retain title to patents and place them in the
public domain. It was believed that government ownership of patents was necessary
to ensure widespread dissemination of the knowledge and prevent large firms from
monopolising their use. The opposing view argued that allowing private contractors to
retain patent rights would preserve incentives to develop commercially useful products
based on research funded by government (Kelves, 1990). The Kennedy and Nixon
governments all attempted to develop a consistent patent policy to apply across all
federal agencies. Despite several congressional hearings being conducted during this
time, no consensus was reached due to the inability to resolve the conflicting views
over patent ownership (Kennedy, 1963; Nixon, 1971).
The lack of a uniform federal patent policy meant that each of the major government
R&D funding agencies had to follow its own procedures. This led to 26 different
sets of agency-specific patent regulations by the 1970s. While most of the agencies
chose to retain title to patents resulting from federally funded research; the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, and the National Research Foundation took the
initiative and granted universities the right to patent federally-funded inventions via
agency-specific Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs). Under the IPAs, universities
with proven “technology transfer capabilities” had the option to retain patent rights and
license to private firms, but they had to be approved by the agencies on a case-to-case
basis (Mowery et al., 2004; US House of Representatives, 1980).
The availability of IPAs signalled a change in the attitude of some federal agencies and
helped trigger university interest to engage in technology transfer activities. As the
US elite universities became more and more involved in patenting and licensing, they
became increasingly dissatisfied with the uncertainty associated with the federal patent
48
system which limited their ability to negotiate exclusive licences with firms. Harvard
University, Stanford University, the University of California, and MIT all lobbied the
government for the introduction of the bill that eventually became the Bayh-Dole Act
(Barret, 1980; Broad, 1979).
Another important factor in shaping the introduction of Bayh-Dole bill was the broad
economic conditions of the 1970s. The US economy went into recession and national
productivity declined significantly. From 1969, productivity, as measured by output
per hour of labour input in the non-farming business sector of the economy had shown
significantly diminished annual growth (Scherer, 1983). The congress was concerned
that the US was losing its competitive edge to Western Europe and Japan as they
fully recovered from the devastation of the Second World War. To stimulate the US
economy and to restore its technological leadership, Senators Birch Bayh and Robert
Dole proposed a uniform federal patent policy that gave universities and small business
rights to any patents resulting from government funded research. Based on Bush’s
view, they thought that if appropriate incentives and conditions were provided through
the patent system to promote technology transfer (Stage 2 of Figure 3.1), then the
economic benefits should simply follow.
The Bayh-Dole bill was introduced in 1979. Considerable testimony and commentary
during the congressional hearings on the Bayh-Dole Bill were focused on lagging
US productivity growth and innovativeness, suggesting that government patent policy
contributed to these outcomes (Mowery et al., 2004). For example, Senator Dole
opened the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1979 hearing as follows:
. . . the damaging impact of the Federal patent policy on the economy is
dramatic. That we have lost our leadership role to Japan in the field of
electronics and shipbuilding is no accident (US Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 1979a, p. 28).
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A key assumption underpinning the drafting and passage of the Bayh-Dole bill was
that IP is a key enabling factor in the process of technology development and without
clear IP rights, private contractors would not make the investments necessary to bring
these inventions to the market. Supporters of the bill argued that when federal agencies
retain title to inventions made by universities or small business there is no incentive
for the commercial development of the patentable discovery (US Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 1979b, p. 22). One frequently cited piece of evidence was drawn
from the Harbridge House 1968 report on government patent policy, which concluded
that the rates of utilisation of government funded patents were 10.7 times higher when
contractors rather than agencies held title to these patents (Harbridge House, 1968).
With minimal floor debates, the US congress passed the bill at a time of widespread
concern over America’s relative economic decline. The Bayh-Dole Act was presented
to President Carter on 1 December 1980, and he signed it into law as Public Law 96–
517 on 12 December. The new legislation became effective in July of the following
year (Mowery et al., 2004).
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act represented an important legislative landmark in
US history. It was the culmination of decades of effort to unify federal patent policy.
The Act simplified the formerly complex administrative process through which US
universities and small business gained title to patents resulting from publicly funded
research. It was intended to facilitate the transfer of IP from academia to industry.
Compared to the previous IPA policy, the Bayh-Dole Act certainly made it easier for
universities to own patents and license them out to private companies.
3.4 Key Changes After the Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 instituted a uniform US federal patent policy as a way to
stimulate the transfer of promising new inventions to industry. The introduction of this
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legislation fundamentally changed the incentive structure that governed technology
transfer by allowing universities and research institutions to own inventions resulting
from federally sponsored research and to exclusively license those inventions to private
firms. Although the Act did not mandate universities to patent and license faculty
inventions, the explicit endorsement by policymakers seemed to lead many university
administrators to believe that direct involvement in IP management, an activity once
thought of as inappropriate, was legitimate and even desirable.
Following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, many US universities greatly expanded
their patenting and licensing activities (Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998). The
number of patents granted to universities grew from 96 in 1965 to 2725 in 2005.
The share of all US patents accounted for by universities increased from less than
1% before 1980 to 3.57% in 2005 (US Patent and Trademark Office, 2005). Several
patent bibliometric analyses show that biomedical sciences represented the majority
of patents assigned to universities during the post-Bayh-Dole periods (Heisey, King,
& Rubenstein, 2005; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2001; Hicks, Breitzman,
Olivastro, & Hamilton, 2001). By 1998, 49.5% of all patents issued to US research
universities were based on biomedical inventions (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003).
This growth in biomedical patenting was largely driven by progress in basic research
and subsequent development of the biotechnology industry. Biotechnology had just
emerged in the 1970s as a new knowledge-based industry predominantly composed
of new firms with close ties to university scientists (Audretsch & Stephan, 1996;
McMillan et al., 2000). Patenting in biotechnology was further facilitated by the
US Supreme Court verdict in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case of 1980. The court
decision stated “anything under the sun” whose invention involved the hand of man
was patentable and thus opened the door to patenting life organisms and engineered
molecules (Mowery & Sampat, 2001).
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Figure 3.2 Year of “entry” into technology transfer activities by US universities.
Source: Sampat (2006, p. 781).
Another change in the aftermath of the Bayh-Dole Act was that many universities
instituted polices and systems to manage the IP generated by their faculty members.
Rather than outsourcing to the Research Corporation or legally separate foundations as
in the early days, a growing number of universities established their own technology
transfer offices (TTOs) to administer all research commercialisation related activities
(Carlsson & Fridh, 2002; Markman, Phan, Balkin, & Gianiodis, 2005; Siegel et al.,
2003a). This trend is demonstrated by the dynamics of year of “entry”1 in Figure 3.2.
According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), which
collects survey data about the technology transfer activities of US universities and
research institutes, the number of invention disclosures increased from an average of
58.4 per institution in 1995 to 91.5 in 2004, a 56.7 % growth. During the same period,
the average number of new patent applications increased 87.1 % from an average of
40.2 per institution to an average of 75.2 per institution (AUTM, 2004).
1Year of “entry” is defined by the Association of University Technology Managers as the year in
which the universities first devoted 0.5 full-time employees to technology transfer activities.
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Licensing of university inventions to industry also experienced rapid growth since the
1990s. The number of licence and option agreements executed rose 47.3% from an
average of 16.9 in 1995 to an average of 24.9 in 2004. In 1995, the licensing income to
universities was $299 million and this number increased to $1,099 million in 2004; an
annual growth rate of 12.2% per university. Licensing income as a percent of research
expenditure changed from 1.7% in 1995 to 2.9% in 1994; a growth rate of 6% per year
compounded over the 9 years (AUTM, 2004).
A few universities either by chance or by extraordinary foresight, have “hit the jackpot”,
with single invention that brought in multi-million revenue. Well known licences
include University of California and Stanford University’s Cohen-Boyer gene splicing
technique, Michigan State University’s Cisplatin and University of Florida’s Gatorade
sports-drink (Nelsen, 2004). These blockbuster examples have been frequently cited
by policymakers and administrators as evidence of university success in technology
transfer and its contribution to economic development.
In parallel with an increase in patenting and licensing, there has been a significant
growth in the creation of university spin-offs since the Bayh-Dole Act. University
TTOs considered spin-offs as a new vehicle to commercialise technologies that are
difficult to license to existing companies. Between 1980 and 2000, 3376 university
spin-offs were founded in the US (AUTM, 2001). This growth was partly driven by
the availability of venture capital and business angel financing, which provide a source
of external funding that could not be tapped easily in previous periods (Gompers &
Lerner, 2006).
In summary, since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities in the US have
greatly expanded their involvement in patenting, licensing and spin-off activities. Most
of them have instituted formal policies and systems to manage IP resulting from
publicly-funded research and established their own TTOs.
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3.5 Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on OECD Countries
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act has stimulated considerable enthusiasm among
OECD countries to adopt similar legislations and policies for promoting university
technology transfer. The Bayh-Dole Act has frequently been portrayed as the critical
catalyst to the US universities’ contribution to innovation and economic development.
For example, an article in The Economist characterised the Bayh-Dole Act as:
. . . perhaps the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in
America over the past half-century. . . This unlocked all the inventions
and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout the United
States with the help of tax payer’s money. More than anything, this
single policy helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into industrial
irrelevance (“Innovation’s golden goose”, 2002, p. 3).
During the late 1990s and the early 21st century, the OECD has often cited the Bayh-
Dole Act as an important factor in the remarkable growth of income, employment
and productivity in the US economy. It argued that such legislation “provides greater
legal certainty, lowers transaction costs, and fosters more and efficient channels for
technology transfer” (OECD, 2002, p. 3).
The widespread media and political portrayal of the Bayh-Dole success has led many
OECD governments to assume that academic patenting and licensing are essential for
facilitating university-industry interaction and technology transfer. There has been “a
general trend across OECD countries to emulate the Bayh-Dole patent legislation that
allows performers of government research, including universities and small business,
to patent and license inventions” (OECD, 2002, p. 10).
Despite of the popular journalistic and policy-oriented claims about the positive effects
of the Bayh-Dole Act, there has been very little empirical evidence supporting the
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central assumption underpinning this legislation (Mowery et al., 2001; Mowery &
Ziedonis, 2002; So et al., 2008; Murray & Stern, 2007; Rosell & Agrawal, 2009). It
is misleading to interpret the growth of academic patenting and licensing as evidence
that technology transfer or commercialisation of university technology has increased
because of the Bayh-Dole Act. Furthermore, the potential negative effects of the Bayh-
Dole Act on university research and the broader economy should also be included in
the policy discussion (reviewed in Appendix A).
A number of scholars have raised the concern that it would be dangerous or even
harmful to shape national policies based on the US “best practice models” (Isaksen,
2001; To¨dtling & Trippl, 2004; Mowery & Sampat, 2005). They argued that blanket
recommendations to enhance IP rights have overlooked the unique features of the US
research system, the long history of university-industry interactions, and the scale of
federal investment in science and technology (Conceic¸a˜o, Heitor, Sirilli, & Wilson,
2004). For example, So et al. (2008, p. 2079) commented:
While polices supporting technological innovation and diffusion contribute
to economic growth and development, the appropriate sets of polices to
harness public sector R&D are highly context specific. Much depends
on factors such as the level of publicly funded research, the focus of
such research on basic versus applied science, the capabilities of industry
partners, and the nature of university-industry linkage.
Moreover, a narrow focus on IP-based channels ignores the fact that most of the
economic contributions of public sector research has historically occurred through
dissemination of knowledge by means of journal publications, conference presentations,
and training of students (Narin, Hamilton, & Olivastro, 1997; McMillan et al., 2000).
Early surveys of industry R&D managers and university researchers by Cohen et al.
(2002) suggest that academic patenting and licensing are not the primary channels
for technology transfer and knowledge exchange with industry. Some of their survey
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Figure 3.3 Channels used by industrial R&D labs to access public research.
Source: data for the plot are obtained from Cohen et al. (2002).
data are replotted in Figure 3.3 to illustrate how the usage of various channels varies
between different sectors. University patenting may indeed facilitate the transfer of
knowledge and technology in the case of biotechnology; however, in other fields, other
types of interaction including publication, movement of personnel between university
and industry, and research collaboration, are of greater importance. In these cases,
restrictive licensing policies may even limit the diffusion and use of an invention or
related knowledge.
3.6 Birth of Research Commercialisation Policies in Australia
Inspired by the Bayh-Dole Act and the US success in economic performance, the
Australian government has introduced a series of policy changes to promote research
commercialisation. The common theme of these policies is an increasing need for
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universities to contribute more effectively and more directly to the national economy
and the wider society. Commercialisation of research outcomes is seen as an important
aspect of these developments. Driven by the economic imperative, the Australian
government expects universities to better demonstrate their contributions or “return
on investment” through closer engagement with industry (Zhao, 2004).
In December 1999, the higher education white paper Knowledge and Innovation: A
Policy Statement on Research and Research Training was released by the government
(Kemp, 1999). This white paper represented major changes to policy and funding
arrangements for higher education research in Australia. These changes included
strengthening the role of the Australian Research Council (ARC) as an invigorated
national funding agency, reinforcement of performance-based funding for research
student places and research activity in universities, and the establishment of a broad
quality verification framework (Kemp, 1999).
The release of the higher education white paper provided universities with an incentive
structure more conducive to research commercialisation. Under the new Institutional
Grants Scheme, funding for research would be allocated on the basis of a formula
that reflects success in attracting income from a diversity of sources (60%); attracting
research students (30%); and the quality and output of research publications, through
a revised publications measure (10%). Universities were also expected to report on
their research strengths and activities; graduate outcomes in terms of both attributes
and employment; linkages to industry and other bodies; and their policies on research
commercialisation (Gallagher, 2000).
In July 2000, the ARC recommended to the government that greater effort should be
made to commercialise research findings, emphasising that:
As the way in which knowledge is produced undergoes fundamental change,
the exploitation of research will need to become an integral part of the
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research process. . . There is a need to develop an integrated set of actions
by industry, government, universities and other research organisations,
venture capitalists and the researchers themselves (ARC, 2000, p. 33).
In an effort to develop a consensus on clear strategies for government, industry and the
research community to encourage further economic growth and improve Australia’s
competitiveness and innovation capacities, the then Chief Scientist presented a report
on the Australian science capability entitled The Chance to Change in November 2000
(Batterham, 2000). The Chief Scientist was highly critical of the lack of progress in
commercialisation, arguing that “universities must introduce strategies to stimulate and
facilitate increased transfer of knowledge to business and society” (Batterham, 2000,
p. 88). The key recommendations from this report included increased funding for the
ARC, expansion of the Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) programmes, and more
strategic approaches by universities and government-funded research agencies to the
management of IP.
As a result of the two policy papers, the government announced Backing Australia’s
Ability (BAA): An Innovation Action Plan for the Future in January 2001. This was the
federal statement on innovation that outlined the government’s strategy and funding
initiatives to enhance the innovation capacity of Australia. BAA provides $8.3 billion
over 10 years for a wide range of programs to promote research, commercialisation
and skill development (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001a). A number of specific
initiatives were introduced to enhance the commercialisation of research and new
technologies. These initiatives will be described in more detail in the next chapter.
Since the announcement of BAA, research commercialisation has become one of the
priorities on the national innovation policy agenda. The government has recognised
that universities can be a strategic asset to a national innovation system, particularly if
linkage with industry is strengthened and the transfer of technology is enhanced and
accelerated. To facilitate the transfer of university inventions to industry, the National
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Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research was
drafted in 2001 by a number of government agencies including the National Health
and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and Australian Research Council (ARC). It
was developed:
. . . to assist researchers, research managers and their research institutions,
in ensuring that they have access to best practices for the identification,
protection and management of IP, and therefore, to maximise the national
benefits and returns from public investment in research (ARC et al., 2001,
p. 2).
Unlike the Bayh-Dole Act, there is no federal legislation in Australia that mandates
universities or public research organisations to retain ownership of IP developed from
publicly funded research. IP protection is governed by general laws such as Patents Act
1990, Copyright Act 1968, Trade Marks Act 1995, Designs Act 2003, Plant Breeder’s
Rights Act 1994, and Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Collier, 2007). Our national principles
do not carry legal force and therefore place the responsibility of IP ownership on grant
recipients and research institutions. To make them effective, each university has to
incorporate the national principles into their IP policies and procedures.
3.7 Summary
This chapter described the rise of the research commercialisation phenomenon. Before
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, much of the interaction between university and
industry involved a variety of channels. Although there was considerable awareness
and interest in academic patenting and licensing in the early 1900s, most universities
in the US avoided direct involvement in the management of patents and chose to
outsource to third parties.
The subsequent introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has fundamentally changed
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the way in which university inventions are transferred to industry, not just in the US,
but also in other OECD countries including Australia. Since its passage, IP-based
channels have become much more prevalent in university-industry technology transfer.
Many universities around the industrialised world have instituted formal polices and
systems to manage IP generated by their staff members.
One of the key assumptions underpinning the Bayh-Dole Act is that IP-based channels
such as patenting and licensing facilitate the transfer of university inventions to industry.
Despite the lack of empirical support, many OECD countries have adopted similar
legislation and policies. In Australia, the National Principles of Intellectual Property
Management for Publicly Funded Research has been established as a patent guideline
giving universities the possibility to own patents resulting from government sponsored
research.
In the following chapter, I will consider how this possibility of IP ownership has been
realised and the subsequent implementation of TTO-based structural arrangements by
Australian universities. In addition to government policy changes, there are other
factors which have shaped our current practice in research commercialisation. These
factors will also be discussed.
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Chapter 4
Structural Arrangements for Research
Commercialisation
All things appear and disappear because of the concurrence of causes and
conditions. Nothing ever exists entirely alone; everything is in relation to
everything else.
Buddha
(Founder of Buddhism, 563–483 B.C.)
4.1 Introduction
As described in the previous chapter, the Australian government has introduced a series
of policy changes to promote research commercialisation. The National Principles of
Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research has been established
as a general guideline to facilitate the transfer of IP from academia to industry. This
patent policy and a set of government supporting schemes have created a general
environment to encourage the commercialisation of academic research. In addition
to these factors, the declining proportion of federal funding in universities has also
contributed to their direct involvement in research commercialisation.
This chapter illustrates changes in funding arrangements for Australian universities,
establishment of a general environment to support research commercialisation, and
the specific institutional management structures that have been implemented by the
universities.
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4.2 Funding Changes in Australian Higher Education
The operation of Australian universities have evolved over time in response to changes
in government expectations and funding arrangements. Traditionally, government
support for university teaching and research has been justified on the basis that it
produced a “public good”, where specific benefits are widely dispersed and payoffs
are not immediate. However, in recent years, with increasing emphasis on research
commercialisation, universities have been expected to contribute more effectively and
directly to economic development. The government has encouraged universities to
raise funds from other sources and compete for fee-based private revenues. In response
to these changes, universities have been increasingly concerned with meeting the short-
term and economic needs of the market to ensure their own financial survival (Currie
& Vidovich, 2000; Marginson, 2002; de Zilwa, 2005, 2007). Their recent expansion
into patenting, licensing and spin-off activities has been partially driven by the quest
for new sources of revenue.
The history of funding of Australian higher education can be divided into several
phases. Figure 4.1 summarises the changes in funding sources for universities from
1951 to 2007 (DEST, 2003; DEEWR, 2009). It illustrates that the cost of investment
in tertiary education has been shifted from government to students and other private
sources. Prior to 1951, funding and management of universities was primarily a state
government responsibility. Between 1951 and 1973, the Commonwealth government,
in response to a series of reports identifying resource problems in universities, assumed
increasing responsibility. Higher education significantly expanded over this period,
with 10 new universities being built and enrolments increasing 6-fold. By 1980, the
Commonwealth assumed full financial responsibility for Australian higher education
institutions (SEWRSBER Committee, 2001).
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Figure 4.1 Australian university funding sources, 1951–2007.
Source: data for the plot are compiled from DEST (2003); DEEWR (2009).
Table 4.1
Comparison of University Revenue by Source, 1995 Vs. 2007
Revenue
($ million)
Proportion
of total
funding by
source (%)
1995 2007 1995 2007
Federal government 4,308.1 7,016.3 57.2 40.5
State/Territory
governments 103.7 691.3 1.4 4.0
HECS/PELSa 902.0 2,770.4 12.0 16.0
Student fees & charges 880.4 3,793.4 11.7 21.9
All other sources 1,341.5 3,044.7 17.8 17.6
Total 7,535.7 17,316.0 100.0 100.0
a HECS = Higher Education Contribution Scheme. PELS = Postgraduate Education Loan
Scheme. All other sources include payments for contract research, donations and bequests,
investment income, etc.
Source: data for the table are compiled from DEEWR (2009).
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Figure 4.2 University revenue from international student fees, 1995–2007.
Source: data for the plot are compiled from DEEWR (2009).
The higher education reforms implemented by the then Labour Government Minister
for Employment, Education, and Training, John Dawkins, in the 1980s have led to
declining proportion of government funding to universities, forcing universities to
develop alternative revenue sources1 (Dawkins, 1988). As illustrated in Figure 4.1,
between 1995 and 2007, public source funding fell from 59% to 45%, and funds from
students rose from 24% to 38% (DEEWR, 2009). Changes in university revenue by
source during this period are summarised in Table 4.1.
The substantial increase in private tertiary funding in Australia was largely driven by
the growth in the number of fee-paying international students (Figure 4.2). According
to the Reserve Bank of Australia (2008), since the 1980s foreign student education
has been explicitly commercial and designed to generate export revenues. Education
services exports have grown at an average annual rate of around 14%. It has become
Australian’s third largest services export, earning $12.6 billion in 2007. (Figure 4.3).
1The privatisation of Australian higher education sector is reviewed in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.3 Four largest Australian export sectors in 2007.
Source: data are obtained from RBA (2008).
Despite the remarkable growth in private income, Australian universities have been
affected by the tighter constraints on public funding. The average student per staff
ratio rose from 14 to 1 in 1991 to more than 20 to 1 only a decade later (DEEWR,
2009). Most of the additional private revenue has to be ploughed back into marketing,
recruitment, teaching, and facilities for international students; that is, the costs of
raising that revenue to reproduce the business itself. At best international student
income subsidises some facilities and a little teaching used by domestic students but it
cannot substitute for the public funding of basic research (Marginson, 2009).
Faced with continuing financial pressures within their operating and research budgets,
universities in Australia have begun to look seriously into private funding sources
including research commercialisation as a way to diversify their income streams.
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4.3 Environment Created by Australian Government
4.3.1 Mechanisms and Schemes for Research Commercialisation
Since the announcement of Backing Australia’s Ability, the Australian government
has put considerable effort into creating a supportive environment to encourage and
facilitate the commercialisation of research conducted in public research organisations
and universities (Harman & Harman, 2004; Harman, 2005).
At the national level, a range of instruments has been employed by the Commonwealth
government to support research commercialisation. These include legislation, fiscal
and taxation regime, and provision of boundary-spanning facilities. Examples of
initiatives implemented by the Commonwealth government are shown below:
• Strengthening university-industry linkage through encouraging the development
of the Cooperative Research Centres Program;
• Supporting financial investment through the Venture Capital Limited Partnership
Program and the Early State Venture Capital Limited Partnership Program;
• Providing funding to assist proof-of-concept and early stages of
commercial development;
• Creating fiscal incentives by removing some taxation impediments and
introducing additional taxation benefits; and
• Facilitating commercialisation skill development through developing the
Commercialisation Training Scheme (Harman & Harman, 2004; Harman, 2005).
Apart from the Commonwealth government, recently the State/Territory governments
have also invested heavily into research commercialisation. Significant focus has been
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put into improving pathways and support for the commercialisation of publicly funded
research. This has been achieved through business incubation support, commercial
skill development and the provision of seed funding.
The Queensland State government has been particularly active in supporting research
commercialisation. Recent examples include BioStart which is a $6 million investment
designed to support start-up companies by providing early stage financing to get to
the proof-of-concept stage; BioCapital which is a $100 million venture capital fund
for biotechnology companies; and the Innovation Start-up Scheme which provides
grants of up to $80,000 to promote innovation and commercialisation for early stage
companies (Allen Consulting Group, 2003). The Queensland government also took the
initiative of establishing an Australian Institute for Commercialisation whose official
aim is “to drive commercial returns from Australia’s research and development (R&D)
by reducing barriers to commercialisation” (AIC, 2003).
In Victoria, a $310 million science, technology and innovation initiative has been
established which aims to enhance Victoria’s science and technology base and to
encourage commercialisation. The New South Wales government, as part of its BioFirst
Strategy, has introduced the BioBusiness program which provides funds and support to
assist the growth of companies and the commercialisation of research outcomes. The
South Australian government has recently established a $4.5 million Bio Innovation
SA Pre-seed Fund (Allen Consulting Group, 2003).
The most comprehensive analysis of the Australian government supporting programs
for research commercialisation and innovation has recently been carried out by the
Intergovernmental Working Group coordinated by Dr Terry Cutler (Cutler, Cutler
& Company, & DIISR, 2008). The study identified 221 programs, comprising 69%
State/Territory and 31% Commonwealth initiatives. Commonwealth programs account
for 90% of the total average expenditure, which is approximately $3.7 billion per
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Figure 4.4 Government support programs across the commercialisation chain.
The size of the bubble and the number annotation represents total average annual
expenditure in million.
Source: Cutler, Cutler & Company, & DIISR (2008, p. 28 of Annex 9).
annum. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, most programs are aimed at the early phases of
the commercialisation chain. Table 4.2 summarises some of the key Commonwealth
programs. A particular focus of these programs is to provide seed funding to assist
R&D and early commercialisation.
The government support programs are sectoral in nature. The 221 programs supporting
research commercialisation are categorised according to whether the programs provide
direct assistance or indirect support. Of the 143 programs that provide direct assistance
for commercialisation and innovation, 85 are industry specific (Table 4.3). The sector
which receives the most government support is biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and
health sciences, representing 20% of all sector-target programs (Cutler, Cutler &
Company, & DIISR, 2008). The biotechnology sector represents an unusual case in
research commercialisation due to its heavy reliance on public support. In the next
section, specific government initiatives for fostering the growth of the biotechnology
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Table 4.2
Major Commonwealth Funding Programs Supporting Research Commercialisation and
Innovation
Programs Life of the
program
Funding Objectives
Commercialising
emerging
technologies
(COMET)
Introduced in
1999 and
extended until
2011 (as part of
BAA)
$30 million
allocated for the
first 3 years
To provide support to early-
growth stage companies,
spin-offs and individuals
to commercialise their
innovation
R&D Start Introduced in
1998 and
concluded in
2005
$1.6 billion in
total
To assist industry to undertake
research and development and
commercialisation through
merit-based financial support
Innovation
Investment Fund
(IIF)
Introduced in
1998 (10 yrs
program)
$358.4 million in
total
To support the provision of
early stage capital to new
technology based firms and
develop experienced early
stage venture capital fund
managers
Biotechnology
Innovation Fund
(BIF)
Introduced in
2001 and
concluded in
2005 (as part of
BAA)
$48.86 million in
total
To help biotech companies to
move their projects beyond the
research stage and into early
commercialisation
Commercial
Ready
Introduced in
2004, but
officially started
in 2006 and
concluded in
2008 (as part of
BAA)
$200 million per
year
To provide financial
support for R&D, proof-
of-concept and early-stage
commercialisation activities;
and to streamline existing
government funding programs
by combining R&D Start and
BIF
Pre-Seed Fund Introduced in
2002 (10 yrs
program as part
of BAA)
$100 million in
total
To encourage universities
and public sector research
agencies to develop their
discoveries and create new
business opportunities through
equity-based financial support
Source: data for the table are compiled from AusIndustry (2006).
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Table 4.3
Government Innovation Support Program by Industry Sector
Industry sector targeted programs Total Commonwealth State/Territory
Biotech; Pharmaceuticals; Therapeutics; Life
Science; Medical Health 16 2 14
Manufacturing; Automotive; Aerospace;
Tooling 14 3 11
Energy 9 6 3
ICT 6 1 5
Arts; Films; Creative industries 6 0 6
Agriculture; Food 6 3 3
Defence 4 4 0
Other 2 1 1
Science; Research; Technology 2 0 2
Regional; Rural; Remote 5 0 5
Education; Training 1 0 1
Several (cover a range of the above) 14 4 10
Total targeted programs 85 24 61
Total non-targeted or not clearly targeted
programs 58 14 44
Source: adapted from Cutler, Cutler & Company, & DIISR (2008, p. 31 of Annex 9).
industry will be discussed.
4.3.2 Government Support for Biotechnology
Over the past decades, biotechnology has been portrayed as an enabling technology
that is capable of transforming the processes and inputs of a broad number of industrial
sectors. Finding applications in healthcare, medicine, agriculture, food processing,
mining and environmental management, biotechnology has captured the imagination
of the Australian government (Access Economics, 2003).
No other sector has received as much R&D investment from the Australian government
as biotechnology. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, this sector represents approximately
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Figure 4.5 Government expenditure on public sector R&D, 1992–2007.
Source: data for the plot are compiled from ABS (2008).
50% of total R&D expenditure by government. Between 1992 and 2006, the federal
expenditure on biotechnology-related R&D increased from $896 million to $1.6 billion
(ABS, 2008).
In addition to providing R&D funding, the Australian government has implemented
a set of regulatory and support measures to foster the growth of the biotechnology
sector. Key initiatives include the establishment of a dedicated national agency –
Biotechnology Australia; the announcement of a National Biotechnology Strategy, and
the adoption of the Gene Technology Act 2000 (Lo¨fgren & Benner, 2003).
In consultation with industry stakeholders, the Department of Industry established
a Task Force in August 1998 to design a biotechnology Action Agenda. The aim
was to develop a coordinated Commonwealth approach which would “encourage the
advancement and uptake of biotechnology applications by Australian industry, with
consequent benefits both in economic development and in the large number of jobs
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being created” (DISR, 1999, p. 216).
As an outcome of the Action Agenda, Biotechnology Australia was established in May
1999 as an agency to provide a one-stop shop for the coordination of the Government’s
support for biotechnology (DISR, 1999). Its role is to develop and administer non-
regulatory policy, including programs to ensure that the general public is provided
with balanced and factual information on biotechnology. With the concerted push by
Biotechnology Australia for more industry representation, in March 2001, AusBiotech
Ltd was established. The association is structured to provide a single and consolidated
voice on matters of biotechnology policy (Lo¨fgren & Benner, 2003).
Another early priority for Biotechnology Australia was the development of a National
Biotechnology Strategy, initially promoted through a discussion paper which generated
110 submissions addressing themes such as the need for more R&D spending, the
need to enhance the public’s understanding of biotechnology, and IP, market access
and trade related issues (Biotechnology Australia, 1999). The National Biotechnology
Strategy was launched in July 2000. The key objective was to provide a framework
for government and key stakeholders to work together to ensure that developments
in biotechnology are captured for the benefit of the Australian community, industry
and the environment, while safeguarding human health and ensuring environmental
protection. The strategy addresses six key themes with specific objectives and activities
to achieve them (Biotechnology Australia, 2000):
• Biotechnology in the community
• Ensuring effective regulation
• Biotechnology in the economy
• Australian biotechnology in the global market
• Resources for biotechnology
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• Maintaining momentum and coordination
The National Biotechnology Strategy received $30.5 million initial funding over three
years for targeted initiatives to support the government’s vision for this sector. In
July 2001, a further funding of $46.5 million was announced for the Biotechnology
Centre of Excellence with the purpose of creating critical mass in priority areas of
biotechnology such as genomics and bioinformatics (Commonwealth of Australia,
2001b).
As part of the National Biotechnology Strategy, direct funding has been provided to
specifically support biotechnology R&D. In July 2001, the Biotechnology Industry
Fund (BIF) began operation. The BIF is a competitive grant program which aims to
address the funding gap at the pre-seed or proof-of-concept stage. A $40 million in
funding was provided for the first three years (Lo¨fgren & Benner, 2003).
The Australian government has also been instrumental in providing regulatory support
for biotechnology. A national system of gene regulation was established which involved
the formation of the Interim Office of the Gene Technology Regulation in 1999 and the
passage of the Gene Technology Act 2000. The Act provides one central, enforceable
scheme for regulating genetically modified organisms. As a result of this Act, an
independent statutory officer, the Gene Technology Regulator was estalished (Lo¨fgren
& Benner, 2003).
Ensuring supportive IP protection of biotechnology inventions is another key concern
of the government. In 1992, most IP related functions were consolidated within the
Australian Industrial Property Organizations, since renamed IPAustralia (Lo¨fgren &
Benner, 2003). According to Ernst & Young, Australia’s IP system is seen as:
. . . very well suited for protection of biotechnology inventions, because
the Australian Patents Act does not include any firm definition of what
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constitutes a patentable invention . . . the range of patentable subject matter
is very similar to that in the US. Indeed, in 1976, Australia was the first
country to grant a valid patent for a living organism (Ernst & Young, 1999,
p. 33).
In summary, the Australian government has invested significant amount of resources in
supporting biotechnology R&D and created specific regulatory and legal frameworks
to foster the development of this sector. As illustrated in Table 3.3, biotechnology is
also the sector which receives the most government support for commercialisation.
4.4 Institutional Support and Management Structures
In response to changes in government policy and funding arrangements, Australian
universities and public research organisations have become much more commercially
oriented in recent years. They have quickly developed new policies and systems to
manage and support the creation, identification, capture, protection, dissemination and
exploitation of IP generated within their institutions. Partly, research institutions are
attracted to the commercialisation of academic research as a way to diversify their
income streams; but more importantly, they are often driven by the desire to more
directly service society and so generate political support for ongoing public investment
in research (Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003; Zhao, 2004).
According to the latest National Survey of Research Commercialisation (DIISR, 2009,
p. 1), between 2000 and 2007, patenting and licensing activities have increased across
all Australian research institutions2:
2Research institutions include publicly funded research agencies (PFRAs), medical research
institutes (MRIs) and universities.
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Figure 4.6 Number of invention disclosures from public research institutions,
2000–2007. Source: data for the plot are obtained from DIISR (2009).
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Figure 4.7 Number of LOAs yielding income from public research institutions,
2000–2007. Source: data for the plot are obtained from DIISR (2009).
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• The number of invention disclosures3 increased by 126%, from 528 in 2000 to
1,193 in 2007 (Figure 4.6); and
• The number of licences, options and assignments (LOAs) yielding income
increased by 70%, from $125 million in 2000 to $213 million in 2007 (Figure 4.7).
4.4.1 Facilitating Technology Transfer Through Intermediaries
A growing number of Australian research institutions have established their own TTOs
to support research commercialisation (Table 4.4). The TTO goes by many names
such as the commercialisation office, commercialisation arm, business liaison office
and business development office. In general, it is a mediating entity which aims to
facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries from academia to industry.
The first TTO in Australia was established by the University of New South Wales
in 1959. Until the 1970s, most universities handled the limited amount of research
commercialisation activities through their research offices and/or legal offices (Allen
Consulting Group, 2003). In the 1980s, the majority of Australian universities began
to set up TTOs, with the strategic role of identifying and managing institutional IP
portfolios. These offices soon expanded and today they perform the role of brokers in
their institutions in a number of areas, including:
• creating awareness of IP processes and requirements among researchers;
• assisting researchers with their IP and patent protection;
• assessing market potential;
• identifying potential industry partners and collaborators;
3An invention disclosure occurs when a device, material, or method that is novel and useful is made
known to research management within the institution.
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Table 4.4
Establishment of Australian University Technology Transfer Offices
University Name of TTO Year of establishment
ANU ANUTECH Pty Ltd 1979
UTS Insearch Ltd 1976
UNSW UniSearch Ltd (Renamed to
NewSouth Innovations)
1959
UQ UniQuest Ltd 1984
University of South Australia Techsearch Inc 1971
Flinders University Luminis Pty Ltd 1984
RMIT Technisearch Ltd 1972
Monash University Montech Pty Ltd 1986
Curtin University Curtin Consulting Services Ltd 1971
University of Tasmania UNITAS Consulting Ltd 1992
Source: adapted from Allen Consulting Group (2003, p. 38).
• negotiating licence agreements;
• forming spin-off companies;
• finding investors and industrial partners; and
• managing contract R&D.
To carry out these tasks, a new group of specialist professionals have been recruited
by the TTOs, namely, the technology transfer managers. As shown in Figure 4.8, over
the period of 2000 to 2007, the number of technology transfer managers across all
research institutions increased by 52%. This number grew rapidly from 190 in 2000 to
296 in 2003 and has remained relatively stable to 2007 (DIISR, 2009). The technology
transfer managers are a new class of employee who tend to be recruited from outside of
higher education sector, with significant numbers having prior commercial and public-
sector experience. A survey conducted by Harman and Stone (2006) found that 31%
of the technology transfer managers who responded (n=98) have doctorates, 26% have
MBA degrees and 16% have legal qualifications. A high proportion of their time
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Figure 4.8 Number of technology transfer managers in public research institutions.
Source: data for the plot are obtained from DIISR (2009).
is involved in identification and marketing of IP, patenting, and licensing IP to both
existing and spin-off companies.
The rapid expansion of TTOs has given rise to a new medium in which scientific
discoveries are transferred from academia to industry (Figure 4.9). Traditionally,
the transfer of scientific discoveries occurred without intermediaries and it primarily
took place through non-commercial channels which include informal interactions,
publications, conference presentations, education/training and collaborative research
(Figure 4.9a). Today, TTOs are created as mediating institutions to facilitate the
transfer of IP resulting from publicly funded research to industry through contractual
arrangements. This new mode of transfer typically involves IP-based channels such as
patenting, licensing, and creating spin-offs (Figure 4.9b).
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Academia Industry
Knowledge flow                Direct                                                                    Through intermediary
Nature of 
communication                 Generally informal                                                Contractural
Academia IndustryTTO
Dissemination 
channels Non-commercial routes Commercial routes
Publications
Education/training
Conferences
Seminars
Informal contacts
Licensing
Spin-offs
Contract research
Consultancy
Direct transfer Indirect transfer(a) (b)
Figure 4.9 Modes of transfer of scientific discoveries from academia to industry: (a)
direct transfer, (b) indirect transfer.
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4.4.2 Forms of Technology Transfer Offices
Generally universities have been required to bear the substantial financial and staffing
costs in establishing TTOs. Based on the level of resources that are available and the
functions that need to be carried out, universities have adopted two main structural
arrangements for TTOs:
• an internal division which exists within the university administration; and
• an entity which is constituted as a separate, corporate entity but with the
university as the majority owner of shares (Allen Consulting Group, 2004, p. 29).
Smaller and regional universities typically manage research commercialisation related
activities through their internal research offices with a relatively passive approach. The
advantage of this arrangement is that it has lower establishment and compliance costs.
Due to comparatively low levels of research expenditure, the amount of IP generated
from these universities is insufficient to justify a separate TTO. Often the internal
research office takes on additional commercialisation related tasks and provides a “one
stop shop” for faculty members (Harman & Harman, 2004).
Some of the bigger and more established universities tend to set up a separate TTO
based inside the university administration, often in parallel to and closely linked with
their research offices. A key strength of this form is that the TTO remains within the
university and it can receive strong and visible support from the senior management.
The best known example of this structural arrangement is the Business Liaison Office
(BLO) at the University of Sydney. The BLO is the commercialisation arm of the
university which handles collaborative research, contract research, consulting, joint
ventures, facilitation of the formation of spin-off companies, technology transfer and
commercialisation. The university also has a Research Office which manages research
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grants and contracts, ethics and scholarships. Both units report administratively to the
Pro Vice-Chancellor Research (Harman & Harman, 2004; Allen Consulting Group,
2004).
Amongst the eight research-intensive universities, six have established technology
transfer companies. The logic for establishing an incorporated entity is that, as the
entity’s purpose is to carry out a commercial function, it is appropriate that it has a
corporate form with all that implies for governance and the applications of corporate
law. This arrangement has placed technology transfer functions on a more commercial
and professional basis. Arguments supporting this approach are:
• the board of a company can be constituted to comprise people external to the
university who have the expertise in licensing and establishing new companies;
• the chief executive of the company can be paid at commercial rates to attract
people with the right capabilities;
• decisions can be made more quickly;
• risk can be shifted away from the university;
• resourcing of the company and accounting for it can be clearly defined (Allen
Consulting Group, 2004, p. 29).
Apart from the advantages, there are a number of issues associated with establishing
university technology transfer companies. The key problem relates to raising funding
to support ongoing research commercialisation. Since earnings from licences, sale
of patents, and spin-offs often take considerable time to realise, technology transfer
companies need to find a substantial source of funding. In a few cases, such funding
has been provided by the parent university; but most likely, the technology transfer
companies need to undertake income-generating activities such as offering educational
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and consulting services and being involved in international projects. As the technology
transfer companies become increasingly preoccupied with income generation to ensure
survival, they may neglect their original technology transfer focus (Harman & Harman,
2004).
One of the most highly regarded technology transfer entities in Australia is UniQuest
which is the wholly owned company of the University of Queensland. UniQuest was
established in 1983 as the technology and consulting company. Its main function is
to identify and package commercially valuable technologies and expertise from the
university and bring them to the market via licensing, venture capital funded start-
up companies and consulting activities. The university invested $5 million equity in
UniQuest in 1995 with the aim of building a professional team and implementing a
commercialisation strategy with a ten-year horizon. In making this investment, the
university accepted that a positive return was unlikely within five years (ACI, Howard
Partners & Carisgold, 2002; Allen Consulting Group, 2004).
With the university’s support, UniQuest has reorganised itself and become the best
performing technology transfer entity in Australia. Royalty income grew from less
than $2 million in 1998 to $15 million in 2001. The number of start-up companies
established has averaged just over two per year from 1995 to 2000. Each year Uniquest
handles over a hundred new IP disclosures and a few dozens provisional patents (ACI,
Howard Partners & Carisgold, 2002). The performance of UniQuest will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter 6.
A particular feature of UniQuest is its decentralisation approach to IP identification
and support. Recognising that TTOs are often at the periphery of core university
activities and therefore finding it difficult to build effective ongoing links with the
academics, since 1999 UniQuest has adopted a “hub and spoke” management structure
to maximise commercial opportunities. Vital to this structure are the Managers of
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Innovation and Commercial Development who are based in the faculties and work
collaboratively with the researchers to identify, protect and package new discoveries
for commercialisation. These managers then draw on the resources based within
UniQuest headquarters (the hub) to identify market opportunities and manage the
exchange and commercialisation of knowledge with industry and government. This
approach has proved to be quite successful and has been adopted by a number of other
Australian universities (ACI, Howard Partners & Carisgold, 2002).
The University of New South Wales has made recent changes to its technology transfer
office. Established in 1959, UniSearch is the oldest university technology transfer
company in Australia. Its creation was quite innovative at the time, but over time,
UniSearch became increasingly preoccupied with consulting and offering non-award
educational services. A few years ago, Unisearch’s focus on income generation led
to its non-technology-transfer functions being hived off to a new company, namely
UNSW Global Education. This allowed Unisearch to concentrate solely on research
commercialisation. Senior management of the university took the view that technology
transfer and provision of education services are very different businesses with different
financial and business needs, and providing different services to different clients. As
a result of this view, UniSearch was restructured and changed its name to NewSouth
Innovations. With $10 million capital injected by the university, NewSouth Innovations
recruited new staff with a stronger commercial background (Harman & Harman, 2004).
In the last few years, there has been a trend for universities to work together for joint
activities in research commercialisation. One of the best-known examples is UniSeed,
a company set up in 2000 jointly by UniQuest from the University of Queensland
and Melbourne Ventures from the University of Melbourne. Each of the founding
universities provided Uniseed with $10 million to fund early-stage commercialisation.
Since then through investment commitment from Westscheme, Western Australia’s
largest non-government superannuation fund, the University of New South Wales and
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further investment from the founding universities, the fund has grown to over $60
million. Uniseed represents a unique commercial partnership between the technology
transfer companies of three universities: UniQuest, Melbourne Venture and NewSouth
Innovations. It provides its partnership universities with access to pre-seed and seed
funding, so that early-stage inventions can be developed to the point where external
investors are likely to become interested (Uniseed, 2009).
4.4.3 Managing Intellectual Property
In Australia, there is no government patent legislation over IP resulting from federally-
sponsored research. IP management in universities follows the National Principles
of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research. Although the
national principles give the universities the possibility to own IP, these principles have
no legal force.
Apart from the national principles, the Ownership of Intellectual Property in University
Policy and Good Practice Guide also influences university practice. This guideline
was developed by the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee in 2002 to provide
“advice on how to deal with questions of ownership of intellectual property generated
within the institution by staff, students, under agreements with outside bodies, and
under grants or sponsorship” (AVCC, 2002, p. 5). Similar to the national principles,
this policy guide has no legislative effect in any university unless its recommendations
are incorporated into individual university policies and procedures (Collier, 2007).
The ownership of IP is generally viewed by administrators as providing strong incentive
for universities to commercialise the research they produce. Almost all Australian
universities now assert ownership of IP created by university employed researchers in
the course of their work. The key factor which supports a university’s claim is the use
of university resources to generate the IP. Australian universities usually require the
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disclosure of new discoveries as part of their IP policies. Researchers are not allowed
to publicly disclose potentially valuable IP until arrangements to protect it have been
made with the university TTO (Allen Consulting Group, 2004).
There is no standard national formula for allocating royalties from licences. Based
on the national principles and the guideline, each university has adopted its own set
of IP policies and procedures. The most common approach for distributing returns
from successful commercialisation of IP involves a three-way equal split between the
inventor, department and the university. More complex schemes involve a return to the
university TTO, and a higher return to the inventor when the revenue to be distributed
is small (ACI, Howard Partners & Carisgold, 2002).
Due to the lack of a standardised university IP policy, there is some ambiguity in
sharing of profits from research commercialisation activities. According to a study
carried out by the Allen Consulting Group (2004), the point at which profits become
payable under some of these policies is not well defined. Some university IP policies
are not clear on what costs should be deducted from revenues to arrive at a profit.
In addition, IP policies are frequently silent on the allocation of part of the profit to
the university TTO. In addition to receiving a share of the profits, the university TTO
needs to recover costs, including costs incurred in protecting discoveries that have not
yet and may never yield a profit.
4.4.4 Selecting Commercialisation Mechanisms
The two principle routes for commercialising publicly funded research are to license
the IP to an existing company in exchange of royalties or set up a spin-off company
and take an equity stake. Universities may choose either mechanism, dependent on the
opportunities and their institutional policies. Licensing the IP to an existing company
in the target industry is relatively simple and can be executed reasonably fast. The risks
and resource requirements associated with licensing are much lower than in forming
spin-offs. However, spin-off is often the mechanism of choice where a market does
not presently exist for the product or service involved, or when the IP may have the
potential to generate larger financial returns to the research institution (Rogers, Yin, &
Hoffmann, 2000; Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2004).
Licensing has traditionally been the most popular mechanism for promoting research
commercialisation. A licensing agreement provides a company with the legal right
to use a university’s invention for further commercial development. In return, the
university receives revenue in the form of upfront fees at the time of closing the deal,
and annual, ongoing royalty payments that are contingent upon the commercial success
of the technology in the market (Siegel et al., 2003a).
One of the strengths associated with licensing is that the university can control to
whom to license the technology. A non-exclusive licence is desirable if the university
invention has broad applications and can be used in multiple industries. On the other
hand, when the invention requires significant private investment to reach the market,
the university may consider granting an exclusive licence. This is especially the
case in drug discovery (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). Without an exclusive licence to
protect the potential target from competition, a biopharmaceutical company is often
unwilling to take the high risk and invest the time and hundreds of millions of dollars in
development and clinical testing that are needed to bring a new drug to market (Jensen
& Thursby, 2001).
The downside associated with licensing is that royalties can only be earned if a licensee
has successfully turned a university invention into a marketable product. Given the
uncertain nature of university technology, the probability of taking it to market is often
very low (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). Along the way, the licensee may dramatically
improve upon the licensed technology before developing it into a new product (Levin,
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Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987). If the original university patent becomes less
relevant to the final product, the licensee may not need to pay royalties to the university.
Even if the licensee does pay royalties, the time it takes a university from signing a
licensing agreement to obtaining financial returns can be rather long. For biomedical
inventions that need Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, 8 to 12 years of
development is not unusual.
Until recently, many Australian universities have been focused on the spin-off route.
In a study of the role of spin-off companies as a commercialisation channel for public
research, Yecken and Gillin (2002) reported that the rate of spin-off establishment has
increased since 1995 (Figure 4.10). Between 1998 and 2000, 78 direct research spin-
offs4 were established by public sector research agencies. Support for use of spin-offs
as a commercialisation route was particularly strong for large and medium research
universities. There are a number of reasons behind favouring the spin-off route.
First of all, creating a spin-off is perceived to offer higher overall financial return than
licensing to an established company (Thorburn, 2000a). Holding equity of a spin-off
provides a university with options or financial claims on the company’s future income
streams. The attractiveness of equity is that the university can capture value from the
spin-off, even if the licensed technology fails to be taken to the market. This is because
the value of the equity is linked to the overall success of the spin-off, not to the success
of particular IP. Spin-offs often go public long before they have introduced products
into the market. By cashing out equity holding in a spin-off, the university can receive
a financial return on its technology within a few years (Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz, &
Burton, 2002).
4Direct research spin-offs are companies which have been created in order to commercialise IP
arising out a research institution where IP is licensed, usually through a patent, from the research
institution to the new firm to form the founding IP of the firm (Yencken & Gillin, 2002, p. 10).
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Figure 4.10 Direct spin-offs established by public research institutions.
Source: data for the plot are obtained from Yencken and Gillin (2002).
Secondly, establishing a spin-off can enhance the commercialisation of university
inventions that would otherwise go undeveloped because they are too uncertain for
established companies to pursue. In a survey of industry licensing executives, Thursby
and Thursby (2000) found that one of the most important reasons why established
companies do not license IP from universities is the early stage of development of
the inventions. When existing companies do license university inventions, they tend to
license technology that is at a later stage of development (Thursby, Jensen, & Thursby,
2001). Matkin (1990) reported that the most common reason for university researchers
founding their spinoffs was that existing companies would not license and develop
their inventions, and they wanted their technology to be commercialised.
Another reason why setting up a spin-off is considered to be more attractive than
licensing is that it can enhance economic development, not only through producing
innovative products, but also through job creation particularly for highly educated
people. According to the estimation made by the Allen Consulting Group (2003),
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in 2002, the total economic impacts associated with commercialisation of publicly
funded R&D through spin-offs included 10,000 jobs.
Despite the advantages associated with the spin-off mechanism, forming a company
often requires substantial resources from the parent research institution. To support a
spin-off, the university needs to acquire skills in a number of areas where it may have
limited experience, such as raising capital, identifying and enlisting commercial board
members and managers, and valuing assets.
4.5 Summary
This chapter explained some of the main factors which have contributed to Australian
universities’ involvement in research commercialisation and described the TTO-based
structural arrangements that have been implemented.
To encourage universities to commercialise their research findings, the Australian
government has introduced a number of policies and support schemes, particularly
in the biotechnology sector. The aims of these government initiatives are to strengthen
university-industry linkage and to facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries to
industry. By allowing universities to own patents resulting from government sponsored
research, the National Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly
Funded Research provides strong incentives for universities to participate in research
commercialisation. Although this patent policy does not mandate IP-based technology
transfer as a university practice, most universities have instituted formal policies and
systems to manage and commercialise the IP resulting from publicly funded research.
After understanding the historical background and the general context of the research
commercialisation phenomenon in Australia, we are now in a good position to answer
the two guiding research questions formulated at the beginning of this study (p. 6).
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Chapter 5
Divergent Views on Research Commercialisation
Give no decision till both sides thou’st heard.
Phocylides
(Greek poet, 6th century B.C.)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the first research question of this study and explores how research
commercialisation is perceived from the perspectives of Australian academic scientists,
technology transfer managers, and entrepreneurs/business managers.
Although research commercialisation has been defined as the transfer a new scientific
discovery from academia to industry in the thesis, this definition does not cover all
possible meanings that have been attached to the term. I provided a working definition
at the beginning of my thesis to set up the boundary for my research and to minimise
ambiguity.
My interviews 1 with various participants revealed that in practice there are multiple
definitions of research commercialisation. The term has often been used loosely,
referring to different matters by different participants. The specific meaning which
they attach to the term shapes their motivation, objectives and patterns of behaviours.
At the individual participant level, most of the respondents are not fully aware of
the existence of multiple meanings associated with research commercialisation. They
1Sample interview questions are shown in Appendix C.
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often assume that other participants have the same understanding, and therefore do
not see the need to specify their perspective. However, without stating the specific
meaning in which they refer to can lead to many problems in the commercialisation
process.
5.2 Perspectives from Academic Scientists
5.2.1 Definitions
One of the empirical findings of this study is that academic scientists often use the term
research commercialisation interchangeably with technology transfer. Technology
transfer refers to “the movement of know-how, technical knowledge, or technology
from one organisation to another” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 629). The most common
use of the term technology transfer is in relation to the transfer of inventions and
associated know-hows from research organisations to research users. Interviews with
academic scientists revealed that some of them referred to research commercialisation
as a narrower subset of technology transfer which was only concerned with the transfer
of IP resulting from public sector research through contractual arrangements; while
others adopted a broader technology transfer perspective which involved the transfer
of scientific discoveries through a variety of channels.
Two main definitions of research commercialisation from the perspective of academic
scientists emerged from my field visits at several Australian universities and research
institutes:
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Definition 1. (Narrow)
Research commercialisation is the transfer of IP resulting from public sector research
into the private sector.
Definition 2. (Broad)
Research commercialisation is the transfer of public research findings into the private
sector.
My empirical data show that an academic scientist may adopt one or the other definition,
with each definition often linked to a distinctive objective. For example, when I asked
a university professor what research commercialisation meant to him, he adopted
definition 2 (broad) and explained that his objective for commercialising his research
was to translate research findings into a useful product that would benefit humankind:
Commercialisation is the transfer of a great idea or finding into the private
development of a product. You don’t have to make a lot of money, but
you have to say if I invent a vaccine that is useful for HIV or whatever,
then if I don’t take out a patent on it, if I don’t commercially develop it,
then it’s all a waste of time. If your research is a waste of time, if you
are not prepared to translate that research or get this research translated
into something useful. So that’s my commercial development. It’s not
making money, or setting up a company. It’s really that the transfer of
your invention into a technology: that is, useful; that is, benefits. It’s the
translation of that research that benefits the human population. The only
way for that to occur is through commercialisation, and no one else would
do that.
In answering the same question, another professor used definition 1 (narrow). For him,
the goal of research commercialisation was:
Taking a piece of research so that it generates a non-government derived
funding stream, or at least a part of the funding stream that is non-government
derived.
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5.2.2 Attitudes
Another finding of this study was that an academic scientist’s attitude towards research
commercialisation is often been associated with the definition he or she has adopted.
Overall, despite the increasing awareness of the importance of patenting, licensing
and creating spin-offs, many academic scientists still distanced themselves from such
endeavours. In describing this general tendency, a university professor said:
There’s a much more widespread appreciation of commercial reality in
the universities than I think that anybody outsiders is aware of, but within
the university there is only a certain number of people there who have
that. And in chemistry and biomolecular science for example, I think
there is a general air of disdain towards the people who actually prostitute
themselves to get outside money. I think there is still an English-type habit
that still is maintained at universities here.
When definition 1 (narrow) was employed, most academic scientists interviewed were
against research commercialisation. Specifically, they were negative about protecting
research findings in the form of IP and profiting from it. They believed that scientific
discoveries resulting from government funded research should be made freely available
to the public. For example, in commenting on his colleague’s negative attitude towards
commercialisation, a professor stated:
There are people in this place who believe it is completely immoral to
even contemplate commercialising anything because we receive money
from the government, and on behalf of the taxpayers and we have a duty
therefore to make everything publicly available.
In this study, only a small number of scientists who adopted definition 1 (narrow)
embraced patenting, licensing and spin-off activities. These scientists typically viewed
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research commercialisation as a means to raise additional funding to support their
research, and they did not find such activities interfere with basic research. A professor
described how his commercial work blended nicely with his other research activities:
It is pretty integrated. Because I think a lot of things feed off one another.
Obviously you have to be careful about taking important things you might
have discovered in a commercial context and pushing them back into the
academic arena without the agreement of the company or collaborator
involved. But what we do find is if I’ve got a reasonable large research
group — a group who have been doing strictly academic things that are
initiated from within the group without any major external commercial
influences — often we make discoveries in that academic activity that can
be applied to the more commercially arranged. . . and I make the point to
any potential collaborators there is merit in backing the research we are
doing for them within my larger research group because there are often
discoveries we make within our more academic activities that can help to
progress the work that is commercially oriented. So there is at least a flow
of information into all the commercially oriented activities and we would
unashamedly in our commercially oriented work capture anything useful
from the academic research and apply it if that was appropriate. So I like
to have this blend of commercial activity and academic activity and if you
want to differentiate them like that — I like to have that blend within the
group because they fire off one another. . .
On the other hand, when definition 2 (broad) was adopted, academic scientists who
participated in this study tended to be very positive about research commercialisation.
They were optimistic about the possibility that by working closely with industry, their
research results could be transformed into new treatments to alleviate diseases and
suffering. They viewed research commercialisation as a means to make a difference in
society. Nevertheless, despite their enthusiasm about technology transfer in general,
the majority of them were very much against an IP-based formalised approach to
technology transfer. They believed that universities should not be directly involved
in the management of IP generated by their staff members. A typical remark from a
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university scientist was:
There are people in the commercial sector who know how to commercialise
science. And probably they make a lot of money commercialising science.
My feeling if I can give my opinion, is that universities shouldn’t try to
do that. They tried to do that by having something called Unisearch, and I
don’t think they can match the expertise you are going to get if you walk
out there into some expensive capital investment firm or whatever. They
are going to have access to a lot more capital and a lot more expertise, it
seems to me. And what the university ends up developing is something
that is inferior to what the financial sector can offer. So it is bound to
fail. So I think what universities maybe should do, is develop the science
and the intellectual property, and have an office that doesn’t really try to
be an investment firm or a capital fundraising firm. They should actually
outsource that. They should go out into the sector that already has the
expertise, already has that.
5.2.3 Motivation
The analyses of my interviews show that there are three main reasons for an academic
scientist to engage in research commercialisation activities. The motivation is also
linked to the definition one has in mind.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, academic scientists who adopted definition 2 (broad)
were not motivated by personal financial gains, but rather by their intrinsic desire to
make things happen and to make a difference in society. A representative comment
from an associate professor was:
I don’t want to go to my grave with a little grave stand saying lots of nice
papers, but never did anything to cure a single disease or anything. . . I like
to see my work, my intellects, stuff and my teams can go somewhere to
alleviate suffering, simply moral. . . I just do not find it very exciting to
churn out more and more papers which increase all the general body of
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knowledge and that stuff, I think that is OK and I don’t have any problem
with it. But it is just for me not enough. So I will sacrifice papers if I can
see if there is application there.
For academic scientists who employed definition 1 (narrow), different driving forces
were identified in this study. Some of them were pressured by their university to
commercialise; while others viewed research commercialisation as a way to generate
additional research funding. An example of the first motivation was illustrated by a
comment made by a university department chair:
So in general it is an attitude and a mandate that is coming down from the
top. We have to play the ball.
A representative remark on the latter motivation was:
Really in the early days it was about trying to maintain a research program
and finding a number of different sources of funding, and commercial sorts
of funding was one such stream.
In summary, more than one definition of research commercialisation was identified in
this study. From the perspective of an academic scientist, research commercialisation
is essentially the same as technology transfer. Some of them referred to it as a narrow
subset of technology transfer which involved the transfer of IP through formal legal
arrangements; while others took a broader technology transfer view. The definition
an academic scientist adopted in turn shaped his or her motivation, objectives and
attitudes towards research commercialisation.
An important finding of my research was that regardless of the definition one had in
mind, most academic scientists interviewed were positive about transferring research
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findings to industry for the public benefits. However, they were negative about an IP-
based formalised approach to technology transfer. This finding will be explained in
more detail in the following chapter.
5.3 Perspectives from Technology Transfer Managers
5.3.1 Definitions
My interviews with technology transfer managers showed that they also do not make a
clear distinction between the term research commercialisation and technology transfer.
Similarly to the academic scientists, they often referred to research commercialisation
as technology transfer, although their perspectives on the transfer channels might differ
depending on the specific definition one adopted.
Most technology transfer managers interviewed were concerned with IP-based transfer
channels and they defined the term as the sale of university IP to industry. Only a very
few TTO respondents adopted a broader technology transfer view in their definition
and they believed that the transfer of public research findings to industry could occur
through a variety of channels.
The two main definitions identified in this study are summarised below:
Definition 1. (IP-based)
Research commercialisation is the sale of IP resulting from public sector research into
the private sector.
Definition 2. (technology transfer-based)
Research commercialisation is the transfer of a research finding resulting from public
sector research into the private sector.
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One of the empirical findings of this study was that the objective of a TTO has often
been associated with the definition its manager adopted. When definition 1 (IP-based)
was employed, a TTO tended to be concerned with two main objectives: to facilitate
the transfer of university technology to industry through IP-based channels; and to
generate financial returns from licensing and spin-off activities. A typical remark from
a university technology transfer manager was:
. . . increasing the measure for the universities is not just what used to
be called ‘knowledge transfer’, it is whether or not the universities gain
appropriate consideration. In other words if they make a commercial gain
or get some commercial benefit as a result of the transaction. A lot of
people would have said our responsibility is about knowledge transfer, and
it’s not commercial, and its never going to make any dividends, or benefits
for the university at all. And I don’t think that is true at all. Certainly our
ethos is to successfully transfer the technology, see social impacts, see
the benefits and see new industries created, but equally see the University
appropriately compensated for the effort it has put in.
Out of these two objectives, the financial objective seemed to be given more weight by
the TTOs. Many technology transfer managers interviewed who adopted definition 1
(IP-based) mentioned the importance of achieving profitability through commercial
activities. An illustrative remark was:
So in that sense we are looking to become a profitable enterprise in our
own right. And we can only achieve profitability if we are generating
some pretty serious commercial returns. And our aim is to try and see any
profits that we generate and reinvest it back into research — strategically
used by the university to target research or help with a particular focus.
However, not all technology transfer managers interviewed shared this view. A very
small number of them adopted definition 2 (technolgy transfer-based) and the objective
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of their office was not about maximising revenue, but to assist the university to get its
research findings used by the private sector. A representative comment was:
So my view in this office is that commercialisation is a way of taking
technology from the bench to the bedside. So if you have an invention or
an idea or an anticancer diagnostic you know you really have to generally
pass through the commercialisation process if you want to get that out
and used by people. . . When we think commercially — this office, or the
way I view commercialisation, it is not about dollars. Particularly our
Technology Transfer Office, if it thinks it is going to make money, it won’t.
5.3.2 Role of a TTO
The role of a TTO often varies from one research institution to another. The empirical
data of this study show that the definition of research commercialisation also influences
a technology transfer manager’s perception about the role of his office.
When definition 1 (IP-based) was adopted, there seemed to be a strong sentiment
amongst the technology transfer managers to safeguard research findings from industry.
Many technology transfer managers interviewed believed that IP derived from publicly
funded research should not be free and industry needs to pay commercial rates for it.
For example, speaking on behalf of his office, a university TTO director said:
I think historically companies used to sort of rape and pillage universities.
They come, they pick up the science, they sign a little consulting agreement
with the scientist, and they’d run away with the technology and they got
stuff for relatively little cost — of great value. . . Our attitude is now, no.
We are safeguarding the taxpayer’s money. The university’s money. You’re
putting a quarter of a million in, the universities putting in half a million
in, if you want the technology that comes out of it you have to pay for
it! You can’t expect to leverage one dollar to three dollars, and get the
intellectual property for nothing. You’re going to pay commercial rates
for it.
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This comment reflects an underlying belief that the results of publicly-funded research
have commercial value in themselves. That is, the technology transfer managers see
the IP from public research as a marketable product, not simply as an input into the
process of developing a commercially viable product.
The majority of university technology transfer managers who participated in this study
used definition 1 (IP-based), and they believed the role of their office was to identify,
package, and sell IP resulting from public sector research to industry. A representative
remark from a university technology transfer manager was:
Our primary responsibility is strictly, basically, identifying inventions and
research outcomes, managing the patent portfolio, negotiating licences,
option agreements and assignments, and setting up start-up or new spin-
off companies. And that’s all we do, within reason.
The small number of respondents who adopted definition 2 (technology transfer-based)
perceived the role of their office was to assist the university to form collaborative
partnerships with industry. An illustrative comment is shown below:
The primary purpose of the role is to look at how do we form research
partnerships within industry. So how do we have some ideas to do good
research, and how we identify on the one hand, the opportunity to do
research, and on the other hand the capability and the skills and put them
together. . . So a key part of my job in this particular role is looking at what
are the shared objectives. What do we want out of it as a university and
what does industry want out of the project specifically? And making sure
that we can align them so we are heading in the right direction.
5.3.3 View on the Commercialisation Process
Due to the existence of multiple definitions of research commercialisation, technology
transfer managers often have different views on the research commercialisation process.
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When definition 1 (IP-based) was adopted, the majority of the respondents viewed
research commercialisation as a transactional process where IP resulting from public
sector research could be packaged and sold to industry. Their underlying assumption
was that there is some objective monetary value associated with university IP if it is
packaged and marketed properly. In illustrating this view, a university TTO director
said:
We pursue a model where those innovations that we — not just disclosures,
we work them up and we really package the information in terms of what
the market is — whether there’s protectable intellectual property, whether
there’s competitors out there for that type of thing, whether there is a
market need for the opportunity. . .
The technology transfer managers who used definition 1 (IP-based) were also inclined
to view research commercialisation as a one-way process where the TTO played a
critical role. When I asked the question whether scientists/inventors were involved
in the negotiation of IP, the most common response I received from the technology
transfer managers was “no”. Moreover, these technology transfer managers thought
they should be in control of the research commercialisation process. One university
technology transfer manager phrased this view as follows:
We use the researchers as a way of helping us present the scientific and
technical aspects of the technology. They certainly help us sell the product
in the broader sense, but they are certainly not involved in structuring
the deal or completing any of the commercial negotiations. . . We have to
make that assessment ourselves. So we assess the technology for research
commercialisation. We are probably assessing three things: the intellectual
property position, the technology itself and its market and commercial
potential; and we are looking carefully at the researchers who are often
multiple and really making sure they are going to come along on the
ride with us and they are not going to cause a problem and that will be
actually complementary to the whole process, rather than obstructionist
or whatever.
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On the other hand, when definition 2 (technology transfer-based) was employed, the
respondents tended to view research commercialisation as a dynamic process which
is far more than a simple financial transaction. They perceived their role was to align
different interests to ensure the university inventions or discoveries got transferred and
eventually used by the industry. For example, a university technology transfer manager
said:
If you are going to be in a Technology Transfer Office, you need to get
more personal with the technology and work with the personalities to get
it over the line. So it’s a lot more than a simple financial transaction. . . In
this role here you have to be able to manage the scientists. You have to
understand their needs and where they are at, and their funding position,
and you have to understand what the companies want. You have to try and
align that over a five or six year timeframe because that’s how long it is
going to take.
Contrary to the first type of technology transfer managers (IP-based), the respondents
who adopted definition 2 (technology transfer-based) considered scientists critically
important in the research commercialisation process. They thought scientists were
the primary driving force behind the technology and should be kept involved. In
explaining this view, a university technology transfer manager stated:
So part of this office, my role in this office is to get out to the scientists
and to remind them in a positive way to use this office. I have to be
careful because they bring in the work. It is through them — through
their capabilities, through their lab’s capability that the work comes in the
first place.
5.3.4 Motivation
The motivation of a technology transfer manager has rarely been examined in literature.
This study found that regardless of the definition of research commercialisation one
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adopted, the majority of technology transfer managers interviewed were driven by an
intrinsic, and sometimes altruistic, desire to help their orgnisations to commercialise
scientific discoveries. A typical response from a technology transfer manager was:
So the question was, who else in Australia does interesting science around
inventions and ideas? And I realised university commercialisation arms
and academics were doing this all the time, playing at the cutting edge of
science. But I also realised that they didn’t really know how to turn that
into valuable stuff. And that’s where my experience was. My experience
was innovation and exploring in a sense from a commercial point of view,
so it was at that point I said, let’s go back into academia. I hadn’t taught
at that stage. It was just simply to help commercialise ideas.
Most respondents of this study had PhD and MBA qualifications as well as many
years of scientific research and business experience. They sincerely believed that
their offices had all the necessary knowledge and skills to help academic scientists to
commercialise their research findings. In illustrating this point, a technology transfer
manager said:
The help is out there. There are people who have done this before. There
are entrepreneurs out there who have done it and they are more than
happy to help universities do stuff. And our commercialisation arms are
full of people who are business development managers who have been
entrepreneurs. We’ve got a whole bunch here who have done it. They
have set up businesses themselves, globally. We have people here in IT
and solar, biotech, and they keep coming back to universities to help others
do it — to learn from their mistakes if you like.
In summary, this study shows that research commercialisation is understood differently
by different technology transfer managers. The majority of them adopted an IP-based
perspective in their definition and they were primarily concerned with the protection,
packaging and sale of university IP to industry. This prevailing definition in turn
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shaped the objectives of their office. On one hand, their office was focused on the
generation of financial returns from licensing and spin-offs activities; but on the other
hand, it was also concerned with facilitating the transfer of university IP to industry.
Only a very small number of technology transfer managers interviewed took a broad
technology transfer perspective in their definition of research commercialisation. They
perceived that the transfer of public research findings to industry could happen through
a variety of channels. Their objective was not about maximising revenues, but to assist
the university to get its research findings transferred and used by industry.
Despite the existence of multiple definitions, all respondents from the technology
transfer manager group genuinely believed that they were there to facilitate the research
commercialisation process.
5.4 Perspectives from Entrepreneurs/CEOs
5.4.1 Definition
A key finding of this study was that respondents from the industry stakeholder group
had a completely different understanding of research commercialisation compared
to academic scientists and technology transfer managers. From the perspective of
entrepreneurs and CEOs, research commercialisation is the process of moving ideas
from the laboratory bench to the marketplace and there is no ambiguity in its meaning.
Consistently, the term has been defined as the process of transforming a research
finding into a marketable product or service.
Their definition of research commercialisation is very different from the concept of
technology transfer. All respondents from the industry stakeholder group stated that
research commercialisation is much more than handling over a piece of university IP
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to the private sector. An illustrated remark was as follows:
By research commercialisation, I mean making a product, launching it,
advertising it, supporting it all that stuff which goes on afterwards; whereas
what a university might mean by research commercialisation, is handing
a piece of technology to a company to do that.
This clearly illustrates that to an entrepreneur of a spin-off company the value of public
research findings is likely to be fairly low compares to that places on the same research
findings by academic scientists and technology transfer managers. The concept of
research commercialisation to an entrepreneur involves much more than what it does
from inside a university. In the entrepreneur’s conception, public research results are
just one input into the process.
5.4.2 View on the Commercialisation Process
Research commercialisation has been perceived as an iterative long-term process from
the perspective of entrepreneurs and CEOs who participated in this study. According
to the respondents, having a promising research finding is an extremely small part of
the overall process. To successfully turn an idea into a marketable product, a lot of
additional work needs to be involved.
Their view on the underlying research commercialisation process was very different
from academic scientists and technology transfer managers. From the perspective of
entrepreneurs and CEOs, research commercialisation does not stop after a university
invention is transferred over. In explaining their difference, an entrepreneur from a
biotechnology spin-off said:
So one of the key things I found is that the view of the world from an
academic’s point of view and the view from an entrepreneur’s point of
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view is quite different and the expectations are different. So an academic
may think their idea is the best thing ever, therefore everybody has to
support it and fund it and protect it. But in actual fact their idea is one in a
thousand, and they don’t really understand the whole amount of work that
needs to be done, to get from the initial idea to the final product. And often
the figures that are used that you would have come across — people say the
‘idea’ is maybe 5% of everything. It is just 5% of the commercialisation
process. It’s not 100%.
5.5 Collision of Interests
The empirical data of this study illustrate the existence of multiple meanings associated
with the term research commercialisation. At the individual participant level, none
of the respondents realised that the specific meaning they attach to the term actually
shapes their particular view on research commercialisation. This particular view in
turn drives their behaviours and actions.
Within the university stakeholder group, both the academic scientists and technology
transfer managers perceived research commercialisation to be the same as technology
transfer. Although a small number of respondents adopted a broader perspective, the
majority viewed research commercialisation as the process of transferring IP resulting
from public sector research to industry. Under this prevailing view, a new scientific
discovery is transferred to the private sector through IP-based channels. The process
is depicted in Figure 5.1A.
This process is transactional and sequential in nature. It typically begins with a new
scientific discovery or invention which is made by a university researcher working
under a publicly-funded project. In compliance with the university’s commercialisation
policy, this scientist needs to file an invention disclosure with the TTO. The TTO then
tries to access the commercial potential of this invention and decides whether patent
protection is worthwhile. Given the high cost of filing and protecting patents, only
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if the invention can attract considerable interest from industry, will the TTO proceed
to lodge a patent application. Depending on the size of potential financial return, the
university may choose to apply for domestic or international patent protection. Once
the patent is awarded, the TTO needs to market the IP and negotiate with the interested
industry partners. At this stage, the university may choose to license the patent to an
existing company in exchange of royalties or setting up a spin-off company and taking
an equity stake.
From an industry perspective, my interviews with entrepreneurs and CEOs show that
research commercialisation is the process of moving a promising research idea to the
marketplace. It goes far beyond transferring IP through a simple financial transaction.
As illustrated in Figure 5.1B, the process typically begins with the perception of a new
market opportunity and/or a new invention; this is followed by the analytical design
for a new product or process, and subsequently leads to development, production and
marketing. For industry, research commercialisation is not a sequential process which
flows from point “A” to point “B”, but rather an interactive path with a great deal of
back-and-forth feedback loops. Short feedback loops link each downstream phase in
the central chain with the phase immediately preceding it and longer feedback loops
link perceived market demand and product users with phases upstream. This view
agrees with the model proposed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986).
Due to their different views, when university and industry stakeholders discuss research
commercialisation, they actually refer to different processes operating under different
time-scales. This in turn influences their perception on the value of university IP.
The technology transfer managers interviewed often perceive university IP as an end
product which can be packaged and sold to industry with a high price tag. However,
the entrepreneurs and CEOs perceive university IP as a very small component of their
product development process, and from their point of view, most university inventions
are at too early a stage to justify the asking price. In commenting on the value of
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Figure 5.1 Two representative views on research commercialisation: (a) university
perspective, (b) industry perspective.
Source: (b) adapted from Kline and Rosenberg (1986).
university IP, a CEO of a biotechnology spin-off company said:
Institutions always ask me how you evaluate IP, what’s the IP worth, and I
always say that IP is worth what you can earn from it. Intrinsically, it isn’t
worth anything. They don’t like this very much.
My interviews with respondents from the industry stakeholder group showed that
generally speaking, a scientific discovery generated from a university has many issues
(e.g. technology, legal) which need to be resolved. A substantial amount of work is
therefore required by industry to take it to a stage where it can be incorporated into
product development. To illustrate the early nature of a university research finding, an
entrepreneur commented:
University research generally comes with warts and a lot of problems
haven’t been sorted out, and even though the scientist is championing that
thing, this is great, a lot of the confirmation data, like the animal model
data, hasn’t been done. It is all in negative. So that scientists work on
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the positives, what could you do with this technology? The company
works on removing the negatives. What are the problems with it? Are
there regulatory issues? Are there quality control issues? Can you even
manufacture it? But the scientist won’t worry about that. They worry
about what you could use it for. So, slightly different mindsets.
5.6 Summary
This chapter described the empirical data obtained from semi-structured interviews
to illustrate how research commercialisation is understood from the perspectives of
academic scientists, technology transfer managers, and entrepreneurs/CEOs. Several
definitions of research commercialisation were identified. Most respondents were not
aware of the existence of multiple meanings associated with the term. Moreover,
the specific meaning they adopted shaped not only their objectives, motivation and
behaviours, but also their particular view on research commercialisation.
A striking difference was discovered between academia and industry stakeholders in
regard to their views on research commercialisation. For the majority of academic
scientists and technology transfer managers interviewed, research commercialisation
is the transfer of IP resulting from publicly funded research to industry. This prevailing
IP-based view dominates our current practice in research commercialisation. However,
from an entrepreneur/CEO perspective, research commercialisation is about moving
ideas from the research laboratory to the marketplace. Having a good idea or IP is
really a small part of the overall process. Without recognising the differences between
these two perspectives can create undesirable outcomes in research commercialisation.
Keeping in mind the existence of different views, in the next chapter, I will examine the
TTO-based structural arrangements that have been implemented to support research
commercialisation and explore how they facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries
from academia to industry.
109
Chapter 6
Research Commercialisation Through TTOs
A good design can’t fix a broken business model.
Jeffery Veen
(Founding partner of Adaptive Path)
6.1 Introduction
Australia’s current TTO-based structural arrangements are heavily influenced by the
prevailing IP-based view described in the previous chapter. With a few exceptions,
most TTOs concentrate on the IP-based channels and assume such channels facilitate
the transfer of academic inventions to industry. By actively seeking the protection and
exploitation of IP resulting from public sector research, the TTOs hope to generate
financial returns to their research institutions as an additional source of revenue.
This chapter addresses the second research question of this study, i.e. how do Australia’s
current TTO-based structural arrangements facilitate the transfer of new scientific
discoveries from academia to industry? Through the analysis of semi-structured face-
to-face interviews and survey data from secondary sources, this question is approached
from two different angles: from the individual level and from the institutional level.
The first part of this chapter describes the research commercialisation experience from
the perspectives of academic scientists, private investors, entrepreneurs/CEOs, and
technology transfer managers. The second part of this chapter examines the institutional
performance in research commercialisation.
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6.2 Commercialisation Experience by Participant Groups
6.2.1 Academic Scientists
My interviews with academic scientists showed that the majority of them found very
few positive incentives to commercialise their research findings, despite the possibility
of financial rewards and the availability of TTO support mechanisms. Only a small
number of academic scientists interviewed embraced patenting, licensing and spin-off
activities and they consistently reported that the main obstacle in commercialisation
was the formalised IP-based processes implemented by the TTOs.
From the perspective of academic scientists, research commercialisation requires much
effort with very little return. A representative remark was made by a professor:
Anyway if you ask me ‘would I recommend to going into the commercial
field’, I would say no, not in this university. I would actively say don’t
waste your time. You would spend a lot of time trying to get things up and
running, and not get anywhere and get no support. So the time that you
spent on that would be better spent in doing your research, and just forget
about commercialisation. I know a lot of people who have that attitude.
They don’t want to get involved simply because it’s too difficult. I have
spent an awful a lot of time, and I still have not seen any reward from that,
simply because my feeling would be because the university itself is not
geared correctly to allow this commercial development to occur.
Many academic scientists stated that their efforts in research commercialisation have
not been recognised by the current academic promotion system. Although increasingly
commercialisation related factors such as the number of patents were considered in
their annual performance review, these factors had very little weight in the actual
promotional decisions reached. Academic promotion was still largely based on peer-
reviewed publications. To illustrate this point, a scientist from a medical research
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institute said:
I don’t keep my job if I produce 10 patents and earn millions of dollars
for Australia. It makes no difference to whether I keep my job or not.
What matters the most whether I keep my job or not is how many papers
I published.
Not only did involvement in research commercialisation rarely get recognised by the
current promotion system, by participating in such activities, a research scientist might
also be jeopardising his career progression in academia. A scientist could potentially
lose his or her funding for basic research due to their commercial endeavours. Without
a project grant, one could not conduct research, publish papers and get promoted. An
associate professor shared his experience as follows:
NHMRC insists that we have a process by which we can commercialise
our stuff. They do an audit to make sure that we have processes allowing
commercialisation, but the reality is that if you do commercialisation, it
takes all your money away. I got from my last NHMRC grant review
report saying that why NHMRC should fund research that will benefit
private company. However the good the science is, they say why we
should fund you, you have got the money.
Financial incentives, such as royalty sharing schemes, have been provided by public
research institutions to encourage their staff scientists to engage in commercialisation
activities. Almost all universities interviewed had policies in place for sharing potential
royalties from licensing; usually a third to the inventor, a third to the faculty and a third
to the university. The proportion of the inventor’s share was occasionally higher in
some universities as a means to increase commitment to research commercialisation.
Despite the presence of this scheme, many respondents failed to see it as a positive
incentive. There was a lack of trust in university administrations that potential financial
returns would flow back to the inventor as stipulated in the policy. For example, a
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professor reported that he literally got no financial return from his three patents that
were successfully licensed. He said:
I mean they always say you are going to get IP revenues, right? You know
that’s the card being thrown at you. The commercialisation office will
come to you and say we will sell this for you and make loads of money.
This is the great white hope, but I am not sure that does occur in some rare
occasions. Any of my commercialisation patents have received money?
Sparsely. Because it is not how it actually works. . .
Overall, this study found that most academic scientists interviewed were not interested
in sacrificing their research and teaching time for research commercialisation, unless
they were pressured by their institutions. The small number of academic scientists who
were enthusiastic about research commercialisation tended to be driven by internal
factors, rather than by external incentives created by their research institutions. The
primary motivation was the desire to make a difference in society which was described
in the previous chapter.
This small number of academic scientists who embraced research commercialisation
reported that they were frequently left out in the commercialisation decision making
processes. On many occasions, their opinions were never sought by the technology
transfer managers. A senior scientist expressed his discontent as follows:
One of the things that really annoys me is that, because I was still involved
in an area of research that was quite close to commercialisation, over the
last 5 to 10 years, I’ve on a number of occasions counted the business
managers at various levels within the organisation who treat you as the
ignorant scientists who really is just a problem, and should be pushed
aside. And I mean that really irritates me profoundly, because I feel that I
actually know, in the biotech area, I actually know in many cases certainly
more than what they do, and have actually achieved more than what they
have.
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These keen scientists have typically been involved in commercialisation multiple times.
They genuinely believed that they were the main driving force and therefore should be
involved in the process. For example, a scientist described in the interview that if it
was not for him, his discovery would have never been successfully commercialised.
He said:
But I did lots of the lay work, ringing people around the diagnostic industry,
talking to lots of the companies. If I didn’t get on to do it, this thing was
just going to languish, you know, it would have never seen the light out of
the day.
When I asked the respondents to describe the key challenges they experienced in
research commercialisation, consistently they reported that the major obstacle was the
formalised IP-based processes that were implemented by the research institutions. A
typical comment from a university professor was:
. . . but all of those things are of less importance than the fact that in this
organisation the organisational barriers that exist from . . . the fact that the
processes in place within the organisation are not effective in terms of
management of intellectual property, development of relationships and
management of relationships, and just a lack of sophistication in business
issues and so on at the university.
Many respondents felt that the formalised IP-based processes implemented by the
research institutions created massive internal blocks for technology transfer. They
had to spend much effort fighting within the institution in order to get the technology
out to the industry. Their experience consistently demonstrated that the TTOs could
complicate ways of getting approvals and getting things done by centralising decision
making. An illustrative remark from a scientist was:
The whole organisation became much centralised in terms of decisions
about priorities, financing that sort of thing. That was the time when I was
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involved in trying to get some technology commercialised and I found
from my point of view that was a very obstructive time. Literally for 1.5
or 2 years of my time here, I felt like there was a lot of my effort going
into not actually doing anything externally, but actually fighting internal
blocks.
The bigger the organisation, the more complicated the research commercialisation
processes tended to become. A senior scientist described in the interview that his
organisation had a couple of extra layers in the way the TTOs were structured. The
organisation had 21 divisions and each division had its own business development unit.
On top of that, there was a central commercialisation office which was responsible for
final evaluation and approval. To commercialise his invention, this scientist had to
work with the local business development managers as well as representatives from
the central commercialisation office. In his experience, the central and the periphery
office had competing views regarding the value of his IP which led to internal conflicts.
He commented:
That was probably my most bitter experience in the whole of my whatever
19 years with the organisation. Because all the energy went into the
internal fight. . . We had different views within the organisation competing
and I mean that’s essentially the problem. One is that the business people
at the head office did not actually think that there was any value in this. So
I guess they were placing their judgment over that of potential investors.
Then there was almost a competing and completely opposite view as well
if somebody else from outside is showing commercial interest in this, then
it’s obviously going to be so valuable that we are going to be robbed if we
do a deal with them.
This scientist’s bitter experience in research commercialisation was not atypical. Some
respondents were so frustrated about the commercialisation processes implemented
by their organisation that they even set up a network group to discuss the issues they
experienced. A professor from a leading Australian university reported:
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In fact, there is a group of research scientists within the university who
have created a network amongst ourselves because we are frustrated with
the university that we meet ever so often and talk about our commercial
problems that we have. We have speakers coming and that sort of thing.
We get together and share our experience and concerns and what we can
do. So that tells you how bad this university is.
A prevailing view amongst the respondents who were experienced in commercialisation
was that their TTOs have not got the expertise to manage relationships. Most of
them valued contacts and personal relationships. They found that the TTOs tended
to focus on contractual relationships and often lacked the contacts which they needed.
A university professor who was also the deputy vice chancellor for research described
his view as follows:
One of the difficulties is the attitudes of the university’s technology transfer
agencies who are really unhelpful. I mean they have not got the expertise,
they have not got the contacts but they want to have everything, and they
are protecting the universities, they think, by sort of shielding the people
inside by getting their IP outside where people might appreciate it. . . They
don’t facilitate at all, it is one of the major barriers.
Some respondents were also cynical about the TTO’s capability to manage IP resulting
from public sector research. They did not believe that the TTOs had sufficient resources
to deal with all IP generated by their staff members. They thought it would be much
more efficient for a private company to evaluate the commercial potential of IP than
an intermediary such as the TTO. A professor from a research institute commented:
. . . back to the nonsensical notion of having a commercialisation office
within a medical research institution, knowing all there is to know about
all the intellectual property in their institution and trying to sell it. You
cannot do it. One person, however brilliant they are, can not wrap their
minds around the science and the commercial potential of 20 to 30 projects
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all across their desk a year. . . I think it is not impossible, you can do
it, but I think it is not an efficient way of judging whether something is
commercially viable. Businesses know what it is commercially viable.
In summary, most academic scientists interviewed were reluctant to participate in
research commercialisation, despite the possibility of potential financial returns. If
it was not for internal motivation or external pressure, they would prefer to spend their
time on research and teaching, because their career progression was still largely based
on refereed publications. Only a small number of respondents in this study embraced
research commercialisation because of their internal desire to make a difference in
society. These respondents consistently reported that their key challenge was the
formalised IP-based processes implemented by the TTOs. From their perspective, by
centralising decision making, the TTOs created internal blocks and complicated ways
of getting approval and getting things done.
6.2.2 Entrepreneurs/CEOs
My interviews with respondents from the industry stakeholder group showed that in
general it was very challenging for them to negotiate with the TTOs over IP or equity
related issues. They found that the TTOs tended to focus on protecting IP resulting
from public sector research as opposed to facilitating its transfer to industry. Most
respondents of this study reported negative experience in their dealings with the TTOs.
For example, when I asked a chief technology officer of a spin-off whether he found
university TTOs helpful, he commented:
They [university technology transfer offices] were a serious impediment.
I can’t think of anything positive.
Many respondents reported that university technology transfer managers and lawyers
were very aggressive in fighting over legal terms and conditions during negotiation.
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This made it rather difficult and slow to reach a licensing or a shareholders agreement
with them. A co-founder of a university spin-off described the challenges his company
experienced over equity ownership issues as follows:
We went through six months of negotiation and we started a shareholders
agreement and we got basic agreement. It took us three or four months to
get basic agreement that the university would get a 15% equity stake, and
the founders would get 15% equity stakes each, and the company would
get 15% equity stakes. It was the only way we could agree because if the
numbers weren’t all the same for all the parties, someone would point a
finger. So it had to be the same. Everyone got the same thing, and so
when we finally agreed that, we finally got a shareholder’s agreement in
place and we thought okay this is it, and then I think it was another year
of reiterating the terms of the shareholder’s agreement with the university.
I think it was 45 revisions - every time it would be a couple of weeks and
come back with this Word document, marking it up, accepting it, writing
over the terms, and they fought and fought over these terms.
This co-founder felt that the university lawyers had no incentive to reach an agreement
with the company quickly. They were simply doing their job to protect university’s
IP. As a result, negotiating with the university over ownership issues was slow and
painful. In illustrating his points, he said:
Usually we have negotiated licence agreements with big companies, and
university is the hardest ever. Like big companies, typically three to six
months before you sign up; but with the university, it took us a year to
negotiate. And it’s because there is nobody there whose really keeping an
eye on this legal process, I feel. And so the lawyers for the university, they
don’t have any equity stake or things to lose. It is their job to continue to
be diligent, continue to do things and they are going to do that.
One of the possible reasons for this slow negotiation process is that many technology
transfer managers perceive the role of their office as safeguarding university IP from
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industry. They are afraid that private companies are going to take advantage of them
and run away with university IP. In reality, my interviews with entrepreneurs showed
that most companies are only interested in taking a promising university IP for further
development. An illustrative remark was:
We had no intention of screwing anybody but they were all there with
really really paranoid terms. I think the whole thing came from an attitude
that these guys have got something that the university really owns, and
they are going to take it, and we are not going to get anything.
Some entrepreneurs explained that they could only build a viable spin-off business if
they got university IP transferred over completely. However, the university technology
transfer managers they dealt with preferred to divide a single IP into different pieces
thus making the transfer process more difficult. A representative comment was:
So we wouldn’t have started unless we’d gotten the equity and the IP
through the company, and then we felt safe enough to join that company.
Whereas the university I believe wanted to kind of license us little bits
of the IP that was theirs. And you can’t start a company on a licence
agreement and a bit of IP, which was only just embryonic. You know,
really early stage. If it had been something that was already explosive and
already generating huge revenues, then that would be fine, but we knew it
would be many years work before that was going to return any money.
Another possible reason behind the slow negotiation process is that entrepreneurs
and technology transfer managers often have different perceptions on the value of
university IP. As described in the previous chapter, entrepreneurs tend to perceive
university IP as a very small part of the research commercialisation process. From
their perspective, university IP is mostly early stage which has relatively little value. In
order to demonstrate its commercial value, a private company has to invest substantial
resources to further develop the IP into something more useful. The technology transfer
119
managers, on the other hand, often treated university IP as a final product which
could be sold to industry with a high price tag. Most respondents from the industry
stakeholder group reported that the technology transfer managers were asking too
much during negotiation, which made university IP unaffordable for small companies.
For example, a CEO of a spin-off said:
I can only tell you from our own experience we have tried at least six
occasions to get intellectual properties out of various universities, and
been totally defeated by the fact that these guys just want too much for
them. They expect too much from it at an early stage. So unless you
are a major biotech company or a major pharma, you are not going to be
able to afford it. . . We have not licensed anything from any university in
Australia, despite at least six attempts.
Another finding of this study was that almost all entrepreneurs and CEOs interviewed
described their disappointment in negotiating with university TTOs over IP issues.
They felt that a lot of time was actually wasted on deciding the value of university IP
which has not yet been demonstrated. A co-founder of a spin-off company commented:
We were very held back by internal negotiations and bickering, basically
about power struggles over nothing. The IP was there but you couldn’t
build on it until the company had enough money to create something, so
there was this feeding frenzy over essentially nothing. . . You could see a
feeding frenzy over a chunk of meat which really didn’t exist you know.
It was the idea of a chunk of meat.
From an entrepreneur’s perspective, the delay in getting university IP into industry
means that business could lose a time advantage. The respondents explained that
timing is critically important in research commercialisation. The university IP had to
be transferred to the company by a certain time; otherwise there would be no incentive
for them to take the IP out of the research institution. In illustrating this point, a chief
technology officer said:
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You don’t have any time, because the business opportunity is quickly
dwindling as other people hear the ideas and competitors start to wake
up. It’s all about time. You have to do it by a certain time.
Despite the fact that most respondents from the industry stakeholder group having
negative experience in their dealings with the TTOs over IP ownership issues, they
were actually quite sympathetic to the technology transfer managers who were working
there. They felt that it was the particular organisational arrangements of the TTOs
which impeded the transfer of university IP to industry. A representative comment
was:
So you find that the commercialisation companies [TTOs] here are sitting
on a heap of IP that they just can’t get rid of. Simply because they
are asking too much. And why are they asking too much? Because
the universities are demanding that they become self-sufficient quickly
in terms of cash, and so have to try and raise as much cash early as they
can. So it is self-defeating. It is really not working at all in my opinion.
6.2.3 Private Investors
This study also explored the experience of private investors in commercialisation. The
most striking finding was that private investors were generally reluctant to invest in
IP resulting from public sector research. From their perspective, the key issue in
research commercialisation is not the lack of funding, but the lack of commercial
opportunities that are worthwhile investing in. They typically found university IP has
a lot of unresolved ownership and legal issues, and the transaction costs involved in
getting the IP transferred over are quite high. A representative remark was:
Buy it from a pharmaceutical company, less transaction overhead because
the technology is a bit more in a box where it can be transferred. At
the university it is not so much a box it is a bit of a mess and there’s
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a lot of details, IP issues, legal issues, technology issues that need to
be solved. . . I think there is a lot of transaction overhead associated with
university technologies.
Some private investors reported that they were not keen to invest in university IP
through the TTOs because of the high risks involved. They found that some TTOs were
trying to shift the risks to either the spin-off companies or the investors themselves,
rather than facilitating the transfer of technology. To illustrate this point, an investor
said:
They are not commercial. They don’t have a commercial view so that they
are trying to push all of the risks, every risk item they are trying to push
on to the investors, push on to the company. And of course that’s just
simply not acceptable. I mean we had experience with major institutions
where we simply say this: We can not do this deal with this risk transfer,
where you’re trying to transfer all your risks on to a tiny company and
that’s never going to survive those risks. We won’t make an investment
because it’s not a reasonable thing to do. So enormous amount of time and
enormous amount of cost get soaked up with that risk-shifting stuff that
goes on.
Another possible reason for this general reluctance amongst private investors to invest
in IP through the TTOs is the amount of time that is involved to make a deal. When
the IP is owned by a university or a public research organisation, investors are not just
dealing with the commercial opportunity per se, but also various representatives from
the research institution as well as the TTOs. This can make IP negotiation a rather
complex and long-term process. For example, an investor described the IP negotiation
process as follows:
If you go to institutions something like the xxx, then typically you are
dealing with at least four different breeds of people. You are dealing with
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the scientists themselves, and you’re dealing with the division they happen
to be in, you are dealing with the division’s business development manger,
and you are dealing with the xxx corporate. So you tend to have, you
know, a minimum of four different parties who supposedly are all on the
one side. And that becomes a very complex and very long-term process.
So if we’re dealing with an opportunity that is not within the institution,
it generally takes around 4-6 months to get a deal done and finish it and
document it and execute it. With institutions, it can take anything up to
two years.
My interviews with private investors also showed that the internal communication
within a research institution could be an issue during IP negotiation. The respondents
reported that the various representatives from a research institution were supposed to
be on one side, but in reality the interests of these parties were often not aligned. One
example was that when the academic scientist or the inventor of the technology was
kept aside by the technology transfer managers during the negotiation process, deals
could potentially fall over:
We had experience where the research institution takes a particular line
and negotiates the deal up to a certain point but hasn’t told the individual
scientist that is the position they are taking or hasn’t got the scientist to
sign off they are agreed to this. And you get to certain point of this and
the whole thing falls over because the scientist says hang on a second,
nobody asks me.
From a private investor’s point of view, the academic scientist or the inventor of the
technology plays an important role in the research commercialisation process. Some
investors remarked that they were not just buying the IP, but also the key individuals
involved in order to get the technology transferred over. An illustrative comment was:
. . . whereas the university, the technology is very intimately tied to the
inventor, to the professor. So you are not just buying technology, you have
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to buy that person too in the sense that you need to interact with them to
get technology transferred over. That can be a difficult process. Not so
accessible.
When I asked the private investors the question of what would be their preferred
approach in research commercialisation, some respondents said that they like to deal
with the people who are behind the IP directly, rather than going through an intermediary.
From their perspective, part of their due diligence was learning about the people. A
typical comment was:
As an investor, the actual process you go through in terms of screening
and negotiating with the deal all that style of things, it’s all part of learning
about those people. And if you are not dealing with them direct, you don’t
know what they are like. . . I like things to be really simple. And what I
find is, if you deal directly with compassion, with appropriate thought and
process, you get there much quicker than if you have multiple parties in
the chain. So the more parties you put in the chain, the more complex it
becomes and the longer it takes and the more it costs and the less likely
you are to get a reasonable outcome.
In summary, the empirical data of this study show that private investors typically had
very little interest in IP resulting from public sector research. The respondents found
that most university IP was at too early a stage with many unresolved technical and
legal issues. Moreover, the transaction costs in getting university IP transferred is quite
high. From a private investor perspective, the TTOs facilitated the transfer of risk as
supposed to the transfer of technology to industry. Negotiation with the TTOs was a
long-term process, and it often fell over due to internal communication issues within
the research institution.
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6.2.4 Technology Transfer Managers
Technology transfer managers were the only stakeholder group in this study who
sincerely believed that they were there to facilitate the commercialisation of publicly
funded research. The prevailing view amongst them was that most academic scientists
do not know how to commercialise or do not have the time for it. They could help the
scientists to identify potential IP, package and protect it. An illustrative remark was:
I mean it is horrible to see a researcher basically attempt to spend ten
years of their life on researching an outcome, get it wrong, and come out
with an outcome that’s not commercialisable. We much prefer to make
sure they do their ten years worth of work, we are there alongside them
helping them, they get an end product and result that is commercialisable,
and everybody wins.
The majority of technology transfer mangers interviewed thought that their office
had a very well-trained team. The team had the necessary knowledge and skills in
research commercialisation, which academic scientists could tap into. A representative
comment was as follows:
We’ve got all the range of skills that academics need help with. As a team
we’ve got intellectual property specialists, business analysts who can help
identify markets and work with marketers, venture capital in-built through
an internal seed fund, business development managers in different fields.
So it is all there and we just need to let the academics know it is all there
and to come and work with us.
Besides assisting scientists to commercialise, some technology transfer managers also
believed that they could help industry by making the IP transfer process less difficult.
In illustrating this point, a technology transfer manager said:
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One of the big things is that industry has this perception that dealing
with the university is very difficult; whereas we make it less difficult for
them by understanding the rules of engagement and having all the formal
contracts, and the timely turnaround of those, because most of us have
come from industry and we know the frustrations of having worked with
universities ourselves.
Another finding of this study was that the technology transfer managers have learnt
from their experience and become more realistic about research commercialisation.
Many respondents from high profile research intensive universities have gradually
moved away from an approach which involved setting up spin-off companies. The
rationale was explained by a technology transfer manager:
In terms of spin-offs we are not so much focused on that primarily because
there are very few technologies out there that become successful spin-offs.
Because it really has to be a strong technology. Yes. And there’s very
limited expertise in Australia for managing those sorts of companies. We
could spin-off stuff but then trying to find the right CEO and so on is quite
tough, so what we tend to find is most of them tend to fail.
When I asked the technology transfer managers about their challenges to commercialise
IP resulting from public sector research, almost all respondents said that many of the
difficulties which were frequently mentioned in the government reports have already
been overcome. For example, as described by a technology transfer manager, they
have learnt to standardise the legal agreement and streamline the transfer process:
A lot of those issues have been solved. A lot more of the agreements are
standardised, we don’t argue so much over warranty clauses. You know
there used to be a lot of time involved in that sort of nonsense. There are
lawyers and there is no incentive for them to transfer quickly. But now a
lot of those issues are overcome.
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Although some of the issues in research commercialisation could be resolved by the
technology transfer managers, there were other challenges which were beyond their
personal control. Some of the challenges were related to the nature of university
technology. The respondents consistently reported that university technology was
generally at too early a stage with many unresolved problems. Companies on the
other hand were looking for something more advanced which they could use quickly
to generate income or add value. Therefore, it was not easy for the technology transfer
managers to make the companies become interested in university IP. In illustrating this
point, a respondent said:
The biggest hassle is that invariably your technology is just not advanced
enough for their taste. Everyone wants a phase three product. Everybody
wants that. And if a pharmaceutical could get away with just in-licensing
things for marketing, you could make a business out of that. But they
can’t, so invariably your data is just not good enough. You know you
might have one animal model, they want two! Or maybe your animal
model is a rabbit they want something else. Or maybe not even have that.
So you have to do a lot of work just to get them convinced that this is a
good technology that they would want to own.
Some respondents also realised that the transaction costs involved in getting university
technology transferred were quite high. Due to the early nature of university technology,
the technology transfer managers often had to spend substantial time and effort to
further develop the IP and package it to suit the industry’s need. A representative
comment was:
You get an opportunity with all its problems and requiring significant
investment. That’s what you are going to get from university technology.
And you might get to own it because you are first on board with it, and
that’s the plus side. The downside is it’s going to require a lot of your time.
So unless it is perfectly aligned with what your business is doing, you can
bolt that technology on to yours, like an antigen for an assay or something
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that just fits in with your technology – it is always going to require a lot of
technology transfer effort. So I call that transaction overhead.
Another challenge identified in this study was the difficulty of attracting investors
to invest in university IP. This again was related to the early nature of university
technology. Most respondents acknowledged that it was actually relatively easy to find
a small amount of pre-seed funding. Surprisingly, they found the challenge was not the
lack of investors or funding, but the lack of university technology that is worthwhile
investing in. For example, the following comments made by three technology transfer
managers all illustrate this point:
And there’s the pre-seed fund set up by the Commonwealth government
to do that, and there are other private investors who will still play in that
space. So we don’t find there’s any lack of money to be honest. There’s a
lot of willing investors. The common thing of course is, how good is your
technology, and is it really something that has a large market potential?
Is it marketable internationally? How strong is your intellectual property
position? What competitive advantage do you have? It is all the normal
things you would evaluate in assessing a business opportunity. So the
investors I’ve spoken to certainly say it is more of matter of, we have the
money but we are a little short on identifying the best opportunities, and it
is the quality of opportunity they are looking for.
You know I’ve been having a conversation where they’ve said, you know
that there are great antibody companies in Europe and the US and there’s
nothing here, and when they [venture capitalists] looked at the projects we
were running here, they said oh no, it was all too early, etc. etc. So there
is still this disconnect between getting the projects robust enough.
So if you talk to someone from CM Capital or someone from GBS or
Starfish. I mean Starfish is a pooled development fund, so it actually has
some bits of money from the government anyway. If you talk to people
like that they’ll say the money is here, or if you talk to Biotech Capital, I
have the money if I can find the deals.
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From a technology transfer manager’s perspective, there was a disconnect between
what the research institutions could offer and what the customers wanted. Some
respondents did not believe that this issue could be easily resolved by having more
access to funding. A technology transfer manager explained:
But the biggest problem to commercialising is that the customer wants to
have quite well advanced technology and a lot of the problems addressed,
and they are problems generally that the outsider isn’t interested in. So
there needs to be some funding that will then address that issue of how to
design, or fund some experiments that will take the technology close to
what the customer is interested in. And may fund things that the scientists
themselves would never do or couldn’t find money for. But the caveat
would be that you would have to manage it very carefully. And I don’t
know exactly how you would do that but otherwise it just becomes more
funds for more experiments.
6.2.5 Analysis of TTO-based Structural Arrangements
The empirical data presented in this section describes the research commercialisation
experience from the perspectives of various stakeholder groups. The experience of
these participants shed some light on how our TTO-based structural arrangements
facilitate the transfer of new scientific discoveries to industry. Other than the technology
transfer managers interviewed, all other respondents of this study consistently reported
that the formalised IP-based processes implemented by the TTOs impeded the flow of
IP resulting from public sector research to industry. This outcome is not the fault of
any particular stakeholder group, but rather the way the TTOs are structured.
From the perspective of a private investor, the way in which the TTOs have been
organised significantly increases the transaction costs involved in moving scientific
discoveries to the marketplace. These costs include tangible and intangible expenses
related to the identification, protection and the sale of IP as well as administrative
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expenses and the opportunity costs for the time that would be lost in negotiation.
Due to the high transaction costs, private investors have less incentive to invest in
IP resulting from public sector research.
From an entrepreneur’s point of view, technology resulting from public sector research
is generally nascent in development and much of its value lies in the tacit knowledge of
the inventors. Without additional commercial inputs, university IP typically represents
little value to companies and they are not prepared to pay the price often ask for by
technology transfer managers. The entrepreneurs found that the current approach to
research commercialisation implemented by the TTOs puts too much emphasis on
safeguarding public sector research and overestimates the value of university IP. As
a result, negotiation with the TTOs has become a complicated and difficult process
which significantly slows down the transfer of university IP to the private sector.
From an academic scientist’s perspective, apart from the possibility of getting huge
financial rewards, there is very little positive incentive for them to engage in research
commercialisation because their career promotion is still largely based on publications.
The small number of academic scientists who embrace research commercialisation
are typically driven by internal forces. These scientists believed that they are the key
individuals behind the technology and should be involved in the process. They were
frustrated that the technology transfer managers often left them out of the game. They
found by centralising decision making the TTOs actually complicated ways of getting
approvals and created internal blocks.
From a technology transfer manager’s point of view, making the private sector more
interested in university IP is not an easy task. No matter how much time and effort they
spent on packaging the IP, they could not change the nature of university technology
and make it more advanced to suit the industry’s need. This finding illustrates a
contradiction inherent in the IP-based approach to research commercialisation typical
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of TTO’s. The technology transfer managers themselves recognise that the IP resulting
from public sector research is generally not ready for private sector investment; but
under the current structural arrangements, they are forced to try and sell this IP.
Although the technology transfer managers interviewed genuinely believed that they
were employed to facilitate the transfer of scientific discoveries from academia to
industry, unfortunately the reality is very different from what they hoped to achieve.
Based on the experience of various stakeholder groups in research commercialisation,
the empirical data of this study show that Australia’s current TTO-based structural
arrangements may not only increase the transaction costs involved in moving public
research findings to industry, but also make the process more complicated and difficult.
6.3 Commercialisation Performance
The second research question of this study can be addressed from an institutional
perspective. In this section, I present the analysis of secondary quantitative survey
data together with primary interview findings to illustrate the performance of research
commercialisation through TTO-based structural arrangements.
6.3.1 Performance Metrics
Before examining the performance of research commercialisation through our current
TTO-based structural arrangements, it is important to define how success in research
commercialisation is understood from the perspective of various stakeholder groups.
Defining success in research commercialisation is a function of defining what outcomes
are desired, then tracking and measuring performance in light of those desired outcomes.
From a government perspective, successful research commercialisation often means
new jobs, growth in GDP and improved productivity in the economy. For example, a
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report published by the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council
in 2001 illustrates this view:
Commercialisation of public sector research is on the rise in Australia. . . If
we can grow 200–250 more Australian research-based companies like five
of those shown in this report over the next 5 years, the prize would be
around $20 billion added to our annual export earnings. Australia would
be well on the way to reducing the national debt and the cost of servicing
it (Independent working groups for PMSEIC, 2001, p. 3).
From an industry point of view, research commercialisation is about transforming IP
that is generated from public sector research into something marketable. It is only
after a product or service is launched, revenue is received and cash flow becomes
positive, that a commercial success is achieved. The consensus within the Australian
biotechnology industry in regard to commercialisation performance is that there is a
lack of local success stories (Vitale, 2004). For example, this view was expressed by
an interviewee:
. . . from a therapeutic point of view there is no shining star, there is no
Genetech or CAT or Biogen – no such company exists in Australia, no-one
has a product that is on the market that we can point to and say well this
was the company. I guess we do have Biota, but Relenza is not considered
a success. When you have one company that manages to somehow stay in
Australia, that is a success story.
Further evidence of industry’s perspective on research commercialisation performance
comes from a study conducted by Hine and Vieira (Vieira & Hine, 2005). Based on a
quantitative analysis of 85 listed Australian biotech companies, this study shows that
losses are common in the industry (Figure 6.1). In 2004, only 13% of the companies
researched were profitable, while 87% of the companies had negative revenues. Out of
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Figure 6.1 Profitability of publicly listed biotechnology companies in 2004.
Source: data for the plot are obtained from Vieira and Hine (2005).
the companies which were not profitable, 45% of the companies lost between $5 and
$10 million, and 14% lost more than $10 million.
From an academic perspective, most universities and public research organisations are
ambiguous about the way they perceive research commercialisation success. On the
one hand, they want to maximise financial returns by exploiting research results in the
form of IP sold to industry; while on the other hand, they want to maximise the amount
of technology that is transferred to the private sector. Some research institutions have
difficulty in deciding the outcomes they wish to pursue in research commercialisation.
For example, a university professor described in the interview how his university kept
re-inventing itself:
They have a hard time making up their mind. It changes as a function I
guess — the views of senior administration, so when I first came there
wasn’t much emphasis put on it so — early to mid 1990’s. Then xxx was
kind of re-invented to be a much more formal commercialisation arm in
the University. And then it was dis-established, three years ago probably.
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It is important to note that there are at least three different perspectives of research
commercialisation success: government, industry and academia. Performance is often
assessed based on the objective one has in mind. Indicators developed for measuring
one objective usually ignore the other. Similarly, indicators applying to one stakeholder
group are unlikely to be relevant to others. Ambiguities and mismatch between goal
formulation and output measures may create difficulties in evaluating performance.
Current standard performance measures for research commercialisation, also known as
metrics, are shaped by the prevailing IP-based view discussed in chapter 5. The metrics
are developed to measure tangible outputs being achieved by research institutions
through identifying, packaging, protecting and exploiting IP. These narrowly-defined
metrics are neither designed to evaluate non-IP based transfer, nor are they intended to
assess commercialisation success from the perspectives of industry and government.
The performance metrics which are used in Australia are heavily influenced by foreign
models. The US Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) Licensing
Survey methodology is the most widely accepted standard for evaluating research
commercialisation performance. The survey provides a yearly profile of US universities,
hospitals, and research institutes and Canadian institutes. It focuses on indicators
related to the generation of tangible commercial outputs. Typical indicators include:
• Number of full-time equivalent staff employed in TTOs
• Research expenditures per institutions
• Legal expenditure and reimbursement
• Patent related and start-up activities
• Licences, options, and assignments (LOAs)
• Licensing income (CCST, 2005)
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The AUTM has collected annual survey data since 1991. Its survey methodology
has become the basis for the Australian equivalent, the National Survey of Research
Commercialisation, which has been conducted periodically by the ARC, the NHMRC
and DEST since 2000.
The National Survey of Research Commercialisation is expensive to conduct, report,
and respond to. The 2001 and 2002 survey spent $400,000 to cover the costs in
designing and conducting the survey, compiling and analysing the data and publishing
the results (CCST, 2005). Due to the high cost and the amount of time required
to conduct the survey, there is usually a considerable delay before the results are
published. For example, the National Survey of Research Commercialisation 2005–
2007 is the latest survey available in Australia, and it is already more than two years
behind (DIISR, 2009).
There was a great deal of concern amongst the respondents of this study that defining
research commercialisation success based on the current performance metrics is limited.
Some technology transfer managers interviewed mentioned that the National Survey of
Research Commercialisation only tracked narrow IP-based outputs, and therefore did
not capture the net economic and social return accruing to the wider economy. Some
argued that research commercialisation needs to be measured at an aggregate level. In
order to evaluate the broader impacts of research commercialisation on society, new
performance indictors have to be developed which require clearly defined objectives.
6.3.2 Performance of Research Institutions
Despite the limitations of the current performance metrics, the National Survey of
Research Commercialisation provides insights on how public research organisations
and universities performed in relation to patenting, licensing and start-up activities.
Based on the measures mentioned before, in the first instance, it seems that Australian
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research institutions have performed rather well in research commercialisation. Over
the period 2000 to 2007, most indicators have increased across all research institutions:
• The total number of invention disclosures increased by 126%, from 528 in 2000
to 1,193 in 2007;
• The total number of LOAs yielding income grew by 51% from 489 in 2000 to
737 in 2007;
• The total number of start-up companies operational at the end of each year
increased by 179%, from 86 in 2000 to 240 in 2007;
• Adjusted LOA income increased by 70%, from $125 million in 2000 to $213
million in 2007; and
• The total value of insitutional equity held in start-ups increased by 21%, from
$153 million in 2000 to $185 million in 2007 (DIISR, 2009, p. 1).
An in-depth analysis of the national survey data shows that there is a huge variation in
research commercialisation performance amongst Australian universities. According
to the National Survey of Research Commercialisation 2005–2007, the increase in
LOA income was dominated by two universities:
• University of Queensland reported income of $21 million in 2006 and $45 million
in 2007, including from the licensing of GARDASIL; and
• Monash University reported LOA income of $101 million in 2007 alone from
its assignment of Monash IVF (DIISR, 2009, p. 18).
Apart from these large transactions, the majority of LOAs involved very small amounts
of income. In 2007 over half of LOAs were for amounts less than $50,000 (DIISR,
2009).
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Performance of individual universities was reported in the National Survey of Research
Commercialisation: Years 2003 and 2004 1 (DEST, 2007). Key unit record data are
summarised in Table 6.1. Out of 39 Australian universities reported in 2004, the
Group of Eight (Go8) research intensive universities accounted for 62% of invention
disclosures, over 70% of patents applications, and about 70% of all new start-up
companies formed. Financial return from licensing activity was also highly skewed
towards the Go8 universities. For instance, the Australian universities generated $35
million income form LOAs in 2004. Of this, the Go8 universities were responsible for
$24 million, about 70% of total licensing income. By contrast, 9 universities reported
no income from LOAs during the same period.
The strong performance of the Go8 universities in research commercialisation may be
linked to their magnitude of investment in research. Several studies show that research
commercialisation performance is correlated to the volume of research, as indicated by
expenditure on research (Heher, 2006; Hicks, Breitzman, Hamilton, & Narin, 2000;
Rasmussen, Moen, & Gulbrandsen, 2006; Debackere & Veugelers, 2005). Compared
to regional and less established universities, the academically prestigious universities
tend to be better funded and have higher quality research systems, so there would be
sufficient “deal flow” for research commercialisation.
6.3.3 UniQuest as an Exception
Out of the Go8 universities, the performance of the University of Queensland clearly
stood out on a number of standard measures (Table 6.1). In 2004, the university
achieved 60 disclosures per $100 million research expenditure, 75% higher than the
next best performing university. By the end of 2004, it had generated 38 start-up
companies that are still active, 7.5 times higher than an average Australian university.
1Although the National Survey of Research Commercialisation 2005–2007 has the most up-to-date
statistics, the performance data is represented in aggregate. There is no information on individual
university performance in this survey.
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Table 6.1
University Research Commercialisation Performance in 2004
No. of
invention
disclosure
No. of
patent
filed
No. of
start-up
operational
Gross
LOAs
income
($’000)
Value of
equity
holding
($’000)
Research
expenditure
($’000)
University
of Queensland
182 230 38 13,290 48,450 304,506
University
of Sydney
113 51.34 16 1,553 11,932 331,228
UNSW 65 81 11 1,145 3,006 216,142
University
of Melbourne
6 49.58 20 4,470 200 428,630
Monash
University
37 80 26 898 38,152 328,815
University
of Adelaide
36 55.5 8 1,504 9,718 128,637
ANU 30 7 16 589 unknown 317,916
UWA 21 8 4 406 10,900 122,074
Go8 subtotal 490 562.42 139 23,855 122,358 2,177,948
Total uni 791 790 200 34,455 161,631 3,467,504
Go8 as % of
total
61.9 71.2 69.5 69.2 75.7 62.8
Source: data for the table are compiled from DEST (2007).
Note: fractions of patents are reported in the original source.
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The gross LOA income generated by the University of Queensland in 2004 was similarly
exceptional, representing 39% of all LOA income received by universities.
UniQuest, the research commercialisation arm of the University of Queensland, has
been regarded as the best performing TTO in Australia. My interviews with various
technology transfer managers revealed that a unique feature of the Uniquest’s approach
is that they favour a mechanism which involves setting up spin-off companies. A
representative from UniQuest explained that by spinning out companies, they could
leverage commercialisation grants that are available from the Commonwealth and the
State governments to assist further research and development. To illustrate this point,
he said:
Our preferred mechanism is to put them into a start-up company, where
there is further research and development, because they are very early
innovations. By generating start-ups we get research dollars back to the
university, and we get greater leveraging and it is accessing a different pool
of money than is available for publicly funded research. . . So the norm for
us to generate revenues from investment from pre-seed and venture capital
paths, which is our superannuation — so if we get money into it that way
we can then leverage that with money that is available from commercial
grants from government to assist companies to develop R&D. We have
done about 50 start-ups — yes we have done 55 so we generate then about
$150 million worth of research contracts out of those start-ups back to the
universities. So it is a huge leveraging of funds.
Other than the technology transfer managers from UniQuest, many respondents of this
study expressed concerns over the danger of creating too many spin-off companies.
One of the concerns was that these spin-off companies might not be viable businesses
in the long run. However, without longitudinal performance data, it is very difficult
to prove this speculation. A technology transfer manager explained his concern as
follows:
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I’m not critical of Uniquest. I am only critical of the fact that they hold
themselves out as ‘the saviour’ and they have a very successful model.
Now the University of Wollongong and the Mater Research Institute are
running it. It would be nice if someone actually had the time to go to
UniQuest, or do the research on UniQuest saying how many companies
do you spin-out looking at the annual reports in 1999 say, and how many
are there in 2004, how did they exit or did they just fall over? No one has
ever done that study because you won’t get the data.
Similar concerns were also raised by academic scientists. For example, a professor
questioned whether these spin-off companies were companies of real worth:
I would be very interested to know if these companies are actually doing
anything except raising government funding. The Queensland government
now see these companies as real entity, as something useful, and truly
represent employing company and the technology of the future. So they
actually give them grants which UniQuest administers. UniQuest charges
administration and service fee to the companies and gets a cut. Basically,
UniQuest just pulls out more and more of these companies that get these
grant money. Now some of these companies are going to work. This isn’t
a bad model to suck up government money. But you have to be careful
saying that this is going to produce companies of real worth. The hard
question you have to ask is that are those 20 companies going to be in 5
years time market cap companies $50 million? Or are they just going to
be replaced by other companies that do the same circuits.
Despite the lack of evidence, a technology transfer manager interviewed strongly
believed that many spin-offs from the University of Queensland were virtual companies
and whether they were successful or not in the long run was not important. Based on
his personal working experience in Queensland, he explained why spin-offs are still
considered as a successful commercialisation mechanism as follows:
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Spin-out companies, economical development, growth. That’s what the
Queensland State government wanted. In reality what you got was a
virtual company. They were all virtual companies and what nobody has
ever written about is, the reason why that is still a successful model of
the university is, you spin-out a company (and its just a term really, no-
one builds a lab for them) or they get money from a VC and the VC
gets rights to the technology. Then all of that money, or most of it, gets
spent back into the university as research income, and a lot of that income
from the university’s point of view is matched by federal funds. That is
call ‘quantum’. So the university is happy and whether the company is
successful or not doesn’t matter. Because whether BIF funds or VC funds
they all get spent in the university. They all employ people to work in the
university.
From an industry perspective, the main issue of spinning out too many companies
was that they created a lot of pressure for the business community. Without sufficient
financial support from the business sector, most spin-off companies struggle to survive
in the long run. A CEO of a biotechnology company explained his view as follows:
I think spin-off is good as long as there are sufficient support mechanisms
within the business community to handle that number of companies that
have spun out. Because UQ is only one commercialisation group. Every
university has its own commercialisation company now and if they are
all using that policy or using that model every time – let’s form a new
company every time we have a new piece of intellectual property, it puts
a lot of pressure on the business sector to support those companies. So
there’s a high failure rate and it forces companies into a certain development
path because perhaps there is just too many companies and not enough
venture capital. It is unfortunate to see some universities are spinning out
companies too early, they are getting chunks of the companies and the
companies sit there for five years getting no value. Struggling to survive,
listing early because they run out of venture capital money and the listing
price either plummets or stays low. So the university is getting nothing –
absolutely nothing out of it. Unless that company is highly successful. So
what they really need to do is change the model.
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In summary, although UniQuest performed exceptionally well in commercialisation
according to the current performance metrics, the respondents of this study raised
concerns over its spin-off model. From a short-term perspective, UniQuest is successful
in achieving the objective of maximising revenue and meeting the expectation of
university administrators and policymakers. However, from a long-term perspective,
only time will tell if these spin-off companies are viable businesses.
6.3.4 Financial Returns from Commercialisation
Despite the burgeoning number of invention disclosures, patents, LOAs, and start-ups,
financial returns to universities from research commercialisation (excluding contract
research) have been extremely small compared to research expenditure. In 2004,
gross income from LOAs received by all Australian universities only represented 1%
of total research expenditure (Table 6.1). The value of university equity holding in
start-up companies was 4.7% of total annual research expenditure. Therefore, income
from research commercialisation is unlikely to become a significant revenue source
for universities.
This finding is consistent with the view of Allen Consulting Group (2004). In their
study of best practice guidelines for optimising university commercialisation, they
concluded:
. . . in assessing the commercialisation returns associated with publicly
funded R&D, it would not appear that high overall economic impacts are
likely to be found in the area of revenues accruing to research performing
institutions. Even at world best practice levels, total commercialisation
returns (excluding contract revenue) to institutions are unlikely to represent
more than 5 to 10 per cent of total research revenue in the Australian
higher education sector (Allen Consulting Group, 2004, p. 11).
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When examining institutional performance in research commercialisation, it is also
important to look at the costs involved in operating TTOs. My field visits to TTOs
showed that there has been a general reluctance in reporting patent expenses, legal
costs and running costs for the office. Without these data, we cannot really look
at research commercialisation from a straight financial point of view. We do not
know if the revenues received from research commercialisation are enough to cover
the operational expense.
In explaining why the TTOs were unwilling to share data on commercialisation related
expenses, a technology transfer manager said:
I wouldn’t give it to you. Because you know we aren’t advanced like
the US because there you have got AUTM, and they record numbers –
their data recording is quite good, and people are more keen to share
the information which makes them stronger. We are more keen not to
share information so we don’t get criticised and we don’t look across to
IMBCom or Uniquest or UNSW or Garvan and say, well you haven’t done
very well have you. So whereas in the US they open up the doors a little
bit more, we close them and I don’t think that does us any good.
Perhaps this mentality of being afraid to be blamed is shaped by the institutional
objective to maximise revenue from licensing and spin-off activities. If the technology
transfer managers report the real running costs associated with commercialisation, the
overall performance data may look quite different.
The National Survey of Research Commercialisation 2003 and 2004 provides the best
available evidence on the costs involved in conducting research commercialisation
related activities. The survey reports commercialisation staffing and administrative
costs which cover the salaries and other associated costs of staff employed in TTOs as
well as the costs of legal and other fees incurred (DEST, 2007). However, such costs
may be well underestimated as they do not cover the ongoing costs associated with
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Figure 6.2 Estimated profits received by Go8 universities from licensing in 2004.
Source: data for the plot are compiled from DEST (2007).
maintaining the patent portfolio, the opportunity costs of not doing research whilst
engaging in commercialisation, and the academic scientists’ time.
According to this survey, the total costs of research commercialisation incurred by
all Australian universities in 2004 were $29.4 million, or approximately 85% of the
revenue derived from LOAs. Figure 6.2 provides a graphical representation of the
estimated net profits received by eight leading Australian research intensive universities
from research commercialisation in 2004. After subtracting gross LOA revenues from
expenses, only three of the Go8 universities (36%) earned more income from licensing
than they consumed, while the majorities (62%) were not profitable (DEST, 2007).
The pattern of university performance looked comparable in earlier years (DEST,
2004). Over the period 2000 to 2004, based on the income and cost data supplied by
universities to DEST in the National Surveys, at least half of the eight Go8 universities
appeared to have TTOs that cost more to run than they returned in income (DEST,
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Figure 6.3 Time delay between invention disclosure and producing positive return.
Source: Heher (2006, p. 405).
2004, 2007).
The above findings are similar to international performance data on commercialisation.
Statistics from the AUTM surveys show that the revenues generated by licensing pay
only a small fraction, typically less than 5%, of the overall costs of university research
in the US. The AUTM data also confirm that returns from research commercialisation
are highly skewed. The ten most active US universities account for the lion’s share
of patenting and royalty income (Powell, Owen-Smith, & Colyvas, 2007). Once full
costs are taken into account, apart from a few research institutions which are likely to
perform relatively well, the majority rarely break even. Heher (2006) estimates that
50% of TTOs in the USA run at a loss and in the UK as much as 75% of TTOs lose
money.
One of possible reasons for such an outcome is that there is a significant time lag
between disclosing an invention and obtaining revenue from it. According to Heher
(2006), university inventions are mostly disclosed at the proof-of-concept stages and
they generally take 6–10 years to mature to a stage where they can be licensed or
sold. This long delay inherent in the research commercialisation process is depicted in
Figure 6.3.
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During this long-term process, if the TTOs are a net cost to the university, they may
be chronically under-funded. When short of staff and budget, TTOs will be reduced to
devoting their resources to ensuring patent applications are filed and patents are issued
at the expense of marketing of inventions. Further, high-tech inventions are difficult to
market because, often, there are no ready markets for them, especially if the inventor
had no prior contacts with a potential licensee. High-tech inventions originating from
university labs may need market space/niche identification, new market creation, and
the translation of the lab result into an “investor friendly” business plan. Without
adequate financial support from the research institution, the TTOs will not be able to
carry out these tasks to create attractive packages (Swamidass & Vulasa, 2009).
In the best case scenario, assuming the investment to support the commercialisation of
academic research is made by the university, a difficulty is the magnitude of funding
required to support the operation of TTOs over an extended period (up to 10 years)
before a positive return is possible. Given the financial constraints that already exist in
the higher education sector, the continued support for research commercialisation will
put further stress on the universities.
In order to have a reasonable probability of positive financial returns from research
commercialisation, a large portfolio of patents and licences is required. This may be
possible at a national level, but extremely difficult at the individual institution.
6.4 Summary
This chapter addressed the second research question of this study from two different
perspectives. At the individual level, other than the technology transfer managers
interviewed, all other respondents consistently reported that the formalised IP-based
processes implemented by the TTOs made the transfer of university IP to industry
much more complicated and difficult. The empirical data of this study suggest that
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our current structural arrangements for research commercialisation may impede the
transfer of IP resulting from public sector research to the private sector.
At the institutional level, the analysis of secondary survey data show that under the
current performance metrics, university TTOs did well as measured by the increased
number of invention disclosures, patents, licensing agreements and spin-offs. However,
these metrics neither capture non-IP based channels, nor measure commercialisation
success as envisioned by government or industry stakeholders.
Although at this point the two research questions of my study have largely been
addressed, other issues that influence participants’ behaviours have been identified.
The following chapter describes some interesting findings that emerged from my study.
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Chapter 7
Research Commercialisation Without Intermediaries
Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E. P. Box
(Emeritus Professor of Statistics, University of Wisconsin)
7.1 Introduction
Universities and public research organisations have established formal and centralised
mechanisms to ensure that IP exploitation efforts are managed through the TTOs.
Despite the fact that TTOs are frequently being portrayed as facilitators of research
commercialisation, the empirical data presented in the previous chapter suggest that
the IP-based approach implemented by the TTOs may make the transfer of scientific
discoveries from academia to industry more complicated and difficult.
Through semi-structured interviews and participant observation, I found that many
academic scientists and entrepreneurs were frustrated with the TTO’s approach to IP
management. This dissatisfaction has motivated them to choose not to disclose any
inventions with the research institutions. Instead, they have come up with multiple
ways to bypass the TTOs.
This chapter presents these research findings and explains the logics underpinning
the individual’s behaviours. The first part describes the different means of bypassing
the TTOs. The second part describes some of the factors which might explain why
entrepreneurs and academic scientists preferred to interact directly with each other as
opposed to going through the TTOs.
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7.2 Going Around the TTOs
An interesting finding of this study is that some academic scientists and entrepreneurs
interviewed came up with different means to go around the TTOs. For example, a
vice chancellor described the difficulty his colleague experienced in dealing with the
university TTO. In order to get the IP out of the research institution and to commercialise
the invention, his colleague had to use the backdoor approach to minimise the TTO’s
involvement. The vice chancellor phrased his colleague’s experience as follows:
One colleague I had at the medical school was involved in drug discovery
with a British colleague of his. They set up this company and they finally
had to eye out their own IP from the university’s technology transfer
company because they were getting nowhere. They raised $30 million in
the US over the last six months. So it is a hot property. Yet they could get
no movement whatsoever by the university’s technology transfer company
because it was all too hard and too difficult for them.
My interviews with academic scientists revealed that in the extreme scenario, the
inflexibility of university research commercialisation policy has forced the inventors
to leave the university in order to get their ideas commercialised. As a result, the IP
was not disclosed to the TTO, but instead went straight into an existing company. A
representative comment from a university professor was:
The xxx university made it so difficult for the inventors, they had to leave
the university and go into the company itself. Now the company is in
South Australia and doing well, but it has nothing to do with university,
and the xxx university doesn’t get any recognition, simply because the
rules and regulations of the xxx where the inventors are developed are so
restricted you can’t do anything basically. So you can’t be on a board, you
can’t be a director on the board, you can’t do this if you have conflict of
interest, everything is being thrown at you. So it’s very difficult.
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Further empirical evidence came from a CEO of an Australian biotechnology start-up
company. He was also the founder of that company. In the interview he reported that
it was extremely hard to commercialise things in an academic environment where the
TTO had unrealistic expectations of IP and lacked commercialisation experience. The
unpleasant experience he had with the university TTO made him want to leave the
university so that he could setup his own start-up company. He commented:
In those days they didn’t have a budget so they couldn’t get the people
they needed. The people they did get didn’t have experience in research
commercialisation. And they had very unrealistic expectations so they
had a very very high value on the intellectual property even though it
was at a very early stage and so their expectation was that somebody
would come along and pay them $5 million for some intellectual property
that needed maybe three or four million dollars of expenditure to actually
commercialise it. So in that environment it was very hard to commercialise
things so the best opportunity was to go and do it in a company. . . I could
see that it was not going to be easy to do it within that environment so that
made me to get out into business.
Some academic scientists took radical approaches to avoid the TTOs, while other
respondents chose to keep their academic positions and use other means to go around
the TTOs. For example, a professor from a Go8 university took a few months of
sabbatical leave to develop his IP in a biotechnology company. He explained why he
avoided doing this in the university as follows:
Frankly, one of the things is to avoid doing it in the university through
the technology transfer office. You would just be bogged down by people
saying, have you thought about this, and we really need to worry about this
and check up on this and you can’t be an effective entrepreneur in a non-
entrepreneurial environment where you have an employment contract that
requires you to behave in certain way and report to certain people about
things.
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Another way to bypass the TTOs identified in this study was personal consulting.
Some academic scientists interviewed had been involved in research commercialisation
multiple times. Very soon they learnt that if the IP went though the TTOs, the royalty
income rarely flowed back to them. However, if they developed the IP as a personal
consulting job for the industry partner outside their normal working hours, they could
get rewarded rather well. The additional income could fund their subsequent research.
For example, an associate professor from a leading medical institute explained why he
preferred to work directly with biotechnology companies as follows:
Doing sponsored IP, you often become the consultant to hold the hand of
that IP through slings and arrows, outrageous patent examination, and you
get paid to do that. So you get to talk to the patent attorney. So if it takes
three days with the patent attorney, they pay three days with the patent
attorney. You know you are paid, $1000 a day consulting fee. Often I get
paid quite a reasonable amount of money for some of the research and the
profits from that are poured back into my research lab. I used it as a way
to topping up my basic research.
Personal consulting jobs were often initiated by industry. Companies often contacted
academic scientists directly with specific problems which they could not solve. In
this way, they would get a much quicker response than going through the TTOs. An
illustrative comment from a university professor was:
Companies often come and approach us with specific problems which they
could not solve without us. Things like I have just lost this cell line, can
you give us another one? We cannot clone this, can you clone this for us?
We have real trouble extracting X, Y, Z from this, can you do that for us,
etc? We respond very quickly if companies want something done. We can
respond within a month and come up with a project that is agreed to.
Other than semi-structured face-to-face interviews, this study also used participant
observation as a data collection method. I spent eight months in a biotechnology
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company to observe how research commercialisation actually occurs from an industry
perspective. I was part of the R&D team which was involved in the development
of new therapeutic drugs for inflammatory diseases. During this period of time, the
team was trying to develop a new drug discovery program and build its own in-house
research capability.
Although we had several chemists and biologists working in the R&D team, we did
not have all the knowledge and skills to characterise the potential lead compounds.
Particularly, we lacked know-hows in enzyme kinetics and protein structure-function
relationships. Rather than reinventing the wheel and developing everything in-house,
the chief scientific officer wanted to set up collaborative research projects with public
research institutions to gain access to academic scientists’ expertise.
Through his professional network, the chief scientific officer subsequently approached
several academic scientists who had expertise in the areas. Most of them were very
keen to collaborate. The chief scientific officer had a few meetings with them, and
very quickly they came up with research projects that were not only complementary to
our drug discovery program but also beneficial to the scientists. To finalise the formal
collaborative research agreements, they had to go through the research institutions
where the academic scientists were employed. Unfortunately that stopped the whole
thing. The chief scientific officer explained why the agreements fell apart as follows:
As soon as you mention you are from a biotech company, they will charge
you commercial rates and want to have all controls on the IP.
According to the chief scientific officer, all the research institutions he approached had
research commercialisation policies which required their staff scientists to disclose
any invention resulting from any collaborative research to the TTOs. In most cases,
the TTOs he talked to wanted to have ownership of any potential IP and charge the
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company outrageous fees for the collaboration. From his point of view, the company
needed to have complete IP ownership to prevent others inventing similar technology
and to stay competitive in the industry.
Due to disagreements over IP issues with the TTOs, the chief scientific officer decided
not to form any joint research projects with the academic institutions. Instead, he
recruited a postdoctoral fellow who had extensive research experience in the areas
which we were interested in. Although it was a slow way to build up our own in-house
research capability, hiring a postdoctoral fellow worked out a lot less expensive for
the company than paying for collaborative research. More importantly, the company
would have sole ownership of any IP resulting from his work. This postdoctoral fellow
not only brought his scientific knowledge and skills to the R&D team, but also his
professional network which was extremely useful.
Both the interview and participant observation data of this study illustrate that the
difficulty in dealing with the TTOs in research commercialisation has motivated some
academic scientists and entrepreneurs to come up with ways to go around the TTOs.
These participants preferred to interact directly, and by doing so, the inventions or
discoveries flowed straight from academia to industry.
This empirical finding is in agreement with the results reported in a number of recent
US studies. Hertzfeld, Link and Vonortas (2006) interviewed IP attorneys at 54 R&D
intensive firms on IP protection mechanism related to university patents. Their research
found that firms were frustrated with the difficulty in dealing with university TTOs
on IP issues. When possible, they would bypass the TTO and deal directly with the
university scientists. Hall, Link, and Scott (2001) also listed difficulties with IP issues
as a reason why a company may refrain from dealing with university TTOs. Jensen,
Thursby and Thursby (2003, p. 1272) noted that many technology transfer office
directors believe that substantially less than half of the inventions with commercial
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potential are disclosed to their office.
In a series of studies of university-industry technology transfers in the US, Siegel,
Link and their colleagues reported that many faculty members were dissatisfied with
the TTOs and chose not to disclose inventions to the university (Siegel et al., 2003a;
Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2003b; Siegel et al., 2004). They then carried
out a systematic empirical analysis to identify the propensity of faculty members to
circumvent university TTOs. Their recent study found male, tenured and research-
grant active faculty members were more likely to engage in industrial consulting and
joint publications with industry scientists (Link, Siegel, & Bozeman, 2007).
Further evidence of the bypassing behaviour came from two large US-based surveys.
Thursby, Fuller and Thursby (2009) examined a sample of 5811 patents on which one
or more of the inventors were faculty members and reported that 26% of these patents
were assigned solely to firms rather than universities. Fini, Lacetera and Shane (2010)
analysed an even large sample of 11,572 professors and found that 2/3 of businesses
started by academics are not based on disclosed and patented inventions.
7.3 Rationale for Bypassing the TTOs
This study identified two possible factors which may account for why some respondents
avoided dealing directly with the TTOs in research commercialisation. These factors
are described in this subsection.
7.3.1 Role of Personal Relationships and Network
My interviews with academic scientists and entrepreneurs revealed that they seemed to
value personal relationships and network much more than IP. For example, a university
professor described the importance of having contacts in commercialisation as follows:
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I think the key issue in commercialisation is having contacts, or knowing
someone with contacts, having contacts with good business people you
know. . . It’s the people, the experienced people that counts and making it
successful.
By contrast, technology transfer managers tended to focus on the contractual and
pecuniary aspects of research commercialisation. This often brought them into conflict
with academic scientists and entrepreneurs who perceived personal relationships and
network as more important. For example, a professor expressed his discontent with
his university’s contractual approach to research commercialisation:
It becomes very formal when you go through the university system and
they are very risk averse and they are concerned about making sure the
contracts. . . and they don’t really know about managing contracts, so it
gets bogged down. I had another experience with helping somebody else
here with trying to deal with a company that the university had set up and
there were all kinds of problems, and I went through meetings, and it was
all about the wording in the contracts and so on. . .
This professor believed that research commercialisation is more than a unidirectional
transfer of IP from academia to industry. From his point of view, it involves an
ecosystem of interactions. In illustrating his point, he said:
. . . there is this linear view that somehow it goes like that and ends up in
a product, and what you need is a whole ecosystem of interactions that
enable that. And there’s a lot of information of value both ways all the
time, and we don’t have that.
The importance of personal relationships was further illustrated by another university
scientist’s experience in research commercialisation. This respondent described that
in the absence of his business partner’s relationships, he could not proceed to set up
his own biotechnology company:
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My friend knows some of the venture capitalists and he also knows some
of the business development people. We were all lined up with meetings
and things and we had a law firm doing pro bono on all the legal stuff and
everything, and then, he got hit by a truck. It is very interesting because
all of that depended on his relationships. Without him we wouldn’t get
traction with these people. Because all his relationships were important.
Some scientists reported that their involvement in research commercialisation was
typically initiated through their personal contacts and network. As scientists, they have
often worked in a research field for a long time and become the experts in that specific
area. Through publications and conferences, they not only developed their professional
network, but also built their reputation within the scientific community. On many
occasions, research commercialisation opportunities came to them directly because
they were well known by others. For example, an immunologist from a medical
research institute described how he got into research commercialisation through his
contacts:
It usually starts through a network of contacts, because I have now done
contract research for 20 companies all up. I have been going for 25 years.
I am known out there so people know me and the building knows that I
do contract research so when they are approached in conferences, I often
get told and get phone calls. I have friends in those arenas as well. It’s
personal contact mostly now.
In another example, a university professor explained how his personal relationships
and professional network helped him to get involved into research commercialisation
multiple times. He said:
The [company x] contact came through our reputation I suppose as people
who make molecules, so they approached us. The [company y] connection
arose because the new managing director, I had known from previous
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collaborations with the company, and he rang me up and said, would you
mind being a consultant for a little while and coming down and listening
to what we are doing and critiquing that for us. In another case a company
called xxx which you may know of — one of my former students happens
to run the R&D component of xxx and he is using me as a consultant
and we have a modest collaboration going on there at the moment, which
is very enjoyable. In fact it is a repeat of some previous collaborations,
which have been very successful. So it is a whole lot of slightly different
mixes of reasons but I guess at the bottom line, it is being reasonably well
networked both on one’s own campus and also just more generally within
the community in Australia.
Another finding of this study is that scientists who were successful in commercialising
their research actually regarded business people highly. They had a genuine respect
for different sets of skills and enjoyed collaborating with industry people who were
good at their jobs. A representative comment from a university scientist was:
I guess one of the things I did understand, I saw the value of people in
the business disciplines if you like, because it was clear at that point xxx
came to the job with a lot of knowledge which I didn’t have, and relatively
good negotiation skills. Yes, I guess I started to appreciate and something
that I appreciate more and more over the years, is that it takes a team of
people with different sets of skills, whether it’s legal, financial or business
development. I actually enjoyed the interaction with those people when
they are open and collaborative and they are good at their job. . .
From an industry perspective, my interviews with entrepreneurs showed that they
were very interested in building and maintaining relationships with scientists from
government funded research labs. They frequently stressed the importance of having
connections with academic scientists and the mutual benefits that could be gained
through collaborative research. In illustrating this point, a CEO of a biotechnology
company remarked:
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I’ve been very lucky in that I’ve stayed pretty much in the same industry
in the sense that the people I still interact with and get business from
people I’ve known within that industry. Our collaborators. We collaborate,
as I said, with UNSW, the Institute for Eye Research and the School
of Optometry, Prince of Wales Hospital, Endocrinology, and Oncology
Departments. We’ve got quite a lot of stuff out there and more recently
with the nanotechnology people, who are in the. . . there is an ARC Centre
there. So there’s I guess again connections there that we’ve had for a long
time so there’s some advantage of also being in the same city that you
were born in. It is very hard to want to leave it when it is like this.
In fact, some biotechnology companies were actively searching for new ideas from
research institutions which might fit strategically with their R&D programs. They
were interested in having access to different knowledge. Through interaction with
academic scientists, they wanted to learn and to increase their research capability. For
example, a chief technical officer described below that he used a variety of informal
channels to look for interesting ideas:
Yes, I am sort of like the Chief Technical Officer now. I very much travel
for sort of the first month of the year, so I am about to go on a big trip and
just try to meet some new people and go to a few shows and conferences,
and then do a bit of a roundup of the university again, see who I can meet,
see if there is anything new and then try and just drive home the projects
for the rest of the year to make sure we meet our goals.
A number of existing studies have also shown that personal relationships and network
play an important role in research commercialisation (Perkmann & Walsh, 2007).
Even in the biotechnology industry where university-generated IP is more important
than in other sectors (Mansfield, 1995), firms seem to value interaction with university
scientists through a number of social pathways where information, knowledge and
other resources are exchanged or co-produced (Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer,
1996).
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7.3.2 Role of Inventors
Another possible factor which may account for why some academic scientists and
entrepreneurs choose to bypass the TTOs is that they have a different view from the
technology transfer managers in regards to the real asset in research commercialisation.
The empirical data of this study show that academic scientists and entrepreneurs tend
to value people, particularly the inventors of the technology, whereas the technology
transfer managers often emphasise the importance of IP instead of people. A scientist
from a public research organisation explained this difference as follows:
One of the things that I think is really important point, since that project
is closed down, that you know we’ve got that library sitting there. The
division has and is still trying to sell it off. What the business office can
not understand is that they think the value is in the stuff in the freezer. So
they think if we sell the content of that freezer, people are going to give a
million dollars. What they don’t understand is that what is valuable is the
knowledge we gained from it, the knowledge in my head, the knowledge in
our chemist’s head. . . And that’s completely under-valued. Without that, I
mean it happened in our negotiation with the French company. I mean. . . ,
this sounds arrogant. The French company you know is obviously just as
interested in having access to my knowledge as they are in having access
to the physical embodiment. And I think the business people failed to
understand that one of the big value they had actually the knowledge of
their people, and the people are under-valued.
This study found that an academic inventor could play an important role in the early
stage of the product development process. The entrepreneurs interviewed frequently
reported that most university inventions are embryonic in nature. In order to make it
worthwhile they have to invest enormous amounts of time and effort. Therefore, IP
by itself as packaged by the TTO has relatively low value to them. What is important
for the company is the ongoing cooperation of the academic inventors, because they
can bring their tacit knowledge associated with the IP to the company. Without having
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access to this type of knowledge, a company would find it difficult to transform the
early stage university invention into a useful form. For example, a CEO of a spin-off
company commented on the importance of the university inventor in commercialisation
as follows:
But it was just not going to work without this person so it was sort of like
– asset – and the only IP is in the minds of the people, or the ambition of
the people to do it.
From an academic inventor perspective, some of the respondents strongly felt that they
were the driving force behind the research commercialisation process, particularly at
the early stage. These inventors could get very paranoid when the TTOs kept them
aside. They believed that they should be involved in the research commercialisation
process. A representative remark from a university professor was:
I don’t think that it works if you kind of de-couple the scientists from the
business guys. I mean a big message of our process is that the business
guys have to come a bit towards the science folks to understand what is
going on with the science and understand how the scientists think, and
the scientists have to come a way towards the business guys to understand
commercial reality.
Existing studies also support the finding that academic inventors play an important role
in the research commercialisation process. By analysing 124 licensing agreements
associated with MIT inventions, Agrawal (2006) found that a licensee could increase
the chance of successfully commercialising a product by directly engaging the academic
inventor. He argued that much of the academic inventor’s knowledge associated with
licensed invention is not codified and this non-codified knowledge is often valuable
in product development. Based on a study of biotechnology firms and their academic
inventors, Murray (2004) reported that academic inventors contribute not only human
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capital but also social capital to entrepreneurial firms. By involving the academic
inventors, the firms could access their scientific network which include current and
former students, colleagues and collaborators.
7.4 Summary
This chapter described some unintended consequences of the IP-based approach to
research commercialisation implemented by the TTOs. Being frustrated by the difficulty
in dealing with the TTOs, some scientists took their inventions and left the academic
environment to set up their own companies; while others preferred to commercialise
their discoveries by taking sabbatical leave or doing personal consulting jobs. From an
industry perspective, disagreement over IP issues with the TTOs often motivated them
to interact with academic scientists directly.
A possible explanation for these behaviours is that both the academic scientists and
entrepreneurs tended to value personal relationships and social network much more in
research commercialisation than the contractual and pecuniary aspects emphasised by
the TTOs. From their perspectives, the real asset in commercialisation is the people.
The next chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the empirical data presented in
this study and explains why our current TTO-based structural arrangements generate
different outcomes for what is intended. Based on my research findings, I will then
introduce some categorisation schemes and present several conceptual frameworks and
models for analysing the research commercialisation phenomenon.
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Chapter 8
From Empirical Data to Conceptual Models
We shall not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will
be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.
T. S. Eliot
(1948 Nobel Laureate in Literature)
8.1 Introduction
This thesis presents a case study of the commercialisation of publicly funded research
in the biotechnology sector in Australia. I followed an exploratory approach to address
two research questions:
1. How is research commercialisation perceived by Australian participants?
2. How do Australia’s current TTO-based structural arrangements facilitate
the transfer of new scientific discoveries from academia to industry?
My data revealed the existence of multiple meanings associated with the term research
commercialisation. The specific meaning which the respondents attach to the term not
only shapes their motivation, objectives, and behaviours, but also their particular views
on research commercialisation. Second discovery of this study was that Australia’s
current TTO-based structural arrangements may impede the transfer of IP resulting
from public sector research to industry and make the transfer process more complicated
and difficult.
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In this chapter, I will revisit previously analysed data and discuss the empirical and
theoretical implications using a bottom-up approach. First of all, I will examine the
data from an individual participant perspective and clarify the ambiguity and confusion
around the concept of research commercialisation. Clearly defined categorisation
schemes will be inductively derived. I will then take an institutional perspective to
explain why Australia’s current TTO-based structural arrangements have generated
very different outcomes from what policymakers and administrators expected. Some
conceptual frameworks will be introduced to assist the understanding. Finally, I will
step up to the national level and assess my empirical findings against the original
objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act and the National Principles of Intellectual Property
Management for Publicly Funded Research. A model will be presented to illustrate
how research commercialisation plays its part from a national system perspective.
8.2 IP-Based vs Business-Based View
This study has unveiled a striking difference between the academia and industry
stakeholder groups in regard to their views on research commercialisation. Their
views not only differ semantically, but also in many other aspects, e. g. time-scales,
objectives, assumptions and measures of success. In order to reach a common ground
for future discussion, I have classified these two different views based on their essential
characteristics (Table 8.1). I have also introduced two new terms to distinguish between
them: IP-based view and business-based view.
From an academic point of view, research commercialisation is essentially the same
as technology transfer. Although some scientists and technology transfer managers
interviewed adopted a broader technology transfer perspective, most respondents of
this study referred to research commercialisation as the process of transferring IP
resulting from publicly funded research to industry. Under this prevailing IP-based
view, university IP is considered as a marketable product which can be licensed or
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Table 8.1
A Classification of Two Main Views on Research Commercialisation
IP-based view Business-based view
Definition Transfer of IP resulting
from publicly funded
research to industry
Transformation of a new
discovery resulting from
publicly funded research
into a marketable product or
service
Time-scale Short-term Long-term
Institutional objective Revenue generation and
technology transfer
Profitable operation
Characteristics of the
process
Sequential Cyclical
Assumption IP is a marketable product IP is a component of the
development of a final
product
sold through commercial channels. The primary objectives for a research institution
are to generate revenue from IP exploitation and to transfer public research findings
to industry, although there may be other objectives. This IP-based view is short-term
in nature. It does not concern with what is happening beyond handling over a piece
of IP to industry, for example the transformation of a patent into a prototype, or the
prototype into a product.
By contrast, from an industry perspective, research commercialisation is the process
of transforming a new invention or scientific discovery resulting from publicly funded
research into a marketable product or service. Taking a long-term perspective, this
business-based view is concerned with moving promising ideas from the research
laboratory to the marketplace. The process involves multiple feedback loops and
iterations which go far beyond technology transfer. Although private companies are
driven by profit, their successful transformation of research findings into products
generates national benefits (e.g. jobs, GDP and productivity increase).
Further evidence of the existence of multiple views on research commercialisation is
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provided in a recent US study by Feller and Feldman (2010). Drawing on case histories
of technological innovation originating from research by faculty at Pennsylvania State
University and John Hopkins University, the authors described the complexity of the
processes involved in transforming university IP into commercial products. They
reported that universities are concerned with technology transfer, whereas companies
are concerned with the development of marketable technological innovations. Although
their study and my study have both empirically described the different views on research
commercialisation, I have gone a step further and derived a conceptual framework to
clearly distinguish between their essential features.
The characteristics of IP-based and business-based views on research commercialisation
helps explain the behaviours of individuals. An understanding of these competing
views may assist scholars to interpret research findings from existing studies and put
them into perspective. The mainstream academic studies on research commercialisation
are currently focused on university patenting, licensing and spin-off activities. However,
they only provide limited information about how university IP is used, by whom, and
how it is ultimately transformed into a commercially viable product.
8.3 Issues with TTO-based Structural Arrangements
The empirical findings described in Chapter 6 and 7 suggest that Australia’s current
TTO-based structural arrangements for research commercialisation may impede the
flow of IP resulting from public sector research to industry. Not only do TTOs rarely
break-even from licensing and spin-off activities, their centralised approach to IP
management may also motivate respondents to bypass them. In this section, I will
compare my research findings with existing literature. I will also provide a possible
explanation for why our TTO-based arrangements have given rise to outcomes that are
contrary to what are intended.
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Although scholarly investigation on research commercialisation in Australia has been
limited, the Australian Government has commissioned at least 60 studies and reports
relevant to the commercialisation of publicly funded research (Collier, 2008, pp. 327–
333). The main focus of these studies has been the identification of barriers and coming
up with recommendations to address these impediments. Collectively, the existing
literature has provided a comprehensive listing of the possible issues associated with
research commercialisation.
Some of the issues in research commercialisation reported by existing literature are
related to the characteristics of our economic environment. For example, there is not
enough venture capital for early-stage university inventions, and our local market is
too small (Allen Consulting Group, 2004; AIC, 2003). Other issues are related to
the nature of the academic environment. For example, university scientists are not
entrepreneurial, and they have limited time available for commercialisation. In my
view, the issues described above can be classified as external conditions as opposed to
barriers. External conditions are constraints imposed on a system and they cannot be
easily changed due to their inertia. Barriers are impediments to achieving a specific
objective within a particular system. Some barriers can be removed by changing the
objective rather than modifying the system. It is unlikely that given conditions are
going to be changed without major government intervention.
Other issues identified by existing literature can potentially be improved within the
control of the universities or government. For example, academic scientists do not have
enough incentives to commercialise their research findings, and university TTOs lack
commercialisation experience and skills (Yencken, Ralston, & Karingal Consultants,
2005; Independent working groups for PMSEIC, 2001; ACI, Howard Partners &
Carisgold, 2002). In my opinion, these issues can be classified as barriers. Different
studies often report different sets of barriers. Without defining the scope of the system
and its objectives, the identification of barriers soon becomes a meaningless task. What
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are considered as barriers in one system may disappear in another system. Even within
one system, there may be multiple objectives. Barriers associated with one objective
may not be an impediment for another objective. It is therefore important to link
barriers to specific objectives within a given system.
In the following discussion, I focus on the specific issues associated with our current
TTO-based structural arrangements for research commercialisation and explain why
such arrangements have generated very different outcomes from what are expected.
Our contemporary TTO-based structural arrangements for research commercialisation
focus on the exploitation of IP resulting from publicly funded research. They are
particular implementations of the National Principles of IP Management for Publicly
Funded Research that have been adopted by most research institutions in Australia.
Under such arrangements, the TTO is a mediating entity which manages the inventions
resulting from academic research, packages them in the form of IP and markets to
industry in exchange for revenue. Essentially, the TTO is an intermediary between
the supplier of academic inventions and the buyer from industry who can potentially
utilise the IP for further development. A graphical representation of the TTO-based
structural arrangements is depicted in Figure 8.1.
My study identified two main objectives that have been imposed on university TTOs:
(1) to generate sufficient revenues from licensing of university IP to at least cover their
operational costs; and (2) to facilitate the transfer of early-stage university inventions
to existing industry. The empirical evidence suggests that trying to achieve these two
objectives simultaneously can create tension within university TTOs and damage their
relationships with other key participants. The end result is that neither objective is
achieved. I will discuss each of the objectives in more detail.
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Figure 8.1 TTO-based structural arrangements for research commercialisation.
Uni = university, PRO = public research organisation, TTO = technology transfer
office. Dotted arrow is used as most TTOs generate negative returns from patenting
and licensing activities.
Objective 1:
To generate sufficient revenues from licensing of university IP to at least cover
TTO operational costs
University TTOs are typically supported by their parent organisations. As universities
are struggling with reduced government share of research funding, they expect the
TTOs to be quickly self-sufficient. This means that the TTOs need to bring revenues
back to at least cover their operating costs. These costs include expenses related to the
identification, protection and marketing of IP, as well as the administrative expenses.
The technology transfer managers are aware of that other than a few rare exceptions,
most university inventions are no more than “proof-of-concepts” which have many
unresolved issues. However, in order to generate sufficient returns from IP-based
research commercialisation, they have to inflate the asking price of university IP and
fight over legal terms and conditions aggressively.
On the buyer’s side, private companies typically are not prepared to pay for university
IP at the price which technology transfer managers are asking due to the uncertainty
and high risks associated with early-stage university inventions. From a industry
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perspective, they are concerned with business-based research commercialisation. The
value of an early-stage university invention is yet to be demonstrated. Without injecting
substantial resources into its further development, they do not know if a university
invention can be successfully transformed into a new product. Even if the product
can be developed, they do not know how the market is going to perceive it. The high
downstream development costs coupled with the unknown risks mean that industry
will put relatively low value on an embryonic university invention.
Due to the financial objective imposed on the university TTOs, technology transfer
managers cannot afford to reduce the asking price of university IP. As a result, they
often find it difficult to reach an agreement with industry over the value of IP resulting
from university research.
Objective 2:
To facilitate the transfer of early-stage university inventions to existing industry
In order to get early-stage university inventions transferred to existing industry, the
TTOs need to keep both the inventor’s and the company’s interests under consideration.
Both the supplier of a university invention and the prospective industry buyer favour
personal relationships and interactions. From an industry perspective, a university
invention at its embryonic stage of development has little value to a private company.
To transform it into something useful and relevant for downstream development, the
company needs to interact with the inventor directly to gain access to his or her tacit
knowledge and skills. From an academic inventor’s perspective, the university often
does not have the resources and capabilities to further develop the IP. To take the
invention to the next level, the inventor needs to interact with industry to identify an
appropriate partner that can provide needed inputs. The university TTOs can certainly
contribute to this process by assisting the building of personal relationships between
the academic inventor and the private company.
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Figure 8.2 Conflicting objectives imposed on TTOs and their consequences.
Unfortunately, the financial objective shifts the focus of university TTOs to executing
contractual agreements and making transactions with the prospective industry buyers.
In order to meet the first objective, university TTOs often choose to keep the academic
inventor to one side once a patent is granted so that they can negotiate and try to get
a better deal for the university. Having an academic scientist involved may interfere
with the negotiation process. If the university TTOs take the industry’s perspective into
consideration, they have to compromise on the price of university IP. Unfortunately,
university TTOs have great difficulty in doing so because they have the mandate from
their research institution to bring revenues back at least to cover their operational costs.
The empirical data of my study suggest that these two objectives are not compatible
with each other, and trying to achieve both simultaneously can have a ripple effect.
In the short-term, very little university IP is licensed to industry due to disagreement
over its value between the TTO and perspective industry buyer. Both parties not only
lose time during the negotiation process, but also lose trust in each other. This can
damage university and industry long-term relationships. Being frustrated with the
university administration, industry will go around the TTO and deal directly with
academic scientists. Without licensing income, a university TTO will not have enough
resources to attract and maintain qualified staff with commercialisation experience and
skills. In fact, they need external financial support to ensure their continued operation.
These consequences are illustrated in Figure 8.2.
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Although my empirical data are based on the Australian context, studies from the US
reported similar findings. For example, based on the observations of the post-Bayh-
Dole rise of patenting at American universities, Nelson commented:
In most cases, the holding of IP by the university is unlikely to have
facilitated technology transfer, but rather made it more difficult by imposing
transaction costs on firms that wanted to further develop that technology
. . . Very few university ‘inventions’ garner significant license incomes. It
is almost a sure thing that many universities are paying significantly more
to run their patenting and licensing offices than they are bringing in license
revenues (Nelson, 2001, pp. 16–17).
Given that Australia’s current TTO-based structural arrangements are based on the US
best practice, it is not surprising that the empirical data of this study confirm Nelson’s
research findings. A recent US theoretical study by Kenny and Patton (2009) also
reached similar conclusions. They used agency theory and transaction costs economics
to argue:
. . . the current university invention ownership model, in which universities
maintain de jure ownership of inventions, is not optimal either in terms of
economic efficiency or for advancing the social interest of rapidly
commercializing technology and encouraging entrepreneurship. . . These
structural uncertainties can lead to delays in licensing, misaligned incentives
among parties, and obstacles to the flow of scientific information and the
materials necessary for scientific progress. The institutional arrangements
within which TLOs [technology licensing offices] are embedded have
encouraged some of them to become revenue maximizers, rather than
facilitators of technology dissemination for the good of the entire society.
(Kenney & Patton, 2009, p. 1407)
Despite the geographical and methodological differences, the conclusions about issues
associated with the contemporary TTO-based structural arrangements are remarkably
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similar. My study differs from Kenny and Patton (2009) in the sense that my results
are empirically grounded, whereas theirs are theoretically derived.
Kenny and Patton (2009) suggested two alternatives to improve the contradictions,
misaligned incentives and inefficiencies inherent in the structural arrangements for
research commercialisation. One possible solution suggested by the authors is to vest
IP ownership with the inventor, and the other one is to make all inventions publicly
available (Kenney & Patton, 2009). In the long run, revision of IP ownership rights
resulting from publicly funded research is probably required. However, both solutions
require legislative change which are costly to execute. In the short-term, my study can
offer a more straightforward and less expensive solution.
Some of the undesirable outcomes can be prevented by removing one of the objectives
instead of changing the structural arrangements altogether. This strategy is probably
best illustrated by UniQuest, the TTO of the University of Queensland. UniQuest
has been rated as the best performing commercialisation entity in Australia across a
number of measures, e.g. number of patents granted, number of licenses executed, and
licensing income received. In the case of UniQuest, the second objective has actually
been removed because they typically do not transfer early-stage university inventions
to existing private companies with a proven track record. Their preferred approach
is to create new companies and use these spin-offs as a vehicle to shelf early-stage
university inventions and to attract government and private funding. UniQuest has
also improved the means to achieving their financial objective. They have certainly
increased their economy of scale by employing more than 50 professional technology
transfer managers. By adopting a “hub-and-spoke” organisational structure, their
technology transfer managers have developed closer interaction with their academic
scientists. This in turn would give them access to more university inventions. As
a result, their operational cost per patent is generally lower than other Australian
universities.
172
The alternative solution is to remove the financial objective and to focus on facilitating
the transfer of university inventions to industry. Although my study does not have any
empirical data to support this particular approach, valuable insights can be obtained
from overseas examples. Stanford University is probably one of the most successful
universities in the world in research commercialisation with annual gross income of
nearly US$50 million. An archival study of the evolution of the Stanford University’s
technology transfer program in life sciences illustrates that its success has occurred
alongside a university policy not to specially promote licensing, patenting and start-
ups (Colyvas, 2007). Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing was founded in 1968
to ensure new research information flows to the public in a timely manner. In the
early days, the office pursued technology transfer with a broad, relational mission, not
just focusing on licensing patents but on building relationships with companies. The
author concludes that “consequences of lucrative inventions were far different from
the imperatives that gave rise to them” (Colyvas, 2007, p. 474).
In summary, one of the possible explanations for why Australia’s TTO-based structural
arrangements for research commercialisation have led to suboptimal outcomes is that
the goal of facilitating technology transfer is not compatible with revenue generation.
As an intermediary, TTO can still provide important benefits to academic inventors
and industry partners if one of the contradictory objectives is removed.
8.4 Assessment of the Bayh-Dole Act’s Original Objectives
The historical data presented in Chapter 3 illustrate that our current IP-based approach
to research commercialisation can trace its origin to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and
similar patent policies. Although in Australia we do not have a formal legislation,
the National Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded
Research are developed based on the US best practice. Besides Australia, there are
many other nations around the world adopting Bayh-Dole like legislations in the belief
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that it is the best way to ensure the commercialisation of publicly funded research
(Geuna & Nesta, 2006; Mowery & Sampat, 2005). Given the importance of the Bayh-
Dole Act in research commercialisation, in this section, I re-examine this legislation in
the broader historical context and evaluate our progress against its original objectives.
Almost thirty years have passed since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, yet the
effects of the Bayh-Dole Act or similar legislative frameworks remained controversial.
Some regard the Bayh-Dole Act as a catalyst for economic growth, fundamental to the
transfer of IP from university to industry (OECD, 2003; Bayhdole25, 2006). Others
argue that it has brought unintended and deleterious consequences (Baldini, 2008).
Before joining the debates, it is important to examine the original intentions of this
legislation as supposed to secondary interpretations by scholars and the popular press.
In Table 8.2, I have listed the original objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act1 (18 U.S.C.
200). I have used my empirical findings to assess whether these objectives have been
met in Australia. There are six original objectives in the Bayh-Dole Act, but my
discussion is focused on the four primary goals (#1, #2, #3 and #5 in Table 8.2).
The empirical evidence of my study illustrates that patent policies similar to the Bayh-
Dole Act have certainly achieved the objective of encouraging universities and public
research organisations to become more active in the commercialisation of academic
inventions (objective #5 in Table 8.2). Between 2000 and 2007, across all Australian
research institutions, the total number of invention disclosures increased by 126%; the
LOA income increased by 70%; and the total number of start-ups operational at the end
of the year increased by 179% (DIISR, 2009). Based on these performance indicators,
the achievement of the Bayh-Dole Act and other similar legislative frameworks should
be properly acknowledged.
1The Bayh-Dole Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§200—212 and is available from:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscose35/usc sup 01 35 10 II 20 18.html
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Table 8.2
Assessment of the Bayh-Dole Act’s Original Objectives
Original Objectives (18 U.S.C. §200) Empirical findings of this study
1. To promote the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research or
development
If utilization is understood as industry
uptake of inventions arising from federally
supported research, then Australia’s current
TTO-based structural implementation may
slow down the flow of inventions from
academia to industry
2. To encourage maximum participation of
small business firms in federally supported
research and development efforts
From the perspective of new business, the
number of short-lived spin-offs have greatly
expanded. From the perspective of existing
business, some small biotech companies
have refrained from dealings with research
institutions due to difficulty in IP
negotiation
3. To promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and non-profit
organizations, including universities
Exercising IP aggressively through the
TTOs can damage relationships with both
academic inventors and industry partners,
create mistrust and escalate frustration
4. To ensure that inventions made by
non-profit organizations and small business
firms are used in a manner to promote free
completion and enterprise without unduly
encumbering future research and discovery
“Manner”, “completion”, and “unduly” are
subjected to the definitions of the
legislation. These terms are difficult to
measure.
5. To promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the
United States by United State industry labor
Based on the current performance metrics
for IP-based commercialization, great
process has been made as indicated by the
number of patents, LOAs and start-ups. If
commercialization is defined as
business-based commercialization, then
new performance measures need to be
developed
6. To ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the
Government and protect the public against
non-use or unreasonable use of inventions;
and to minimize the costs of administering
policies in this area
Apart from the National Principles of
Intellectual Property Management for
Publicly Funded Research, the Australian
government does not have any formal
legislation which limits its ability to
exercise direct control against non-use or
unreasonable use of inventions
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However, for the remaining three objectives (#1, #2, #3 in Table 8.2), the outcomes
often turned out to be exactly the reverse of the original intention of the Act. My
empirical data reveal that rather than working together to commercialise university
inventions for mutual benefits, university and industry might have become further
apart due to their inability to reach agreement over IP rights. Many biotechnology
companies reported that moving an IP out of a TTO was too slow, too costly, and too
difficult, so out of frustration and mistrust, they gave up and stopped dealing directly
with the research institution.
Some critics argue that the Bayh-Dole Act is responsible for these negative outcomes.
I argue that these outcomes are not a direct consequence of the Act, but rather the
TTO-based structural arrangements that have been implemented by universities.
The Bayh-Dole Act created appropriate conditions and incentives for universities to
engage in IP transfer activities, but it neither enforced them to maximise revenue
from these activities, nor told them how to manage IP. In fact, revenue generation
was not even mentioned in its original objectives. The current TTO-based structural
arrangements are particular implementations of the Act which focus on the exploitation
of IP resulting from government funded research. My analysis shows that by pursuing
two conflicting goals simultaneously, such arrangements may interfere with the flow
of scientific discovery to industry and damage university-industry relationships.
Any legislation is not without limitations. Perhaps one of the unintended consequences
of the Bayh-Dole Act is that it has contributed to the shifting of our attention to IP
ownership and transfer. The overarching goal of the Act was to facilitate the utilisation
of federally funded inventions, but the legislation itself only addressed the transfer of
university inventions to industry. It was assumed that university would take care of the
creation and the transfer of IP, and industry would be responsible for the subsequent
conversion of university IP into new products or services. Overall, the system would
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function efficiently. This assumption was possibly right for the US at that particular
time, because the conditions were very different 30 years ago.
Based on my observation of US history, the Bayh-Dole Act was introduced at a time
when federally funded research had already generated a large number of scientific
and technical “breakthroughs”. By then, the US elite universities such as Stanford
University, MIT and University of California had developed a capability to bring
the inventions close to prototype stage where the risks and benefits became more or
less obvious to industry partners. Patent protection at this stage provided immediate
impetus for private companies to invest in subsequent product development. Moreover,
with the help of the Research Corporation, these elite universities had also developed
their own technology transfer capabilities to assist the management of university IP
(Mowery et al., 2004).
The focus on IP transfer seemed to be able to engage both academia and industry to
work together in the past. However, what has worked before may not be appropriate
when conditions have changed. As the Bayh-Dole Act lacked provisions that had
been included in most IPAs, including the requirement that a participating university
must have an “approved technology transfer” capability, today universities with fewer
resources have also become actively involved in patenting, licensing and creating spin-
offs.
My empirical data suggest that a high number of university inventions are now patented
at the embryonic stage where the risks and benefits are unknown. Unless the IP is a
clear winner, industry has no incentive to license it from the university and invest
in its subsequent development. Certainly, without external financial support, most
universities do not have the capability to further develop the invention to a stage where
industry is willing to take over. In today’s environment, to transform an early-stage
invention into something useful requires ongoing collaboration between the academic
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inventor and an industry partner. From an industry’s perspective, it is the academic
inventor’s tacit knowledge and skills which matter the most. The results of my study
are also in agreement with empirical findings reported by US scholars such as Jensen
and Thursby (2001), Thursby and Thursby (2004) and Link et al. (2007).
There are two general conclusions that can be drawn from the examination of the Bayh-
Dole Act in the broader historical context. First, the process of taking a university
invention to the marketplace not only requires its transfer to industry, but also its
subsequent transformation into a new product or service. The Bayh-Dole Act has
unintentionally shifted our focus to the former. This has worked in the past, but over
time, the importance of the subsequent transformation stage has grown higher. Our
current legislative framework and incentive systems, however, do not address how
university IP is utilised by industry. Second, in today’s environment the continuing
emphasis on the protection and exploitation of university IP may create obstacles to
the flow of scientific discoveries from academia to industry.
8.5 Research Commercialisation in a Discovery-Driven Economy
So far, I have discussed the empirical and theoretical implications of my research
findings at the individual participant and institutional level. In this section, I place
research commercialisation in a broader context and examine how it plays a part from a
national system perspective. The IP-based and business-based views introduced earlier
will be used to assist the discussion.
From a government perspective, the primary concern of research commercialisation is
to maximise national benefits and social return from public investment in research.
This objective was clearly stated in Australia’s National Principles of Intellectual
Property Management for Publicly Funded Research:
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It is important to emphasise that the public research funding agencies,
including the ARC, the NHMRC and other government agencies, will
continue to support the best research in the national interest and will continue
to pursue the vision of advancing the nation’s capacity for quality research
for the economic, social and cultural benefit of the community. The ARC
and the NHMRC do not wish to hold a stake in direct ownership of IP
nor do they intend to benefit directly from commercial outcomes of the
research funded through their financial support (ARC et al., 2001, p. 2).
If we want to achieve the objective of generating national benefits through research
commercialisation, then we need to think from a system perspective and take into
consideration both the business-based and IP-based views. We now have the advantage
of hindsight and can draw on experience which has been accumulated over the last few
decades, both in Australia and overseas. Drawing on Vannevar Bush’s original report
Science: The Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945) and the empirical data of this study, I have
developed a conceptual model to illustrate the cyclical flow of scientific discoveries in
a discovery-based economy (Figure 8.3). Although it is a simplified representation of
reality, it attempts to capture the key phases of the cycle.
This model places research commercialisation in the broader discovery-based economy
and helps us to think about the phenomenon from a systematic perspective. Government
funding for public sector research helps to create new scientific discoveries. Some
of these discoveries are transferred to industry and then transformed into practical
applications. The successful transformation will lead to new products and new jobs
which contribute increased taxes to government. This ensures the continued funding
support for public sector research. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the circular shape
represents the cyclic nature of the underlying dynamic process.
Another key feature of this model is that it emphasises the importance of scientific
discoveries instead of knowledge in the form of IP. It is the scientific discoveries that
will ultimately be transformed into practical applications. IP is a means to exclude
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Figure 8.3 Flow of scientific discoveries in a discovery-based economy.
others using similar ideas. In some rare cases, university discoveries have direct
commercial applications with clear risk-benefit value proposition. In those cases,
patent protection and its subsequent transfer via commercial channels will benefit both
the research institution and industry (Powell et al., 2007). However, the majority of
scientific discoveries resulting from public sector research are embryonic in nature and
their value to industry is not certain (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). The transfer of these
early-stage scientific discoveries to industry would require the consideration of other
channels. Forcing them through the commercial channels can block other channels
of dissemination and have unintended outcomes (Nelson, 2001; Mowery & Sampat,
2005).
Up until now, the focus of our structural arrangements for research commercialisation
and patent policy has been around the transfer of IP resulting from publicly funded
research to industry. Much effort has been spent on negotiating who owns what
and what money should flow to whom, before the subsequent transformation is even
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started. As a step forward, to ensure the system is functioning properly, we need to
shift our attention away from the transfer of IP to the flow of scientific discovery in
the discovery-based economy. The successful transformation of scientific discoveries
into new products requires public funding support for research as well as ongoing
collaboration between academia and industry. We need to strive for appropriate balance
between different phases of the cycle.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered: the point is to
discover them.
Galileo Galilei
(Italian Astronomer & Physicist, 1564–1642)
9.1 Major Research Findings
In recent years, the Australian government has invested heavily in supporting the
commercialisation of academic research. Many policies and initiatives have been
introduced to encourage universities and public research organisations to be more
active in the exploitation of research outcomes. By now, we have accumulated a
considerable amount of experience. Under the current performance metrics, the number
of invention disclosures, patents, licensing agreements and spin-offs has grown across
all research institutions in Australia. However, celebrating our achievements based on
these measures may be too premature.
Based on triangulated data from multiple sources, this study revealed that by focusing
on the protection and exploitation of IP, the Australia’s current TTO-based structural
arrangements might have increased the transaction costs associated with technology
transfer, slowed down the flow of scientific discoveries in the national system and
created more obstacles for university-industry collaboration in the biotechnology sector.
In addition, under such arrangements, the TTOs might have been chronically trapped
between the goal of assisting technology transfer and the primary metrics upon which
their performance is measured, revenue-generation.
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The empirical findings of this study suggest that structural implementation of research
commercialisation that is based on the US best practice may not be appropriate in
the Australian context. Before arriving at specific recommendations to improve our
performance in research commercialisation in the near future, there are still a number
of unresolved issues that need to be addressed.
Firstly, the term research commercialisation needs to be clearly defined in any policy
discussion. By research commercialisation, do we mean the transfer of IP resulting
from publicly sector research to industry? Or, are we referring to the process of moving
a new scientific discovery to the marketplace? Without clarifying the specific meaning
of research commercialisation, discussing the expected outcomes and measures of
success soon becomes a fruitless task.
Secondly, there are fundamental trade-offs between various desirable outcomes of
research commercialisation. Each outcome is closely linked to the objective that we
have in mind. This study identified three main objectives of research commercialisation:
(1) to facilitate technology transfer, (2) to maximise financial returns, (3) to generate
national benefits and social return. At the institutional level, the TTOs are primarily
concerned with objective (1) and (2); and at the national level, the government is
interested in objective (3). My study illustrates that the first two objectives are not
compatible with each other. Trying to tackle them simultaneously can lead to neither
objective being achieved.
Finally, from a national system perspective, if the overarching objective of research
commercialisation is to generate social return from public investment in science, then
we must shift our attention from a narrow focus on IP-based transfer to system-wide
thinking. Appropriate balance needs to be achieved between the creation, diffusion,
adoption and transformation of scientific discoveries.
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9.2 Significance and Limitations of This Study
Most studies on research commercialisation to date are focused on the experience
from the US and selective European countries. Although some scholarly investigations
are within the Australian context, these studies tend to be concerned with a range of
fragmented issues. My research fills a gap in the literature by providing a case study of
the commercialisation of publicly funded biotechnology research in Australia. It has
both empirical and theoretical contributions. On the empirical side, the case reveals
the dynamics, holism and richness of the research commercialisation phenomenon
in a sector and context specific setting. On the theoretical side, I have developed
some conceptual frameworks and models for analysing and thinking about the research
commercialisation phenomenon.
The sector specific approach adopted in this study is both a strength and weakness.
Biotechnology represents an extreme case because it accounts for the majority of
university patenting, licensing and spin-off activities in Australia. Moreover, this is
the sector where IP is perceived as a key enabling factor in the process of product
development. No other sector has put as much weight on IP in commercialisation
as biotechnology (Cohen et al., 2002; Pisano, 2006). If our current predominate
TTO-based structural arrangements have made university-industry technology transfer
more costly and time consuming in the biotechnology sector, it is even less likely
they would facilitate the transfer of university inventions to industry in other sectors.
However, the applicability of my research findings in other sectors still needs to be
empirically determined. A multiple case study design with “within case” and “between
case” analyses (e.g. Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) would be particularly useful for
identifying differences across industry sectors.
This study provides a vivid description of the viewpoints and attitudes held by different
participants towards research commercialisation. Although the case paints a largely
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consistent message towards the problems in the process of research commercialisation
in Australia, it is important to note that not all TTOs hold a “narrow” legalistic, IP-
centric view of technology transfer. There are sophisticated TTOs such as those at
Stanford (Colyvas, 2007), where their primary mission is to facilitate the adoption
and development of university technology for the public benefit. This suggests that
there are varying views among TTOs and perhaps varying attitudes by industry and
academic scientists towards them. It would be interesting to explore these different
viewpoints more fully and illuminate the factors that lie behind these differences.
Another limitation of this study is that the conceptual frameworks and models which
I developed are inductively derived, and their generalisability is still subject to further
investigation. Hypothesis-driven research is required to test them on different sets of
data to see if the same correlation exists between attributes and outcomes.
9.3 Directions for Further Research
Based on my observation and analysis of the research commercialisation phenomenon
in the biotechnology sector in Australia, a number of conceptual frameworks and
models were developed. These analytical tools may clarify some of the ambiguity
and confusion around the concept of research commercialisation and stimulate further
studies and discussions on the topic.
One interesting area for further research is to explore the variation in perceptions
and attitudes towards research commercialisation among academic scientists, TTO
managers and the business community in more depth. Incorporating additional data
such as departmental and sub-field differences, backgrounds of academic scientists,
characteristics of the TTO and characteristics of the firm would make a more compelling
analysis and help to shed lights on factors that may explain the differences in viewpoints
held by various participants.
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Another avenue for further research is to investigate the causal relationships between
the definition of research commercialisation a participant has had in mind and that
person’s attitude towards research commercialisation. Is it the definition that one
adopted drives his or her feeling towards research commercialisation or it is the other
way around? Addressing such questions would give us a richer understanding of the
causal mechanisms at play and yield more tangible implications.
From a broader perspective, current mainstream research is predominately concerned
with the IP-based research commercialisation. Much progress has been achieved in
this area by examining the transfer of research outcomes from academia to industry
through IP-based channels such as patenting, licensing and spin-offs. By contrast, very
limited research has been undertaken from the perspective of business-based research
commercialisation. For instance, how are university inventions adopted, utilised and
transformed by industry?
In order to create a more balanced view on research commercialisation and to ensure
scientific discoveries flow efficiently in the national economy, the understanding of
business-based research commercialisation is equally important. It would be beneficial
to conduct more studies to uncover industry’s needs, interests and expectations. Some
possible research questions are listed below:
• How do firms evaluate IP resulting from public sector research?
• How to stimulate industry uptake of university inventions or discoveries?
• Why do firms license or do not license university inventions?
• What factors promote or inhibit university-industry collaboration in business-
based research commercialisations?
• How are university inventions utilised by firms?
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Appendix A
Concerns Over the Negative Effects of Research
Commercialisation
The commercialisation of academic research has received considerable attention from
the OECD governments in recent years. Due to the recognition of the important role of
knowledge and innovation in fostering economic growth, technological performance
and international competitiveness, policy and legislative changes such as the Bayh-
Dole Act were introduced to accelerate the transfer of academic research to industry.
In response to these changes, universities have greatly expanded their involvement
in patenting, licensing and spin-off activities. Despite the enthusiastic support by
policymakers and the potential economic benefits that research commercialisation can
bring, some scholars have raised concerns about the possible negative effects from
such activities and their implications for universities and society. These concerns are
summarised in Table A.1.
Aggressive research commercialisation may have a deleterious effect on the traditional
“culture of open science” at universities, because commercial and academic endeavours
represent fundamentally different and potentially contradictory arrangements for the
creation, dissemination, and use of scientific knowledge. According to Merton (1973),
communal ownership of scientific results is a fundamental norm underlying the social
structure of academic science. It is exactly this free and open sharing of research
results that contributes to cumulative learning and scientific progress. Profit-driven
companies, on the other hand, are interested in the exploitation of knowledge and
often keep results secret in order to gain a competitive advantage over rivals. Several
empirical studies suggest that scientists who are involved in commercialising their
work are more likely to withhold data from their colleagues and engage in other forms
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Table A.1
Main Concerns Over the Negative Effects of University Patenting and Licensing
Areas of concerns Selected references
Threat to scientific progress
Disclosure restrictions Rahm (1994); Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell,
and Louis (1996); Lee (2000)
Restriction of data sharing Blumenthal, Campbell, Anderson, Causino, and
Louis (1997); Campbell, Weissman, Causino,
and Blumenthal (2000); Louis, Jones,
Anderson, Blumenthal, and Campbell (2001)
Tragedy of anticommons Heller and Eisenberg (1998); Maurer (2006)
Restriction on research tools Nelson (2004); Sampat (2006)
Changes in the research
Decline of patents’ quality Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998);
Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis (2001);
Mowery and Ziedonis (2002); Sampat, Mowery,
and Ziedonis (2003)
Substitution between basic & applied research Thursby and Thursby (2002); Van Looy, Ranga,
Callaert, Debackere, and Zimmermann (2004);
Van Looy, Callaert, and Debackere (2006)
Substitution between patents & publications Carayol and Matt (2004); Gulbrandsen and
Smeby (2005); Meyer (2006); Renault (2006)
Decline of publications’ quality Agrawal and Henderson (2002); Meyer (2006)
Threat to teaching activity
Decline of teaching time Stephan (2001); Geuna and Nesta (2006)
Conflicts of interest Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, and Morgan
(2002)
Decline of students’ publications Behrens and Gray (2001); Lin and Bozeman
(2006)
Threats to industry
Restrictions on university-industry
communication
Thursby and Thursby (2000, 2003); Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh (2002); Fontana, Geuna, and
Matt (2006)
Delays to industry innovation Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, and Louis
(1996); Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link
(2003b); Hertzfeld, Link, and Vonortas (2006)
Loss of proprietary information Blumenthal, Epstein, and Maxwell (1986);
Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, and Louis
(1996)
Unreasonable cost increase Colyvas et al. (2002); Lowe (2006)
Source: adapted from Baldini (2008, p. 291).
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of secrecy than those who are not (Campbell et al., 2002; Vogeli et al., 2006). For
example, based on surveying 2167 academic life scientists who engaged in commercial
activities, a study found that 19.8% of researchers had delayed publication of their
results by more than 6 months to allow for patent application, and 8.9% had denied a
request from another university for access to research results (Blumenthal et al., 1997).
Due to conflicts of interest, the increasing emphasis on research commercialisation
may also threaten the integrity of the research process and the objectivity of scientific
findings (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003). Strong and consistent evidence shows that
industry-sponsored research is more likely to reach conclusions that are favourable to
the sponsor. Scientists and universities can develop financial interests in the specific
research outcomes, leading to bias towards certain research fields and activities. This is
particularly prevalent in the pharmaceutical and the tobacco industry, where companies
preferentially support study designs that favour positive results.
Some scholars are also concerned that the commercialisation of university research
may distort the direction of academic inquiry from long-term, far-thinking projects
toward short-term industrial problems. According to Noble’s corporate manipulation
thesis (1977), corporations interfere with the normal pursuit of science which is driven
by curiosity. They seek control of the academic research agenda for the benefit of
making profit. However, this argument is not always supported by empirical evidence.
Several recent studies show that performing more applied research does not necessarily
imply a trade-off with basic research (Van Looy et al., 2004).
As universities become more commercially oriented, traditional boundaries between
academic and industrial science, and between basic and applied research, are gradually
disappearing. There is now greater movement across institutional boundaries, thus
requiring a rethinking of the role of academia in society. Henry Etzkowitz introduced
the term “entrepreneurial universities” to describe the series of changes that reflect the
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more active role universities have taken in promoting the capitalisation of academic
research. He argues that economic and social development has become the third
component of university mission, in addition to research and teaching (Etzkowitz,
1998; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Other proponents of commercialisation even
urge the need for a new “social contract” between science and society (Gibbons, 1999).
From an organisation’s perspective, entrepreneurial activities do not fit comfortably
with traditional university core activities such as research and teaching. Attempting to
simultaneously manage these activities that have fundamentally different characteristics
is a rather challenging task. To accommodate commercialisation of academic research,
universities need to adapt their policies and organisational arrangements; and yet at
the same time they are expected to adhere to their historic commitment to create and
sustain an “intellectual commons”1 for the benefit of society. Argyres and Liebeskind
(1998) questioned the feasibility of combining educational, scientific and commercial
activities within one organisation. They argued that importing the rules and standards
of research commercialisation into the university will alter the intuitional logics and
organisational arrangements that support academic research.
1Intellectual commons — a knowledge archive openly accessible to all members of society
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Appendix B
Turning Points in Australian Higher Education
Key public policy changes have shaped both the direction and operation of Australian
universities over the last few decades (Wood & Meek, 2002). To understand how
research commercialisation arises in Australia, it is important to examine the historical
development of the higher education sector.
From their inception in 1850, the first public universities in Australia were primarily
concerned with training in the higher professions, particularly in medicine, law and
the humanities. Following the European model of self-governing institutions, the
early universities in Australia provided a broad liberal education which was based on
independent intellectual inquiry and scholarship as well as the mastery of a complex
body of knowledge. Academic independence and institutional autonomy were central
to their traditional roles as knowledge institutions (Marginson, 2002).
This role was expanded from the 1950s with a greater emphasis on the training and
research requirements of a State at a time of economic expansion. From this time,
universities were seen as instruments of “nation-building”, with a key responsibility
in the development of the nation’s human and cultural capital. The central rationality
of government was grounded in the notion of investment in human capital, whereby
the population was understood as a national resource to be harboured and developed.
It was believed that competitive advantage could be created by expanding educational
participation, by improving educational standards and the qualities of graduates, by
importing high quality skilled labour from aboard, and by increasing research outputs
and the take-up of research in industry innovation. More spending on education and
research would generate a corresponding rise in GDP (Marginson, 2002).
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The key moment in the modernisation of the Australian higher education system was
the reform implemented by the then Labour Government Minister for Employment,
Education and Training, John Dawkins, in the 1987 to 1989 period. The reform
focused on efficiency, economies of scale and increased private contribution for public
universities. A decade of school retention to Year 12 created a very large pool of
potential university applicants. To increase tertiary participation and safeguard access
to students from poorer families, Dawkins introduced the Higher Education Contribution
Scheme (HECS) as a means to finance more tertiary places than could be afforded
under a free education policy. The HECS was subject to income contingent repayment
arrangements through the tax system so that current students were not obliged to repay
their HECS tuition debt until their incomes reached the threshold level for repayments,
which was originally fixed at average weekly earnings (Marginson, 2009; Guthrie &
Neumann, 2007).
In a major departure from historical practice, the Dawkins reform encouraged research
institutions to raise funding from non-government sources and compete for fee-based
private revenues and performance-based public research funding. One of the key
initiatives of the Dawkins’ White Paper (1988) was the enhanced accountability of
universities to the federal government though institutional profile negotiations. These
were an annual exercise whereby each institution was required to negotiate its teaching
and research profile with the federal government, within the framework of national
priorities. The White Paper (Dawkins, 1988) also identified a preliminary range of
performance indicators, including student satisfaction, relative staffing levels, research
publications and completion rates, which could be used for accountability purposes.
After the Dawkins reform, the costs of a university education has gradually been
shifted to students. This has resulted in a high tuition–high aid policy through which
the government gives aid to students rather than institutions (Currie & Vidovich, 2000).
The first full fee international students arrived in 1987 and a growing number of
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postgraduate programmes also became market-based (Marginson, 2009).
The World Bank and the OECD have been instrumental in bringing the idea of market
forces into the higher education systems of developed countries, including Australia.
The World Bank in its 1994 Report on Higher Education urged countries to shift from
dependence on just one source of funding – the state, towards more money coming
from student fees, consultancies and donations. It recommended, among a number of
reforms, that governments link funding more closely to performance, develop private
institutions and create greater differentiation between institutions (World Bank, 1994;
Marginson, 2009).
In the OECD’s (1998) review of tertiary education, the US higher education system
was regarded as a model because it combined high participation with user payments.
The private share of costs was 50% in the US. The report identified Anglo-American
countries as increasingly fitting the entrepreneurial model, having a more instrumental
approach and being more responsive to the market. Even though there was no explicit
message that the entrepreneurial, instrumentalist, managerial approaches were better,
there were indications that more of these practices would lead universities in the
correct direction (Marginson, 2009).
In Australia, a number of recent policies and reports may have moved the country
along the same route undertaken by US institutions. For example, a report released
in November 1995 by the Economic Planning Advisory Commission said “micro-
economic reforms embracing ‘market incentives’ should be extended to the education
and training sector” (Armitage, 1995, p. 8). In December 1995, the Hoare Committee
found that work practices in Australian universities were “not keeping pace with the
profound societal and economic changes affecting the sector and the Government
needed to force universities to improve their management and governance policies”
(Richardson, 1995, p. 1). Vanstone envisaged the kind of the change that Australian
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universities need to make: “to survive and prosper in a rapidly changing world,
universities must embrace the marketplace and become customer-focused business
enterprises” (Vanstone, 1996, p. A11).
Since 1996, under the Liberal-National Party government led by Prime Minister John
Howard, there has been very little change in the higher education system settings.
According to Marginson (2009, 2002), once seen by the government as an investment
in the nation, Australian universities are now seen primarily as a source of fiscal
savings used to retire debt and sustain the nation’s global credit rating. Under the
influence of neo-liberal economics, the objective of the federal funding arrangement
was to preserve and strengthen higher education and to give it freedom to adapt to
competition while still achieving efficiency gains. The logic of the Dawkins changes
continued to play out, although student HECS charges increased more sharply, per
student government grants were reduced, and international student numbers grew more
rapidly than Dawkins may have envisaged.
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Appendix C
Interview Guide
Questions for academic scientists
• How did you get involved in research commercialisation?
• Why did you become interested in research commercialisation?
• At that time what was your perception about research commercialisation?
• What is your definition of research commercialisation?
• Was there a technology transfer office back then?
• Did you get any help from the TTO back then?
• How did you establish contact with an industry partner?
• What challenges did you encounter?
• How did your first experience help you with your later commercial activities?
• How did you balance it with your academic research?
• How did you decide the way in which your research should be commercialised?
• How does your division/university/institute value research commercialisation?
Has this been changed in recent years?
• Has your achievement in commercialisation been recognised? In what way?
• How are commercialisation related issues being communicated?
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• How did the business development unit or TTO support you? What kinds of
support did you receive?
Questions for technology transfer managers
• How did you become involved in research commercialisation?
• What is the role of this office?
• What kinds of support do you provide to staff scientists?
• Could you please tell me about the history of this office?
When was it established? Why was it established?
• Has there been any change in the way your office approaches
research commercialisation over the past few years?
• How do you define research commercialisation? What are the outputs?
• How has the process of research commercialisation changed over time? Has the
relative importance of specific outputs been changed over time?
• What data do you collect to measure research commercialisation performance?
Ideally, what would be the best data to collect?
• What is your organisation’s attitude towards research commercialisation? Has
the attitude been changed over time?
• Are scientists typically involved in the negotiation process?
• What are your key challenges as a technology transfer manager?
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Questions for private investors
• Could you please tell me about the history of this investment firm? How and
why was it established? What is the main investment focus?
• How do you initiate first contact with potential investees? Cold calling, referral
or active search?
• In the investment screening and evaluation phase, do you communicate directly
with the scientist/inventor or through the TTOs?
• If you are an educator, what would you like scientists or technology transfer
managers know in order to communicate more effectively with investors?
• What are the key challenges in negotiation?
• Who is typically involved in the negotiation process?
• How do you deal with disagreements in IP valuation and ownership issue?
• How do you align different incentives and interests?
• Do you have any suggestions to improve the negotiation process?
• In your opinion, what are the risks in investing early-stage technology?
• Do the TTOs or the companies who approached you share similar view on risks?
• What are the risks in investing in biotech spin-offs?
• What would you suggest to improve the investor readiness?
• What is your definition of research commercialisation?
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Questions for entrepreneurs or founders of spin-offs
• Why did you decide to found a spin-off company instead of using other means
such as licensing?
• Could you please tell me about the process of spin-off formation? What were
some of the challenges you experienced?
• What does research commercialisation mean to you?
• In your opinion, what are some of the risks in running an early-stage biotech
spin-off? How do you address these risks?
• What was your experience in dealing with the TTOs?
• How much time was spent on negotiating for a deal?
• Was there any difficulty in IP negotiation?
• If you are an educator, what would you like technology transfer managers or
academic scientists to know in order to work more effectively with industry
partners?
• In your opinion, what are the barriers to successful technology transfer? How
would you improve the process?
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Appendix D
Consent Form
I (please print) agree to be interviewed by Eleanor Flening regarding
the commercialisation of publicly funded research. I have read and understood the
following information:
1. The nature and purpose of the study and participants rights have been explained
in the information sheet.
2. Participation is voluntary and interviewees are free to withdraw at any time
during the study without any consequence.
3. No names of interviewees will be included in any publications without their
authorisation and prior written consents.
4. The record of the interview will be kept secure and only accessible by the
researcher.
5. Interview data will be used for research purpose only and will contribute to a
PhD thesis and possible academic journal articles.
6. Further questions about the research may be directed to the researcher or her
supervisor.
7. The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee has approved this study under
the protocol number 2006/289. Ethical concerns about the research may be
directed to the ANU Human Ethics Committee: Human Ethics Officer, Research
Office Australian National University, ACT 0200 Tel: (02) 6125 7945 Email:
Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au
Eleanor Flening (Researcher) Sue Stocklmayer (Supervisor)
Centre for the Public Awareness of Science Centre for the Public Awareness of Science
Building 38a, Australian National University Building 38a, Australian National University
ACT 0200 ACT 0200
Tel: (02) 6125 6149 Tel: (02) 6125 8157
Email: Eleanor.Flening@anu.edu.au Email: Sue.Stocklmayer@anu.edu.au
Signature:
Participant Date
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